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Dedication 
Dear Miami 
Behind these walls 
You can be so self-absorbed 
Behind those eyes, no disguise 
Disguise, no you can't disguise 
Behind this fortress of an address 
Stuck in the passion void 
With a little style full and for a while 
But you can't turn back time 
Dear Miami, you're the first to go 
Disappearing under melting snow 
Each and everyone turn your critical eye 
On the burning sun and try not to cry 
Strictly rolling V.I.P. 
Strictly rolling V.I.P. 
We got it all 
If the empire ever falls 
We got all control, untold power to 
Do what we wanna do 
We got the moves 
But there's nothing left to prove 
There's only stardust memories 
We can make 'em true 
Dear Miami, you're the first to go 
Disappearing under melting snow 
Each and everyone, turn your critical eye 
On the burning sun and try not to cry 
Dear Miami, you're the first to go 
Disappearing under melting snow 
Each and everyone, turn your critical eye 
From the burning sun and try not to cry 
Merry-go-round again 
A carousel 
Passionate raid 
An escapade, adventures eve 
Strictly rolling V.I.P. 
 
Roisin Murphy, 2007 
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1. Topic and Overview of the Thesis 
Mitigating anthropogenic climate change and its disastrous consequences for present and 
future generations belongs to the most important challenges in current world politics. Its 
complexity is unprecedented, as it requires a commitment to radical changes in modern life 
style that still worryingly depends on fossil fuels. In the past decades, globalisation led to a 
massive increase in wealth of the middle class of industrialised countries, the major emerging 
economies, and many developing countries. Paired with a growing population, the demand 
for consumer goods and services increases. In consequence, trade flows, air, ship, and road 
traffic, as well as electricity and land use have massively amplified. All these issues contribute 
to an accumulation of carbon emissions in the global atmosphere, which are harmful because 
they intensify the natural greenhouse effect heating up the planet. 
Albeit a growing awareness for the perils of climate change triggering the use of renewable 
energies, such as solar, wind, or hydropower, carbon emissions are still rising. In addition, 
other greenhouse gases (GHG), such as methane or nitrous oxide aggravate the problem due 
to profound meat consumption and intensive agriculture. Unequal distribution of the causes 
and consequences of global climate change worsen the problem. Today and in the future, the 
ones suffering the most from the negative impacts of climate change are those who are also 
the least responsible, namely the least developed countries and small island states of the 
global South. In these areas, the vulnerability towards climate hazards is high. They are not 
only exposed to droughts, floods, landslides or elevation, extreme weather events, or sea level 
rise, but at the same time, they are less capable of coping with these risks. The consequences 
are more conflicts over scarce resources like water, malnutrition due to droughts, and a loss 
of livelihood in flood-prone areas to name only some of the numerous consequences. 
Eventually, humankind will have to face augmented migration flows from the South to the 
North, raising important questions about social equity (Roberts and Parks 2009). 
While to a certain extent climate change is ‘unequivocal’ (IPCC 2007, 72) and the 
adaptation to its impacts is inevitably a crucial task, the international community must 
increase efforts to mitigate climate change in order to reduce adaptation pressures to a 
minimum. However, finding an effective modus operandi is certainly no less intricate than the 
problem itself. Climate change mitigation policy must find effective mechanisms to incentivise 
consumption and production behaviours less harmful to climate, hence to emit less GHGs. 
The issue is multifaceted due to the wide spectrum of target groups that range from 
individual to multinational corporations or local, sub-national, and even national 
12 
governments. It is also cross sectoral in nature, as the mitigation of harmful GHGs requires 
action in policy domains as diverse as industry, business, traffic, agriculture, or spatial 
planning. In many instances, the interests of these sectors clash when measures to protect 
the climate contrast with traditional sectoral necessities.  
Not surprisingly, the history of the evolution of the United Nations (UN) climate regime is 
delicate. Although the international community has been negotiating for already more than 
two decades over an effective agreement to collectively mitigate climate change in the scope 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the willingness of 
many countries, in particular the major emitters, to commit themselves to effective emission 
reduction targets is poor. The discrepancies arising from different national circumstances and 
deviant opinions about the distribution of responsibilities are enormous. On top of this, 
missing sanction mechanisms incentivise free-riding behaviour, as the implementation of 
mitigation policies is costly when others do not comply. The lack of an international authority 
equipped with enough power to implement and enforce emission reductions makes national 
governments to the protagonists in combating climate change. Therefore, research must 
contribute to an improved understanding of the conditions under which countries are willing 
and able to coordinate their mitigation actions and to adopt national policies. In this context, 
this thesis asks two main research questions: 
1. Under which conditions do national governments engage in cooperative, international 
interactions to coordinate their climate change mitigation policies? 
2. What international and domestic factors contribute or hinder the adoption of climate 
change mitigation policies by national governments? 
The focus on these two questions shall not downplay the myriad of other actors involved 
in this process, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGO), non-governmental 
organisations (NGO), transnational networks, like the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, 
transnational corporations, science, or sub-national and local governments. These are all 
highly relevant as current developments in the Unites States illustrate, again. State 
governments and companies have publicly announced to take climate change mitigation 
action despite the plans of the administration under President Trump to withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement.  
A whole body of research is devoted to this multiplicity of actors that emerged along with 
the concept of multi-level governance (MLG, e.g. Bache and Flinders 2004). The common 
denominator here is the argument that environmental (or climate) governance  - once 
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‘dominated by interactions among nation-states’ (Andonova and Mitchell 2010, 256) - has 
been replaced by a fragmented governance system (Biermann et al. 2009) or regime complex 
(Keohane and Victor 2011), where private and sub-national actors play a major role. In this 
vein, manifold studies investigate various aspects of this development. For example, scholars 
study the role of transnational networks (Lidskog and Elander 2010), environmental NGOs, 
business, scientific or epistemic communities, or mass media (Gough and Shackley 2001; 
Schroeder and Lovell 2012). Others, focus on the interplay between actors from different 
levels of governance, like sub-national or local administrations (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; 
Granberg and Elander 2007; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007).  
These developments are undoubtedly important, but will not be stressed in this very thesis. 
It rather emphasises on countries and their national governments. With the Paris Agreement 
of 2015, which is based on the principle of self-determination of national contributions, this 
perspective has again grown in importance, as the success of the agreement depends on the 
enthusiasm of the countries involved and their readiness to implement domestic mitigation 
measures. 
The thesis assumes that climate policy is constrained by both the dynamics of the 
international relations and the policy positions, interests, and characteristics of the involved 
actors at national scale. At the international level, on behalf of their very governments, 
country negotiators drive a hard bargain for national interests at the international climate 
conferences to satisfy domestic pressures. They make emission reduction pledges and 
coordinate actions or strategies with other countries. At national scale, governments and sub-
governments are responsible for the implementation of these pledges or policies. The 
difficulty arises, as climate policy is also a cross-sectional matter that affects actors from many 
policy domains. National governments must, therefore, negotiate with domestic stakeholders 
that pursue competing interests. Hence, national governments are involved in what political 
scientists typically refer to as a ‘two level game’ (Putnam 1988). The connection between the 
international and national arenas of decision-making refers to the concept of the so-called 
‘win-set’. The ‘win-set’ of a country at international scale largely depends on what is politically 
feasible at national scale and how likely an international treaty may be ratified. Having their 
hands tied to the domestic will, negotiators enter international negotiations in a restraint 
fashion.  
So far, empirical studies focusing on climate policy-making at the intersection of the 
international relations and national policy are either cross-sectional (e.g. Broadbent 2010; 
Dolšak 2009; Schreurs 2004; Stein 2008), or if dynamic, entail predominantly analyses of single 
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cases (e.g. Ingold and Pflieger 2016; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). In general, quantitative 
studies of the politics of climate change in a dynamic perspective remain scarce and focus on 
single case studies (Ingold and Fischer 2013) or have a limited focus on the climate negotiation 
process (Castro, Hörnlein, and Michaelowa 2014; Santos and Pacheco 2013). In addition, 
dynamic studies often face a lack of available time series data or provide only very limited 
systematic analyses on the relevant policy processes. This dissertation takes up these 
challenges by combining a dynamic large-N analysis with the in-depth investigation of an 
individual case study. 
The thesis is conceptualised as a cumulative dissertation, which consists of four papers. As 
Figure 1 shows, Paper 1 and 2 concentrate on international relations and the following on 
national politics. Paper 1 responds to the first research question and identifies factors that 
explain the motives for national governments to engage in cooperative interactions to 
coordinate their climate change mitigation actions. The theoretical approach laid out in this 
paper builds on important axioms of theories of the international relations, like reciprocity 
(Goldstein et al. 2001; Keohane 1986) or structural equivalence (Maoz et al. 2006), and 
combines this with an emphasis on country-specific interests (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994), 
like they arise due to individual political, socio-economic, or geographical circumstances. The 
remaining three papers approach the second research question. Paper 2 attempts the 
question from a macro-level perspective. It conducts a large-N analysis to explain general 
patterns that trigger or hinder the adoption of national climate change mitigation policies and 
their diffusion across countries over the past 20 years. In close connection to previous 
empirical and theoretical advances in the policy diffusion literature (e.g. Dolšak 2009; Gilardi 
2012; Mohrenberg 2017), it elaborates on an improved operationalisation of the international 
interdependencies that are an important factor to explain the propagation of policies.  
Paper 3 and Paper 4 are devoted to an in-depth analysis of a single case to assess 
paradigmatically factors that influence the formulation and implementation of national 
climate change mitigation policies in an ever-changing international environment. I selected 
Switzerland as case study, because Switzerland is highly dependent on international markets, 
policies, and other critical political developments. At the same time, this country is highly 
vulnerable to climate change, due to its Alpine geography. Therefore, its climate policy is 
formulated closely considering international developments. The Federal Act on the reduction 
of CO2-emissions (CO2-Act) is the centrepiece of Swiss climate change mitigation policy, 
providing its main regulatory framework. In 1999, a first version of the CO2-Act entered into 
force, which was supposed to implement the Kyoto Protocol requirements and targets. In 
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2008, the revision process of the CO2-Act started to set up a new legal basis for the Post-Kyoto 
phase. The aim of the revised act was to formulate new reduction targets for this period and 
to decide on adequate policy instruments. The main purpose of the current revision of the 
CO2-Act that started in 2016 is to translate the international commitments made in the Paris 
Agreement into national law. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Thesis 
 
Previous research on Swiss climate policy focuses on different issues, such as the use and 
non-use of particular policy instruments like the climate cent (Bahn 2001; Ingold 2010) or 
voluntary instruments (Baranzini and Thalmann 2004; Niederberger 2005). These studies have 
made a vital contribution to the apprehension of the decision-making processes and the 
effectiveness of specific policy instruments. Moreover, the work of Ingold and colleagues gave 
valuable insights into the important role of actor constellations and policy networks to 
understand policy choices. They assessed the configuration of advocacy coalitions (Ingold 
2007; 2010; 2011), the patterns of collaboration between and among them (Ingold and 
Fischer 2013; Ingold and Leifeld 2014), and the role of individual political actors in their 
functions as policy brokers, veto players (Ingold and Varone 2011), and policy entrepreneurs 
(Ingold and Christopoulos 2015).  
Both Paper 3 and Paper 4 join this literature and extend it in two fundamental aspects. 
Paper 3 investigates the policy-process to implement and revise the CO2-Act in a very detailed 
fashion. By identifying major protagonists and the prevailing actor constellations, it 
contributes to an increased comprehension of how the interplay between different actors 
affects policy decisions. It uses structural explanations such as the endemic decision-making 
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style or characteristics of a subsystem to explore the conditions under which policy 
innovations are possible. Specifically, it provides a comprehensive portrayal of the 
developments in Switzerland´s climate change mitigation policy-making that also critically 
assesses the recent developments with respect to their political feasibility. Paper 4 elaborates 
on one of the crucial findings of Paper 3, namely the decisive position that interest groups 
occupy in the decision-making process. Specifically, it analyses the patterns according to which 
interest groups formulate their policy positions. In doing so, the analysis tackles a question 
that is usually overlooked. Most policy studies treat policy preference or policy beliefs as given 
and use them to explain collaboration (Ingold and Fischer 2013; Ingold and Leifeld 2014), 
policy change (Henry 2011; Henry et al. 2014), or coalition structures (Ingold 2011; Kukkonen, 
Ylä-Anttila, and Broadbent 2017). In contrast, this research creates a discourse network about 
the revision process of the CO2-Act to explain how interest groups form their preferences as 
a function of fundamental value orientations, sector-specific needs, and the interest of others. 
2. Analytical Framework 
A general assumption of this thesis is that the decision to interact, to adopt a policy, or to 
support or to restrain a specific policy option is relational. Hence, political actors are in general 
assumed to be interdependent. Coordination, cooperation, or conflict – all involves 
interaction. National or sub-national policies are adopted in consideration of the behaviour of 
other authorities. Policy-decisions are not made unilaterally, but in a process, that involves 
the participation of multiple actors at various levels of governance. Also, policy preferences 
are formed and adjusted considering overall societal norms, in accordance to the interest of 
allies, or because of mutual adjustments to find a compromise solution. This relational 
perspective is more and more taken into account in the political sciences literature. In a public 
policy context, usually in the form of policy networks or policy discourse networks and in the 
international relations literature as political networks.  
Numerous scholars have tried ‘organizing the Babylon’ (Börzel 1998) of the policy network 
literature, as yet. In an encompassing meta-analysis of policy network studies, Schneider and 
colleagues (Schneider et al. 2009) identified more than 20 overview articles already in 2007. 
Since then, a number of articles elucidated the research area. Older overview articles typically 
assessed the analytical and theoretical value of the policy network concept beyond mere 
metaphorical or descriptive applications (Börzel 1998; Dowding 1995; Héritier 1993; Pappi 
1993; Thatcher 1998). In contrast, newer summaries explicated its wide scope of applications 
without questioning its explanatory power to the same extend (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Kenis 
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and Raab 2007; Knoke 2011; Schneider et al. 2009). The following section is no re-edition of 
these meta-analyses. More importantly, it serves to locate this dissertation within this 
inscrutable research area. In doing so, it briefly overviews the major strands of the vast 
literature on policy networks and justifies the application of the concept for each of the four 
papers. 
Policy networks: A Janus-faced concept 
The literature on the policy network concepts suggests three main streams. First, 
comparably dated literature uses policy networks to describe government and governance 
styles and actor constellations among the political elites. Whereas some authors develop 
typologies to describe coordination among different actor groups (Coleman and Perl 1999; 
Heclo 1978; Marsh and Rhodes, R. 1992), other researchers, in the tradition of the governance 
literature, use policy networks as metaphor for coordination mechanisms and actor relations 
in modern governments (Dowding 1995; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Mayntz 1993; Pappi 1993; 
Scharpf 1997; Scharpf 2006).  
Second, more recent literature studies and highlights the methodological value-added of 
social network analysis for the comprehension of social and political phenomena. These 
advances encompass technical descriptions of methods (Lubell et al. 2012; Robins, Lewis, and 
Wang 2012) and possible applications in political sciences (Victor et al. 2016).  
Finally, the by far largest body of research uses the policy network concept as an analytical 
framework that can be enriched with hypotheses from different theories by applying tools 
from social network analysis. For example, Lubell et al. (2011) combine belief systems and 
social capital theory to explain the participation in the case of regional planning in California. 
In a similar vein, a community of researchers use hypotheses from the advocacy coalition 
framework to explain the roles of various actors in policy processes by using the network 
analysis tool-box (Fischer et al. 2016; Henry et al. 2014; Ingold and Christopoulos 2015; Ingold 
and Fischer 2013; Ingold, Fischer, and Cairney 2016; Ingold and Leifeld 2014; Kukkonen, Ylä-
Anttila, and Broadbent 2017; Varone et al. 2017). Related literature that is in the tradition of 
the Lauman and Knokes ‘Organisational State’ (1987) studies the role of political interest 
groups through the lens of policy networks (for an overview compare Heaney and Strickland 
2016). These studies address questions of interest group formation (Hadden 2015; Heaney 
2006; Padgett and Powell 2012), development and identity formation (e.g. Browne 1990; 
Engel 2007; Halpin and Daugbjerg 2014; Heaney 2004), patterns and prerequisites of 
collaboration (Carpenter 2010; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Leifeld and Schneider 2012), and 
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their general influence in the democratic process (Baumgartner, 2009; Varone et al., 2017). 
To conclude this list of applications of the policy network concept, the emerging literature on 
discourse networks must be mentioned. Akin to the ‘argumentative turn’ (Fischer and 
Forester 1993) in the policy analysis literature, discourse network analysis (Leifeld 2009; 2016; 
Singer 1993) has evolved and long with it a number of interesting contributions (Anttila and 
Kukkonen 2014; Fisher, Leifeld, and Iwaki 2013; Fisher, Waggle, and Leifeld 2012; Kukkonen, 
Ylä-Anttila, and Broadbent 2017; Leifeld 2013). With respect to climate change politics, the 
international research project COMPON (Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks, 
http://compon.org/) needs to be named that conducts both media discourse and policy 
network analyses in 19 countries.  
The use of political networks in international relations literature gained momentum in the 
early 2000s. Current applications utilise social network analysis to test core hypotheses 
related to interstate conflict and cooperation (Corbetta 2013; Corbetta and Grant 2012; 
Dorussen and Ward 2010). Other advances exploit concepts of the network theory to explain 
typical phenomena in the international relations, such as homophily and preferential 
attachment (Maoz 2012), centrality (Maoz et al. 2004), or structural equivalence (Maoz et al. 
2006). In addition, the network approach is applied to the exploration of effectiveness of 
environmental regimes (Grundig and Ward 2013; Ward 2006), to compare cooperation 
patterns in international regimes (Grundig 2006), or focus on the role of international 
organisations in the evolution of international conflict (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 
2006). Finally, a small number studies focuses on international climate politics. For example, 
Compston (2009) uses policy networks as analytical framework to develop a theory of 
resource exchange in climate policy. In contrast, von Stein (2008) uses network centrality 
statistics to explain the ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 
The Network Approach in this Thesis 
This thesis uses the network approach both as analytical framework and as method. This 
approach is affiliated to modern theoretical perceptions that understand policy-making as a 
processes of interdependent interactions, in contrast to treating its components as 
autonomous entities (Lubell et al. 2012). Network analysis is advantageous in particular for 
empirical studies on relational observations, since it allows for dependencies between the 
observations. In contrast, in traditional linear regression models the observations need to be 
independent. This core assumption of regression analysis raises a question for empirical 
analyses in political sciences, public policy, or international relations as many political events 
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are in fact relational, but treated as if they were independent. Often interdependencies are 
included by controlling for relations between the observations (e.g. spatial proximity, common 
membership in an institution, number of meetings per year etc.). Nevertheless, if appropriate 
network data is available, it is usually advisable to rely on network models that can deal with 
dependencies between the observations. In addition, by introducing so-called network 
statistics one is able to infer behavioural patterns from the network structure, for example, 
the propensity of actors to form clusters, to connect to popular individuals, to tie to actors 
with similar characteristics, or to adapt the own behaviour in accordance to actors with similar 
characteristics. 
Figure 2 shows that policy networks structures are located between the macro-level of 
institutional arrangements, such as rules, norms, procedures, or the code of conduct in a 
policy domain and micro-level of the individual political actor. In this context, two crucial 
distinctions have to be made: is the focus on social selection or social influence (or both), and 
is the network treated as a dependent or independent variable. First, in social selection 
models the tie or tie formation (relation) is the main dependent variable, which is explained 
by the characteristics of the actors and by the structure of the relations in a network. 
Figure 2: Policy networks as Meso-level Concept 
Source: Lubell et al. 2012, p. 354 
 
Paper 1 and 4 are in line with this approach. Paper 1 draws on policy preferences and 
country-specific characteristics (micro-level), such as the GDP, natural rents, institutional 
factors, and vulnerability to explain the motivation to engage in international, cooperative 
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interactions. In addition, present events are assessed based on the structure of the past events 
to derive behavioural patterns, such as inertia, reciprocity, structural balance, or structural 
equivalence. Paper 4 studies why interest groups support specific policy preferences. In doing 
so, it regards the connection between an interest group and policy statements made in the 
context of a policy debate as a tie in a discourse network. Applying an inferential network 
model allows to investigate this question by using the structure of the policy debate and 
characteristics of the interest groups as explanations for how policy preferences are formed. 
Secondly, in social influence models the main dependent variable is a specific characteristic or 
behaviour of a social actor that is explained by the characteristics of the actor or other actors, 
and the existing ties in the network. Paper 2 studies the climate policy adoption behaviour of 
national governments. The adoption behaviour of other countries are used as an explanatory 
variable next to national characteristics. Hence, both social selection and social influence 
models combine actor-specific and structural characteristics of the observed relations in a 
single model. Finally, the network structure can also be used as an independent variable to 
explain policy output. In Paper 3, the climate policy subsystem in Switzerland is 
operationalised as a network to inform about changing actor configurations, for example 
whether power is in the hands many or few and on the innovation potential in the policy 
subsystem.  
3. Contribution  
The contribution of this thesis is threefold: it presents three data sets for relational data 
on political processes and analyses them with innovative methods, puts forward a valuable 
theoretical advancement by pointing to future research areas, and provides a number of 
interesting practical implications. 
Data & Methods 
Political science is often about relations – a network perspective on international relations, 
domestic politics, or public policy-making is therefore often the best way to approach research 
questions. But, how to collect appropriate data? The majority of research that uses social 
networks relies on the survey method (e.g. Berardo and Scholz 2010; Ingold and Fischer 2013; 
Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila, and Broadbent 2017). Participants of a social network are a priori pre-
determined and then asked with whom they share a specific relation, such as collaboration or 
conflict, resource or information exchange, asking for advice, and others. This approach has a 
number of drawbacks depending on how well the network survey was constructed (Henry, 
Lubell, and McCoy 2012). The initial problem arises with the pre-selection of actors, which 
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depends on the awareness and attitude of the researcher. As a result, important actors might 
be missing in the network data set. Furthermore, self-reported perceptions about the ties can 
be inaccurate or incomplete. For example, the comprehension of the nature or strength of 
the relation may vary among the survey participants. While one actor considers a relationship 
collaborative, the other actor might perceive it as a mere exchange of information. Whom 
shall we count on? On top, many network surveys are incomplete due to a lack of severity 
among the participants. All these issues lead to a biased representation of the network 
relations.  
Similarly, it is complicated or sometimes even impossible to reconstruct historical 
processes in a survey situation, as this requires conducting a continuation of surveys to follow 
up. This is not always possible. In some cases, the researcher might not be interested in the 
topic anymore; in other cases, the respondents are not willing to participate in a similar survey 
again. In the latter case, a sequent survey may differ with respect to the coverage of the 
respondents, what makes a comparison difficult. Conducting a survey can be time consuming 
and costly in particular in large-scale settings. For example, constructing a survey about the 
relations between intergovernmental organizations may require the researcher to travel to 
headquarters and arrange interviews to ensure an acceptable response rate.  
Finally, surveys are difficult to replicate, as survey responses also depend on the individuals 
filling in the questionnaires. These individuals may also change their opinions over time. In 
consequence, studies based on network surveys are usually limited in scope and mostly focus 
on small-scale policy processes at the national, sub-national, or local level mostly at a single 
point in time. 
This thesis counts on an alternative approach to collect network data, based on document 
analysis, like official documents or press releases. Relying on documents allows reconstructing 
historical data that do not depend on response rates. It improves the replicability, ensures 
that answers are independent from the individual respondent and it is comparably cheap and 
time efficient. Nevertheless, one should be aware of some problems, too. The network data 
may be biased by the coding scheme applied. Based on their knowledge or theoretical 
orientation researches may come up with different coding frameworks leading to different 
data sets on the same relations. Even if the coding is done based on the same coding 
framework, issues of intra or inter coder reliability may arise. Also, the choice of the data 
sources can lead to biases in the network data, in particular if their selection is unilateral. 
However, the main advantage of this data collection approach is the possibility to collect large-
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scale data sets and to reconstruct historical developments. These advantages are the main 
reason for this thesis to use network data based on document analysis. 
I created three different data sets. The first data set was developed in close collaboration 
with Christian Hirschi. He collected the first version of the POLCLIMATE event data set (Hirschi 
2008), which was then elaborated on in the scope of this thesis. To code the network data, we 
relied on press releases issued by the Agence France Press (AFP) media wire service. The 
coding was done automatically using the software TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented 
Replacement Instructions  Schrodt 2011). After several rounds in which the software had to 
be trained to recognise important actors or common verbal expressions used in a policy 
domain, the coding of an extensive amount of text is done in only a few minutes. The coding 
framework is based on the CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observation, Schrodt 2012) 
cooperation and conflict scheme, which was created to analyse violent, international conflicts. 
In consequence, the challenge was to adapt the coding scheme to the purpose of international 
climate policy. The data set captures conflictive and cooperative events related to the 
international climate change mitigation policy between 1995 and 2015 and includes a wide 
range of actors, such as national governments, sub-national governments, IGOs, NGOS, media 
actors etc. It also covers a wide array of different types of cooperative or conflict events. 
Cooperation, as well as conflict often start in a declarative way, for example, by praising or 
criticizing the behaviour of countries, like the release of a new policy, a political reform, or the 
general climate performance. Moreover, cooperation comes about when two countries meet 
to discuss each other’s plans on national climate policy, but it also deals with appealing, 
offering, or providing material cooperation, such as economic and judicial support, exchanging 
information, involving in diplomatic interactions, providing financial or human resources, and 
sharing knowledge. Finally, cooperation involves easing sanctions, solving disputes, mediating, 
and apologising. In contrast, conflictive interactions involve critical comments related to other 
country’s climate policy, denying responsibility, rejecting cooperation or negotiations, 
threatening with or getting involved in substantial conflict. For a more detailed description of 
the data set, the coding framework, the data collection process, and validity issues compare 
Paper 1 and Hirschi (2008). The main asset of the POLCLIMATE data set is its large-scale nature 
both in terms of the time span and the scope of actors considered. In addition, as the data set 
was coded in an automated setup, the coding framework only needs some adjustments to 
extend the time period under investigation. Finally, the coding scheme has the potential to be 
applied to other topics related to international environmental policy. This offers appealing 
opportunities for future research. 
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The extended POLCLIMATE data set was used for Paper 1 and Paper 2. Paper 1 applies a 
Relational Events Model (REM, Lerner et al. 2013). This cutting-edge inferential social network 
model is ideally suited to disentangle explanatory factors of dyadic events, over time. This 
model allows to investigate the dynamic formation of interactions over a period of time. The 
main assumption is that every event depends on the stream of previous evens. These 
dependencies are represented by parameters that reflect patterns in the structure of the 
event sequence (e.g. reciprocity, structural balance, or structural equivalence). Both network 
statistics and actor characteristics are used as independent variables to explain the emergence 
of the next dyadic event. For this analysis, the event data set was restricted to interactions 
between national governments. To this day, and to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
comparable publication that studies this kind of international political interactions related to 
climate policy, covering a period of twenty years.  
Paper 2 studies factors that trigger the adoption of climate policies and their international 
diffusion. Specifically, a temporal network autocorrelation model (Leenders 2002; Leifeld and 
Cranmer 2016) is used to test hypotheses on distinct factors that might lead to the adoption 
of climate change mitigation policies. The event data set on political interactions between 
1995 and 2015 is the foundation for this analysis. Here, the stream of dyadic events was 
divided into four subsequent time phases and restricted to cooperative events, only. 
Transformed in an actor-actor matrix and displayed as social network, the time phases contain 
aggregated information about all cooperative ties between countries in the respective phases. 
In contrast to Paper 1, where the event data set itself, i.e. cooperative interaction was the 
subject of study, in Paper 2 cooperative interaction is used to explain adoption behaviour in a 
network perspective. While the network approach gained importance in the policy diffusion 
literature (e.g. Cao 2010; Mohrenberg 2017), Paper 2 is the first endeavour to study the 
international diffusion of climate change mitigation policies using advanced methods of social 
network analysis. In contrast, previous studies in climate policy diffusion applied event history 
analysis and included country interdependencies by controlling for spatial proximity (Dolšak 
2009; 2013; Dolšak and Sampson 2011).  
The second data set developed in this thesis is related to the decision-making process 
about the implementation and revision of the Swiss CO2-Act between 2004 and 2013. The 
decision-making processes were systematised using the Actor-Process-Event-Scheme (APES, 
Serdült et al. 2012; Widmer et al. 2008). The APES tool is an interface that links relevant 
political actors to important events in the political processes. Based on a thick description of 
the decision-making process as reported in official documents actors are linked to political 
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events in which they commonly participate by manual coding. Examples of such political 
events are expert committees, parliamentary debates, consultations, decisions, statements, 
and so on. Therefore, single actors receive a different status within the policy process 
depending on how often and in which events they have participated. This allows investigating 
single stages of the climate policy formulation process and the role of specific actors therein. 
The APES tool helps to systematize this large amount of qualitative data and enables a 
quantitative analysis by clearly identifying the actor participating in a political event. This 
information is now displayed in a two-mode matrix, which can be transformed into policy 
network data (Widmer et al. 2008). The policy networks can be investigated with the help of 
tools and methods of social network analysis. The interpretation of the results is then enriched 
with detailed qualitative data. For more information, consult Paper 3. The advantages of this 
data collection method are the possibility to display policy processes over time and to combine 
quantitative methods with an in-depth qualitative investigation of the relevant processes and 
actors.  
The final data set displays policy preferences of interest groups about the main issues 
discussed in the context of the revision of the CO2-Act in a discourse network. By coding the 
2009 public consultation about the revision of the CO2-Act, a discourse network analysis is 
created to study policy positions of interest groups. So, what is the use of being concerned 
with discourse networks among interest groups? A policy discourse is defined as what political 
actors express to one another, or the public, in the process of formulating, implementing, and 
legitimating public policies. They encompass ‘both a set of policy ideas and values and an 
interactive process of policy construction and communication’ (Fisher, Leifeld, and Iwaki 
2013). Accordingly, analysing policy discourses provides a deepened understanding of why 
specific policy decisions are made. In addition, policy debates or discourses are often decisive 
for political outcomes, as they predispose topics on the political agenda and the perception 
and evaluation of options by the public and political elites. (Leifeld 2016). The data set was 
coded using the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) tool developed by Philip Leifeld (Leifeld 
2012). This software tool systematises hand-coded information about actors supporting or 
opposing policy statements and provides export facilities to create network data. Compare 
Paper 4 for more detail on the coding process. 
Discourse network analysis (Leifeld 2009) obtains the rich analytical tool box from social 
network analysis. It examines political actors and their statements in a relational perspective. 
This does justice to the necessarily relational nature of policy discourses or debates. Instead 
of treating the reasons for why an actor takes on a certain position towards a policy as isolated 
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from other´s opinions and the discourse dynamics itself, discourse network analysis allows to 
include all possible explanatory factors in one approach ranging from actor characteristics to 
explanations grounded in the structure of the discourse. The latter are essentially issues of 
policy framing (clustering of policy issues) or policy coalitions (clustering of policy actors). 
To test the outlined hypotheses on the drivers of interest group alignment in the climate 
policy discourse, an exponential random graph model (ERGM) for two-mode networks was set 
up (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013). ERGMs render the process of network tie formation 
(here the link between an interest group and a policy statement). In general, ERGMs ‘have the 
explicit aim to relax the assumption of independence between network tie-variables and to 
incorporate possible dependencies among tie variables’ (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013, 
53). While the discourse network approach has been applied in a number of studies using 
descriptive methods, this approach for identifying the factors that influence the adoption of 
policy preferences and how they are interlinked is unique, so far.  
Main Results and Theoretical Advances 
The results for the first research question define the conditions under which national 
governments interact to coordinate their activities to mitigate global climate change. The 
research conducted in Paper 1 emphasises on bi- or multilateral political interactions that 
emerge on a daily basis beyond or in preparation of the yearly “Conferences of the Parties” 
(COP) under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. A key assumption is that the coordination of 
national climate protection measures or bargaining positions does not primarily occur in the 
closed setting of the climate conferences. It is a long-term diplomatic process that involves a 
gradual harmonisation of national policies culminating in the annual summits. Studying and 
understanding these processes is important, because the success of the climate conferences 
predominantly depends on the willingness of countries to negotiate. The more substantial 
“work” (e.g. settling disputes) is done beyond the COPs; their outputs are expected to be more 
effective. Often, the responsible presidency of a specific COP initiates this preparatory work. 
For example, France, among others did an impressive job prior to the Paris summit in 2015, 
by uniting the United States and China. This essentially contributed to the successful adoption 
of the Paris Agreement in 2015 (Brun 2016). 
The results confirm and extend major axioms in the international relations literature. The 
analysis of the dyadic interactions of the past two decades has shown that cooperation ensues 
more often when countries disagree over important principles, policy objectives, or 
implementation procedures. Hence, cooperation arises from discord, not harmony (Keohane 
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1984). When countries are in harmony with respect to their policy preferences no adjustment 
of policies is necessary. Vice versa, when countries disagree over important aspects, they must 
coordinate their policies, thus they must cooperate.  
Nevertheless, the need to cooperate in order to overcome disagreements does not suffice 
to ensure cooperation in an environment of insecurity about other country’s behaviour. 
Climate change is a typical problem of shared resources, where free riding is omnipresent. 
Also, missing sanction systems in the UNFCCC framework increase the dilemma. In 
consequence, countries need trust in other countries to comply. Trustful relationships among 
countries prosper over time in the light of positive experiences and mutuality. Conversely, tit-
for-tat strategies often escalate in international conflicts. Therefore, reciprocity is one the core 
concepts discussed in many international relations theories (Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1986; 
Larson 1988). The findings of this thesis invigorate the importance of reciprocity in 
international climate politics. National governments show an increased likelihood to engage 
in cooperative events, when they share a history of mutuality.  
In addition, the results highlight on structural equivalence, another important concept 
deliberated by the international relations literature (Burt 1982; Hafner-Burton and 
Montgomery 2006; Maoz et al. 2006). Two social actors are said to be structural equivalent if 
they exhibit similar or equal patterns of relations to other actors. The structural equivalence 
theory of international conflicts predicts that two countries with shared allies and opponents 
share, ceteris paribus, similar conflicts. Indeed, in the climate context, national governments 
seem to erect their cooperative relations primarily to countries that are structurally similar, 
i.e. to countries that cooperate or fight in a comparable manner. This points to the tendency 
of countries to organise themselves in homophile structural blocks with an increased 
propensity to coordinate policies and positions within them and a decreased likelihood to 
coordinate with actors outside their own block. 
However, the analysis reveals major changes in the behavioural patterns, over time. The 
Copenhagen climate summit of 2009 was a turning point in the international climate 
negotiations and abruptly ended a phase of intense international interest in the climate 
change problem. The conference was the final stage of two years of negotiations towards a 
follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which defined legally-binding GHG 
emission reduction targets for industrialised countries (Annex I countries) to be reached by 
2012, but did not contain comparable obligations for developing countries (non-Annex I 
countries). Instead of producing a convincing strategy and new binding targets for the next 
commitment period starting in 2013, ‘insurmountable discrepancies of interests between 
27 
negotiation partners’ (Blühdorn 2012, 12) were revealed. Controversies arose over the 
responsibility of emerging economies to reduce their swelling carbon emissions and the rigid 
divide of the world in Annex I and non-Annex I countries that did not account for the changed 
socio-economic realities. In fact, many industrialised states criticised that emerging 
economies, like Brazil, China, or India, were still classified as non-Annex I parties and refused 
to pledge to any further commitments until these countries would also take up their 
responsibility. In contrast, the majority of the developing world insisted on the industrialised 
world to carry the main burden in terms of cutting down GHG emissions, providing financial 
and technical support to developing countries to adapt to climate impacts, and compensating 
for ensuing losses and damages. Ultimately, the irreconcilable positions climaxed in the 
meagre output of the Copenhagen summit that was at best a modest declaration with the 
intention to take further actions in the future. Nevertheless, 2009 also remarked the begin of 
a new era in the climate negotiations that paved the way for a novel agreement (Brun 2016). 
In the years to come, the international community step-by-step abolished the strict divide as 
introduced by the principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ (CBDR, United 
Nations 1992) and developed new mechanisms related to climate finance, adaptation, 
monitoring, and transparency. The most important innovation is the introduction of the 
principle of self-determination of national contributions. Instead of imposing pre-determined 
reduction targets on a specific group of countries, the Paris Agreement obliges all countries 
to formulate their own contributions.  
These developments are also reflected in the results of this thesis. Prior to Copenhagen, 
national governments more actively interacting with countries that disagreed over the CBDR 
principle. With the iterative disentanglement from the rigid Annex I/ non-Annex I division in 
the aftermath of the Copenhagen summit, implementation issues gained importance. Among 
them measures to ensure the commitment to the international agreement, the design and 
use of flexibility mechanisms, approaches to reduce asymmetries across countries such as 
adaptation aid, finance or loss and damage, or the application of technological solutions to 
mitigate climate change. Now, countries got increasingly involved in cooperative interactions 
after disagreeing over these issues. In addition, the Copenhagen shock was apparently large 
enough to dismantle the tendency to interact with structural equivalent partners. In fact, the 
results indicate that national governments started to progressively cooperate across the 
homophile building blocks that have dominated international climates politics before 2009. 
These findings also speak to a small number of studies that demonstrate the empirical 
applicability of the punctuated equilibrium framework to the empirical enquiry of 
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international regimes (Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf, Thijs 2012). It shows that 
institutional innovations, like the shift from the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol that 
imposed emission cuts to a selection of countries, to the bottom-up approach of the Paris 
Agreement that allows countries to formulate their own pledges, have the power to gradually 
change gridlocked behavioural patterns. This is good news. However, future research must 
keep track with old and new controversies that have the potential to stagnate the 
international process, such as the recent debate on Loss and Damage, as well as new 
arrangements that might lead to the consolidation or institutionalization of conflicts 
hampering the urgently needed progress to combat climate change. This phenomenon is 
discussed in literature in the context to effectiveness regimes (Castro, Hörnlein, and 
Michaelowa 2014). Artificially introduced divisions over core conflicts may lead to a gradual 
deepening of the divide seriously endangering the success of an environmental regime.  
In the context of the second research question, this thesis investigates the conditions, 
under which national governments adopt climate change mitigation policies from three 
different angles. The first perspective explores the role of international interdependencies and 
is therefore closely connected to the above outlined findings. Countries cooperate if they 
disagree over important contestations in order to bring their positions in the international 
climate negotiations in line and to coordinate national climate protection measures. As a 
result, countries that increasingly cooperate are more likely expected to adopt similar policies 
at national level. If governments regularly exchange information about their programs, 
negotiate activities, or settle disputes, they develop trustful relationships in which they exert 
influence on each other through a process of communication and comparison. Even in the 
absence of these close relationships, national governments must consider the policy positions 
and activities of other countries. In a policy domain that is prone of free-riding, ambitious solo 
runs can be costly due to relative losses and competitive disadvantages. Conversely, ambitious 
initiatives from other actors, especially if they are in similar structural positions, may increase 
the social pressure to emulate to social norms, thereby setting an incentive to implement 
policies. 
In this context, Paper 2 promotes a dynamic network analysis of political interaction, using 
a subset of 99 countries (including the European Union) to reveal general patterns connected 
to the adoption and diffusion of national climate change mitigation policies in the past two 
decades. The theoretical argument elaborates on the ‘unified model of government 
innovation’ (Berry and Berry 2014) that includes internal and external determinants to explain 
the adoption of national policies. Internal determinants include the intrinsic motivation of a 
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country to adopt mitigation policies, the available resources or the capability of a country to 
adopt respective measures, or the existence of other related policies. External determinants 
determine the relationships to other countries. In many diffusion studies, these factors are 
operationalised through variables like spatial proximity, the membership in an international 
organisation, trade relations, and so forth. Only recently, a small number of studies started to 
explain diffusion processes by using the social network perspective. The analysis conducted in 
Paper 2, however, is the first approach that uses political interactions as a proxy for 
interdependencies in the climate policy realm and therefore provides an improved and more 
accurate operationalisation of interdependencies, compared to previous studies. The biggest 
advantage of this approach is that it accounts for changing political circumstance, as 
interactions between countries evolve over time. The interdependencies can be 
operationalised in different ways, for example as direct relations, indirect relations, time-
lagged variables that capture past relations, or structural equivalence. The results underline 
this consideration. Internal determinants and time-invariant external factors explain the 
adoption of climate policies on a purely general level. In the dynamic perspective, they lose 
their explanatory power. Due to specific national circumstances, some countries are more or 
less incentivised to implement climate protection measures. Examples for national 
characteristics that affect the likelihood of a country to adopt climate policies are prevailing 
the energy mix of a country, its vulnerability towards climate change, or the strength of 
environmental organisations. However, these internal factors, as long as they do not change 
over time, cannot explain the changes in the policy adoption behaviour of a country, over 
time. In addition, the diffusion of policies is a relational process, for an accurate understanding 
of which both the time and network perspective is needed. The propensity for a country to 
adopt climate change mitigation policies rises, if it repeatedly engages in cooperative 
interactions with, or is structural equivalent to, a country that has implemented comparable 
policies.  
The second perspective focuses on the conditions under which national governments 
adopt climate change mitigation polices at national scale. For this purpose, Paper 3 conducts 
an in-depth case study of Switzerland’s climate change mitigation policy by reconstructing and 
analysing the decision-making process related to the implementation and revision of the CO2-
Act between 2004 and 2013 with focus on the carbon levy on combustibles and motor fuels. 
In doing so, this paper contributes to the important, puzzling, and so far, open question of 
why it was possible to introduce a carbon tax on combustibles, already a decade ago, whereas 
the carbon levy on motor fuels continues to be unsuccessful. On a more theoretical level, it 
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discusses under which circumstances policies are feasible and investigates the likelihood for 
policy innovations in dependence of the prevailing actor constellations. 
A two-step approach, that combines a qualitative case study analysis with a quantitative 
policy network analysis, showed what political actors have been influential in the different 
stages of the decision-making process and how this has changed over time. The main 
theoretical argument is that both the decision-making style and policy subsystem structures 
significantly determine the policy instruments selected (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Fischer 2014; 
Howlett 2002; 2007). The analysis is based on a ‘thick description’ (Serdült et al. 2012) of two 
important phases in the evolution of the CO2-Act. The implementation phase between 2004 
and 2008 and the revision phase between 2008 and 2013. In both phases, a carbon tax on 
motor fuels was almost introduced. Both times, it was prevented due to lobbying by the 
business and energy. 
The first step of the analysis dealt with the decision-making process in a longitudinal 
perspective. It explored which actors were involved in what stages and for what purpose. The 
results show that the involvement of many actors in the decision-making process prompts 
compromise solutions, as manifold interests must be balanced out. This is typical for policy 
environments that are characterised by low complexity, yet high constraints (Howlett 2007). 
The analysis illustrates that this was the case for Swiss climate policy during the time under 
investigation. The complexity was low, as the problem was already defined and well known. 
The key parameters of Swiss climate policy were already set by the international 
developments in the context of the UNFCCC, but also by the CO2-Act that determined policy 
objectives and policy instruments. The revised act of the CO2-Act between 2008 and 2013 was 
influenced by international developments to a much lesser extent. During this time, the 
pressure softened, as there was no treaty that had to be implemented in national policies. It 
was very interesting that despite the clear-cut boundaries during the implementation of the 
first act, a much more innovative policy output could be observed. In fact, with the climate 
cent, the oil association very creatively circumvented the introduction of a carbon levy on 
motor fuels before it even went into the parliamentary process. Conversely, during the 
revision, the carbon levy almost made it to the final version of the new act if economiesuisse 
had not threatened with a referendum that endangered the new act, altogether.  
The second step of the analysis is devoted to this puzzle. It explains the different innovation 
potential prevalent in the two phases by changes in the structure of the climate policy 
subsystem over time. During the implementation phase between 2004 and 2008, many actors 
from different levels were active in the climate policy subsystem. The network indicators, such 
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as the density of the network (i.e. the numbers of ties in relation to the number of possible 
ties), centralisation (i.e. the overall trend of a network to be star-shaped or fully connected), 
centrality statistics (i.e.  the importance of single actors) indicated that the power structure 
was rather fragmented across various types of political actors (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 
2013). This increases the innovation potential in the policy subsystem, as more ideas from a 
greater number of actors have a realistic chance to get on the political agenda. For the revision 
phase between 2008 and 2013, the selected network indicators point to a more centralised 
power structure with a small number of actors, mainly from the administration and the 
business sector. Accordingly, the innovation potential should be lower. The empirical findings 
support this. In fact, while a real policy innovation prevailed with the climate cent, the revised 
version of the act did not comprise any real novelties. It was just about a continuation of the 
first version of the act, with intensified reduction targets. It sustained the carbon levy on 
combustibles and replaced the levy on fuels with a compensation mechanism on oil imports, 
a policy instrument that was already envisaged ahead.  
Paper 3 develops an innovative analytical framework for investigating the link between 
structural components, i.e. power structures in a policy subsystem, decision-making styles, 
and the policy output. The framework combines a qualitative description and examination of 
two important policy processes related to the formulation and implementation of Swiss 
climate policy over a decade. This provided insight into details of the decision-making process, 
which would not have been possible through just a quantitative analysis. Combining it with a 
quantitative analysis of actor and policy preference structure prevented it from getting lost in 
myriads of details and lose track of the essentials. Hence, the utilised mixed methods approach 
benefits from the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative tools. Finally, Paper 3 
belongs to a small group of policy analyses that use the network structure as independent 
variable to explain policy change (Bresser and O'Toole 2005; Fischer 2014; Sandström and 
Carlsson 2008; van Beuren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003). 
Finally, the limelight is on a crucial important actors group. Interest groups are not only 
important actors in Swiss politics (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008), but especially in climate policy  
(Ingold 2011; Ingold and Christopoulos 2015). In contrast to weaker parties in Switzerland, 
interest groups are more coherently structured and well appointed with financial resources 
and personnel. As Paper 3 shows, they played a key role in the legislative process, particularly 
in the pre-parliamentary phase, and during policy implementation. They decisively influenced 
the policy output by advocating for their specific interests. Therefore, it does matter, how they 
position themselves in the context of policy-making.  
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The results display that if we examine a general level of the policy debate (i.e. general 
positions related to the ambitiousness of climate policy and the preferred policy instruments); 
interest groups align with the traditional left versus right cleavage. This is backed by other 
studies, which find that interest groups tend to align with party politics and the respective 
political cleavages (Bruycker and Beyers 2015; Klüver 2012; Lowery et al. 2015). Whereas 
business interests align with conservative, Christian-Democratic, and liberal parties, non-
governmental organizations (NGO) align with left, social-democratic, and green parties. 
However, the results indicate that the rightist side of the cleavage is comprehensively split 
over the climate policy issue. In particular, more progressive business groups and energy 
organisations with focus on renewable energies tend to support a more ambitious climate 
policy. These actors tend to adopt more middle ground positions and are therefore possible 
policy brokers. In addition, this paper highlights the importance of a further cleavage between 
the winners and losers of globalisation that seems to be important for the alignment of 
interest groups in relation to climate policy (Kriesi et al. 2006). However, the analysis also 
shows that a perspective that merely focuses on political cleavages has limitations. In contrast, 
on the more detailed and technical level of the policy debate, interest groups position 
themselves more towards the needs of their policy niches and follow opinion leaders. While 
it is reasonable to formulate general policy positions along fundamental value orientations, 
more information is required on the detailed and technical level of a policy. Acquiring this 
information is costly and requires resources. As interest groups are unevenly appointed with 
resources they can afford advocating for their policy positions, many less inclined groups will 
adopt the policy positions of others that are more involved in the policy-making process. 
Policy Implications 
The empirical and theoretical findings of Paper 1 and 2 underline the importance of the 
international climate regime of the United Nations. Despite the many-voiced critique on the 
UNFCCC and its related institutions, agreements, and the negotiations process, it sets an 
institutional framework where countries regularly meet and are forced to interact. We have 
seen in Paper 1, that iteration and reciprocity strengthen cooperation over time and that 
cooperation is necessary to coordinate climate policies. In addition, Paper 2 demonstrates 
that countries implement more national climate policies if they cooperate with other 
countries that too adopt climate protection measures. This argument is very similar to the 
reciprocity finding from Paper 1. If a country learns that other countries comply with the 
international climate protection regime, they are more likely to comply themselves. Repeated 
and reciprocated interaction between countries reduces free-riding behaviour, due to the 
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increased social control in the absence of powerful sanction mechanisms. Also, the 
international process creates awareness of the climate problem among governments and the 
general public. It is, therefore, increasingly difficult to diminish. In this process of continuous 
interaction, countries also compare with each other to understand what they do in terms of 
climate policy, especially when they share similar backgrounds. Moreover, direct interactions 
create a channel for communication and policy learning. The international climate regime 
facilitates all these processes by creating a common forum for regular meetings and 
negotiations, dealing with disputes, exchanging information, and so on. Therefore, even if 
climate negotiations fail to deliver effective agreements, they create a forum that fosters 
cooperation among countries and increases the likelihood for the adoption of climate policies. 
In this context, the presidency of the COP has a special responsibility to unite conflictive 
parties and solve conflicts prior to the summits. 
Paper 3 shows that introducing a carbon levy on fuels was and is politically not feasible in 
Switzerland, due to the powerful interest groups in the climate policy subsystem. Business, 
energy, and traffic organizations that represent a large share of the electorate, are among the 
most active and prominent actors in both policy processes at hand. In contrast, the industry 
that is the most affected target group of the carbon levy on combustibles, is less active in the 
policy process. The industry lobby is less appointed with human resources, which is the main 
factor for successful lobbying. In addition, they are not backed up by the electorate in a direct 
way, but are often considered evil by the general public. The lack of resources probably 
explains the late reaction by industry representatives in the implementation phase. Whereas 
the climate cent for petrol and diesel was already discussed in 2005, the federal government 
considered a carbon levy, the climate cent was only discussed when the governmental 
proposal was already in parliament. The lack of support by the electorate rendered the 
politicians to be less scrupulous towards punishing the industry by introducing a carbon levy 
on fuels. This also calmed down the green and left side of the political spectrum.  
Paper 4 supports this by highlighting the important role of opinion leaders in the decision-
making process related to the revision of the CO2-Act. It argues that on a general level interest 
groups adopt policy positions that best reflect their fundamental value orientations along 
important political cleavages. On the level of technicalities however, they choose positions 
that best represent their policy niches, and that are in line with the preferences of related 
interest groups and opinion leaders. In consequence, Swiss climate policy is essentially the 
result of a political controversy between leading interest groups. Formulating policies that 
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ignore these realities will unequivocally lead to the same results: an ambitious policy proposal 
will be downgraded until it does justice to all individual interests. 
The results of Part 2 have significant implications for future climate policy in Switzerland. 
Assessing two past policy processes confirmed the limited political feasibility of a carbon tax 
on motor fuels and the vital role of several interest groups. As the political landscape has not 
significantly changed, I expect that future policy processes in the realm of climate policy will 
face similar constraints. Anecdotal evidence from several representatives from important 
target groups point to strong lobbying to prevent a more ambitious climate policy in the 
future. Two very recent developments underline this assumption.  
First, in the context of introducing a new strategy on Swiss energy policy, it was discussed 
to meticulously integrate climate and energy policy concerns (FFA and UVEK 2015). The core 
concept of the energy strategy was the so-called climate and energy steering system to 
replace existing subsidy and funding programs by a levy on electricity, emissions from 
combustibles and motor fuels. However, similar to the preceding policy processes an 
overwhelming majority of stakeholders supported the levy on electricity and emissions from 
combustibles, but rejected the levy on motor fuels. Interestingly, even the left and green 
parties rejected the steering system, arguing that the existing mechanisms are already suitably 
sufficient. Secondly, a further revision of the CO2- Act is necessary to implement the 
requirements of the Paris Agreement. Accordingly, in 2016 a public consultation was held on 
three topics: the ratification of the Paris Agreement, the integration in the EU emissions 
trading scheme, and the revision of the CO2-Act. Related to the latter, the introduction of a 
CO2 levy on motor fuels was discussed, again. Although the summary report of the 
consultation is not yet released, it is very likely that it will comprise many critical views 
concerning the levy on motor fuels echoing the past 30 years of decision-making on this issue.  
The analysis of Swiss climate politics illustrates in a convincing way that eco-taxes are not 
always the most efficient and effective solution to environmental problems, if they are not 
backed by the lion part of the society. As stated in Paper 3, policy instruments are not like an 
‘arrow in a quiver (…) awaiting selection and application at appropriate strategic moments by 
public officials’ (Bresser and O'Toole 2005, 132). Rather, their effectiveness depends on the 
social, political, economic, and institutional context of their application and so should their 
selection. A careful recognition of the political context can increase the chance of a successful 
implementation of the policy mix. Put differently, good policy design needs careful analysis of 
the political aspects of public decision-making. Paying attention to the problem of political 
feasibility includes the identification of important actors, their beliefs and interests, resources 
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and venues of interaction (Meltsner 1972). Therefore, the success and failure of a policy 
depends on the decision-making process, like variances in the decision-making style, and 
factors related to the structure of the policy subsystem, i.e. actor constellations and their 
policy preferences (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
Theoretically, eco-taxes might be the most pragmatic way to reduce emissions in a cost-
efficient way. However, it is politically impossible to introduce them, as it is the case for the 
carbon levy on motor fuels in Switzerland. Continuous attempts of implementation are time-
consuming and frustrating. Investing the time that is lost on the fruitless task of introducing a 
carbon levy on motor fuels is better spent on searching for new options to regulate the traffic 
sector. In consequence, it would be commendable for the Swiss government to start changing 
their strategy by considering other measures to reduce the CO2-emissions, such as programs 
to increase rail traffic and transport, levies and taxes on passenger vehicles, increased road 
tolls, traffic-free zones in cities, and so forth. 
4.  Limitations 
The most important limitation of this thesis are validity issues related to the event data set. 
The POLCLIMATE date set is based on media sources. Media is created by humans. Humans 
are subject to their cultural background, their opinions, their education, and their emotions. 
How specific topics are assessed, described, and selected depends on this very individual 
background. Also, news wire services are embedded in different socio-political environments 
that vary across space and time. What is reported is never fully objective and never reflects 
the whole truth. Surely, this analysis would have profited from an inclusion of different wire 
services across the globe. Besides the bias introduced due to this skewed perspective on the 
political process, the data set must also deal with coding errors. The data set was coded using 
an automatic, computer-based coding system (compare Paper 1). Before the coding system 
can be applied to a massive amount of text, it needs a training period of manual coding. This 
allows for two possible sources of error – the human coder and the software. While we tried 
our best to avoid any coding problems caused by the coder (e.g. fatigue or inadvertence) or 
the software (e.g. misspecification or missing specification of important verbs, actors, or 
terms), some issues can simply not be avoided. For example, some sentence structures are 
too complicated to decode for the content analysis software, in particular if it does not follow 
the standard “subject-verb-object” structure. In consequence, the software will ignore a 
number of interactions. We used lead sentences of new wire reports as data source. While 
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this is in general a good proxy for the political process1, some events might be missed out on, 
as they are only reported in the body text. In sum, event data always only covers a small 
fraction of the events that occur and is therefore never able to deliver a complete social 
network, capturing all relations among all involved actors. So, event data is neither a full, nor 
a random sample (Schrodt, 1994). Nevertheless, event data provides a rich data source for the 
analysis of political behaviour, which goes beyond formal institutional links. Thus, it offers data 
on political processes on which systematic quantitative data is usually not available. 
In addition, the APES data set of Paper 3 faces similar problems as discussed for 
POLCLIMATE data. Even though I considered a wide range of official documents and media 
reports to code the decision-making process, some important events might be missing. 
Especially, processes that took place behind closed doors are almost impossible to access, 
although they would be very crucial. To validate my data, I interviewed several vital insiders 
of the policy process. This helped me to understand if I had covered the most important 
aspects of the policy process. APES data is based on the assumption that being part of the 
same political events is equal to interaction. This of course is an oversimplification of the 
political process, yet a very useful device to encode complex processes.  
In a similar vein, the discourse network data set does not reflect all aspects of the policy 
debate. First, it is only a snapshot, as it is based on the public consultation that captures the 
opinion of stakeholders at one specific time in the process – in this case in 2008. It does not 
mirror the development of the discussion over time. The analysis would have benefited from 
investigating the debate just as several time points. However, this would have been at the 
expense of the level of details and comparability as typically public consultations are one-time 
events in individual decision-making processes. Ultimately, all approaches to study political 
phenomena are based on models that depend on specific assumptions about reality. 
Pondering between the completeness and parsimony is not only accountable to political 
science, but a necessary measure in science in general. 
Another number of important points of critique are related to single aspects in the research 
design of the individual papers. Of course, there is no ‘perfect paper’ and the problems in the 
presented research are possibly numerous and due to limitations of the data, the methods, or 
myself. Nevertheless, I would like to highlight some to me important points that might be 
addressed in the future. To begin with, the analyses in Paper 1 and 2 would have profited by 
                                                            
1Compare Hirschi (2008) for a validity check of the POLCLIMATE date set based on lead sentences and 
full text. 
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disentangling conflict from cooperation in the scope of the regression analysis. For Paper 1, 
the current version of the R-package that implements the relational event model applied for 
the analysis, however, does not allow this. Similarly, the R package used for the temporal 
autocorrelation model, in Paper 2, is not yet designed to assess weighted and valued network 
data.  
Furthermore, the emphasis on mitigation policies in Paper 2 is not without problems. This 
decision was mainly driven by conceptual reasons, as this thesis focuses on climate change 
mitigation. It must be acknowledged here, that adaption is an increasingly important topic 
with climate change, becoming more predominant. In fact, countries with a higher 
vulnerability naturally tend to adopt more adaptation than mitigation policies. This analysis 
possibly underestimates the diffusion processes in climate policy. In addition, we did not 
distinguish between the quality and scope of mitigation policies. This means that all policies 
are treated equally, regardless of them being comprehensive flagship legislation or minor 
regulations that focus on single issues. As a result, the effect of the diffusion processes might 
possibly be biased. It is overrated if countries tend to adopt many small regulations or 
underrated if countries tend to adopt flagship laws.  
Finally, the part of this thesis focusing on Swiss climate policy faces two main restrictions: 
Foremost, it studies only one single case. Therefore, they cannot offer thorough tests in the 
theory, presented. However, an extension to a cross-country comparison of analytical 
frameworks presented, offers presents opportunities for future research in this area. Similarly, 
the research presented in Paper 4 is restricted to one point in time. As discourses evolve over 
time, this analysis only provides a snapshot of what has been discussed and is not suited to 
derive causal mechanisms, but relations between observations. Nevertheless, this research 
might be a valuable start for future research in this area if different policy fields are compared 
or the analysis was extended to a dynamic investigation of policy discourses. 
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I. Old wine in a new bottle? A time-dynamic analysis of country motives 
to mitigate global climate change, by M. Kammerer & C. Hirschi 
Abstract 
This paper studies the motives of national governments to cooperate to mitigate global 
climate change. The new Paris Agreement obliges all countries to cut their carbon emissions, 
but allows them to self-determine their contributions. The effectiveness of the new treaty 
ultimately depends on the readiness of the parties to make reasonable pledges, despite a 
strong incentive to free ride. This analysis grounds on a novel data set on political, 
international events that occurred beyond and in preparation to the yearly climate summits 
between 1995 and 2015. A relational events model is utilized to disentangle the factors that 
have shaped these political processes, over time. Our results show that, in general, 
cooperation best evolves in an environment of trustful long-term relations and serves to 
coordinate activities and positions with respect to critical issues. The shock induced by the 
failure of the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 perforated the institutionalised split 
between developed and developing countries and paved the way for the new treaty. 
Nevertheless, old conflict lines are still visible in the contestations about implementation-
related topics. 
Keywords. Climate change, cooperation, reciprocity, relational events model, dynamic 
network analysis 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies factors that explain the motives for national governments to coordinate 
their actions in the context of international climate politics. This question is important, as the 
new Paris Agreement, decided in 2015, depends more strongly on the disposition of national 
governments to comply. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the new treaty addresses 
all countries, but allows them to self-determine their own contributions. While the majority 
of countries have already made their pledges (to date 162 out of 190), the intended national 
contributions are yet not high enough to reach the common target of limiting the average 
temperature increase to two degrees Celsius. Therefore, countries must increase their 
ambitions, while at the same time they are facing a high motivation to free ride. Countries on 
their own accord have only little incentive to adopt ambitious targets and rigid policies. This 
can be explained by using the metaphor of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). The 
investment in mitigating measures contributes to a common pool resource from which 
nobody can be excluded. In contrast, the costs of these measures are shouldered individually. 
Countries are therefore well aware of possible relative losses and competitive disadvantages 
and try to avoid the implementation of too costly climate change mitigation policies (Hovi, 
Sprinz, & Underdal, 2009). 
In this context, a longstanding conflict arises from the contestation about the distribution 
of responsibility between developing and developed countries. According to the UNFCCC, 
climate change is a matter of ‘common but common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR, 
UNFCCC 1992). The principle says that industrialised countries must carry the main burden for 
the mitigation of climate change, as they are financially and institutionally more capable in 
doing so and have a history with creating most of the CO2 emissions in the atmosphere. 
Developing countries shall do their part, but considering their ‘respective capabilities’ (ibid.). 
Until recently, the principle was interpreted more in lines with the ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ between the industrialised and developing part of the world. The Kyoto 
Protocol institutionalised this divide with the definition of legally binding emission reduction 
obligations for industrialised countries in the Annex I to the protocol (Annex I parties), and no 
comparable commitments for all other countries (non-Annex I parties).  
It took eight years from the adoption of the protocol in 1997 until it eventually came into 
effect in 2005. This reflects the widespread opposition in some Annex I countries. For example, 
the United States, which account for almost a quarter of world’s total emissions, even 
departed from the protocol before it entered into force and Canada withdrew as soon as it 
was obvious that it could not meet its obligations. Over time, the positions became so 
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entrenched, that an appropriate subsequent agreement could not be negotiated2. The 
‘constructed peer group’ hypothesis (Castro, Hörnlein, & Michaelowa, 2014, p. 110) suggests 
that the artificial divide of the world between Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
unintentionally intensified the conflict and is therefore responsible for the failure of the 
climate negotiations. When the Copenhagen conference ended in a ‘disaster’ in 2009 
(Blühdorn, 2012), the international community started to reconsider the Annex I/ non-Annex 
I split and began to negotiate a new agreement. The Paris Agreement, despite its limitations 
(Brun 2016, Obergassel et al. 2015), is the result of this turn in the development of the 
international climate regime. In the light of these new developments, it is interesting and 
important to understand more about the factors that caused this turn in climate history and 
to identify early-on possible stumbling stones that could negatively affect the success of the 
agreement in the future. While the insights of this research are primarily relevant to the 
climate case, important lessons can be drawn for other international regimes.  
This paper lines into the wide field of study on cooperation over global climate change, but 
investigates it from a rather distinct and new perspective. Earlier studies on the matter usually 
focus either on the negotiation process (e.g. Blühdorn, 2012; Gupta, 2010; Michaelowa & 
Michaelowa, 2012), the climate policy performance of the parties to the agreement (e.g Bättig 
& Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013; Dolšak, 2009; Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994), or 
elaborate on theoretical arguments about the quarrels of cooperation in the climate regime 
(Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Grundig, 2009; Hovi & Sprinz, 2006). In addition, a large number 
of studies focus on issues related to social justice and international equity in the climate 
negotiations (Morgan & Waskow, 2013; Roberts & Parks, 2009; Stadelmann & Castro, 2014) 
also regarding the divisions between the North and the South and the formation and position 
of different country groupings (Betzold, Castro, & Weiler, 2012; Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014; 
Hallding, Jürisoo, & Atterdige, 2013). Finally, a literature more in tradition of the multi-level 
governance concept (Bache & Flinders, 2004) studies the role of transnational networks to 
arrange interests and mediate positions of countries and organization (Bulkeley et al., 2014; 
Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2016; Roger, Hale, & Andonova, 2016). 
In contrast, our key argument assumes that the coordination of national climate policies 
or bargaining positions occurs based on a long-term diplomatic process that involves a gradual 
harmonisation of national policies that only culminates in the climate summits. Put differently, 
cooperation evolves in the continuous adjustment of a political actor’s behaviour to the 
                                                            
2 In fact, Kyoto II, which was adopted in 2013 as a follow-up agreement only encompassed about 37 
country that together are responsible for 15% of the emissions. 
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tangible behaviour and the anticipated preferences of others through a process of policy 
coordination (Keohane, 1984; Milner, 1992). The political processes side-lining the 
international negotiations are far less institutionalised, less visible to the public, und also less 
understood. In addition, in these usually more informal settings negotiators and other country 
representatives enjoy a larger scope of action and more flexibility, what increases the 
likelihood for concessions to be made. Therefore, investigating these processes could 
contribute to an increased understanding of regime effectiveness, but at least add an 
important aspect that has been overlooked so far. 
In the next section, the paper advances with a discussion of the main theoretical argument. 
Countries cooperate more likely, if they believe others to cooperate, too (Axelrod, 1984; 
Keohane, 1986; Milner, 1992); thus, cooperation follows a logic of reciprocation. In addition, 
cooperation arises predominantly in situations when countries disagree about important 
aspects of an issue; thus, cooperation follows from discord, not harmony (Keohane, 1984). 
However, the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009 was a shock to the international 
community. This made the departure from the strict divide between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries only possible. Akin to these developments, we expect to see a turn in cooperation 
patterns. We assume that after Copenhagen, the reason to cooperate is not anymore 
primarily the Annex I/ non-Annex I division, but more inclined to technical issues related to 
specific policy objectives and policy instruments to reach a most comprehensive nationally-
determined commitment to the treaty.  
To test our theoretical propositions, we systematised information on political events that 
occurred in the context of international climate change between 1997 and 2015. Our new 
data set reflects a stream of relational political events between pairs of countries, which can 
be understood as a network of dyadic events. Methodologically, we apply a relational events 
model (REM) (Butts, 2008; Lerner, et al. 2013). This provides an innovative way to investigate 
the formation of cooperative relationships over time by including parameters reflecting how 
previous realizations of collaboration structures and actor attributes determine current 
cooperation patterns. The paper concludes with a comprehensive discussion of the results.  
2. Explaining International Cooperation on Climate Change 
The need for policy coordination and cooperation results from countries having diverging 
policy preferences about global climate change. Diverse domestic needs call for mutual 
adjustment of the own behaviour to the tangible behaviour and the anticipated preferences 
of others through a process of policy coordination. This process is commonly understood as 
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political cooperation (Milner, 1992). Hence, cooperation goes beyond ‘reflecting a situation in 
which common interests outweigh conflicting ones’ (Keohane, 1984, p. 12). Surely, countries, 
in the context of the climate negotiations, form coalitions based on common policy 
preferences and cooperate to enforce their positions. However, in climate negotiations 
countries of opposing camps also meet to coordinate their positions and therefore, they 
cooperate. Otherwise, solutions or compromises would never be found.  
For harmonious countries (i.e. those sharing policy preferences or interests), this kind of 
cooperation is not necessary. ‘Cooperation, as compared to harmony, requires active 
attempts to adjust policies [or positions] to meet the demands of others. That is, not only does 
it depend on shared interests, but emerges from a pattern of discord or potential discord. 
Without discord, there would be no cooperation, only harmony’ (Keohane, 1984, p. 12). 
Harmony is when countries’ policies match, so that they facilitate the goals of others without 
having regarded the policy preferences of others in the first place. Cooperation, on the other 
hand, is necessary, when countries’ policies hinder common goals or the goals of others. When 
countries attempt to adjust each other’s goals then it is cooperation. If countries’ policy 
ultimately becomes more compatible, it is successful cooperation. Also, we must distinguish 
between cooperation and common preferences. Cooperation is then the consequence of 
diverging preferences, not from harmony. ‘To summarize more formally, intergovernmental 
cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded 
by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of 
policy coordination’ (Keohane, 1984, p. 51). The existence of cooperation does not imply the 
absence of conflict. Cooperation is, on the contrary, the result of any endeavour to overcome 
conflict. It arises in situations in which actors have contrasting beliefs or interests in an issue.  
We argue that countries cooperate more likely with each other when they have diverging 
interests about important critical issues. In the context of the international climate protection 
regime, many conflicts arose due to the stern divide between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries and the thereof resulting differential treatment (Castro et al., 2014). In the Kyoto 
Protocol, only industrialised countries had legally binding emission reduction obligations, 
which were noted in the Annex I to the protocol, while developing countries did not have any 
obligations. Over time, the economic situation for some countries like China, India, Brazil, and 
South Africa etc. ameliorated what called this artificial and outdated divide between 
developing and developed countries increasingly into question. The dispute about who is 
responsible for the emissions causing climate change, and who is responsible for mitigating 
the emissions hindered for many years to come an agreement on a subsequent treaty to the 
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Kyoto Protocol. After, the so-called ‘Copenhagen disaster’ in 2009 (Blühdorn, 2012), the 
international community started to rethink the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (CDBD) and the approach of legally-binding commitments only for 
industrialized countries. Gradually, a new treaty was negotiated. Eventually, it took until 2015 
to find new compromises on old contestations. Now, instead of forcing developed countries 
top-down to cut their emissions, the new treaty set on bottom-up, self-determined, but still 
legally-binding emission reductions commitments. So, at different points of time, different 
issues were critical. Countries are more likely to cooperate with other countries, when they 
disagree about major issues (e.g. ordering principles, contested policy instruments), as here 
cooperation is necessary to mutually adjust policies and positions to find compromising 
solutions. This pattern changes over time as far as policy issues change, i.e. gain or lose their 
importance. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: Over time, two countries are more likely to cooperate, when they 
disagree about a major point in the design of the international climate regime.  
Hypothesis 1b: Cooperation patterns shift with the change of issues discussed. 
However, cooperation is not only driven by these actor-specific preferences, but also by 
the anticipated cooperative (or conflictive) behaviour of others. As policy coordination is 
costly, and even more so, if it is done unilaterally, the incentive to defer is high. The prisoners` 
dilemma illustrates this problem; and it is often used to explain collective action problems in 
societal phenomena. Two actors decide not to cooperate, although the revenue is highest if 
both cooperate. But, if one of the actors does not cooperate, the other will face high costs. To 
avoid these high costs, it is rational not to cooperate. Hence, the preferred strategy is not to 
cooperate.  
In the case of global warming, international welfare would benefit most from all states 
reducing their emissions. The proportional burden share would reduce for all countries and 
the future costs of climate change related hazards were smaller (IPCC, 2013). Yet, states face 
competitive advantages, if they reduce their emissions unilaterally. Without any binding 
emission reduction obligations that count for all countries and that are sanctioned, the most 
rational thing to do is not to reduce own emissions. In other words, to free ride on other’s 
mitigation action and not to cooperate. Axelrod´s (1984) core explanation of why states still 
cooperate is that interstate cooperation is always based on trust. Trust arises from repeated 
and reciprocated interaction. It is rational to cooperate voluntarily if states interact over a 
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longer period, which is infinite, when the end of the interaction is not known. The idea is that 
the past casts a shadow on the future. Past decisions will ultimately affect future decisions.  
Here, the concept of reciprocity is crucial. In a wide range of literature, reciprocity is 
discussed as one the most important patterns and norms of social interactions and is seen as 
vital for the stability of social systems (Gouldner, 1960). The willingness of political actors to 
cooperate depends on whether they believe that cooperation will be repeated or reciprocated 
and whether this continues indefinitely. Repeated and reciprocated cooperation reduces the 
perils of anarchy and the defection trap of the Prisoner’s dilemma by maximizing absolute 
gains due to increased mutual predictability of behaviour, enhanced information flows, or 
effective sanction mechanisms to punish defection (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1986; Young, 
1989). We therefore argue that countries tend to reciprocate cooperation: 
Hypothesis 2: Over time, countries initiate cooperative interactions more likely towards 
countries that have in turn initiated cooperation with them in the past. 
3. Research Design 
To uncover the pattern of cooperative interactions in international climate change politics, 
we rely on political event data. In general, event data can be used to collect and systematize 
data on political processes in a long-term perspective. It captures ‘who did what to whom’ and 
when (Schrodt & Yonamine, 2012) by breaking down these complex processes into a series of 
single events. Relational event models (Butts, 2008; Lerner, Bussmann, Snijders, & Brandes, 
2013) are ideally suited to analyse this kind of data, as they are designed to model causes and 
effects by sequences of related events. They treat past and future events as interrelated as 
well as past and future decisions of individual actors. They add a social network component 
to the analysis, which is advantageous to traditional regression models that would treat events 
and actors as independent of each other and bias the results. In addition, they are also 
advantageous to other temporal network models, such as stochastic actor-oriented models 
(SAOM) or temporal exponential random graphs models (TERGM), as they allow more 
accurate examination of tie formation processes, because they use the whole sequence of 
events instead of several subsequent snapshots of a network (Malang, Brandenberger, & 
Leifeld, forthcoming). This is important, as different interaction sequences can cause the same 
network snapshot. Thus, using the snapshot for inferences about tie formation over time may 
lead to biased results. In the following subsections, we outline the basic intuition behind REMs 
and provide an overview of the data needed and the respective data collection procedures. 
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The Relational Events Model 
Relations events models (REM) are designed to uncover ‘rules that govern behaviour’ in 
dynamic social networks (Lerner et al., 2013, p. 11). They seek ‘to answer questions like what 
makes actor A interact more or less with actor B or what makes actor A engage in a specific 
type of interaction towards B’ (Lerner et al., 2013, p. 4). These interactions form an event 
sequence that involves a sender node, a target node, and a time stamp. Patterns that are 
specific for the event sequence at hand are, like in other dynamic network models, explained 
by endogenous dynamic network statistics capturing basic rules of behaviour of political actors 
such as social inertia, reciprocity, triangulation, or social balance as well as by exogenous 
covariates capturing actor characteristics.  
A basic assumption of REMs is that the probability of an observed events sequence 𝐸𝐸 =(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛) depends on events that have happened earlier. The main explanatory variable is 
the network of past interactions; i.e. a weighted graph defined as a function of the past event 
sequence. REMs model the probability density of 𝑒𝑒 (a single event in the event sequence), 
given the network of past events 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒  using a piecewise constant hazard model, where the 
hazard of an event occurring is held constant within a time interval (Malang et al., 
forthcoming).  
The likelihood that a specific number of events 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) occurs between a pair of actors (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) 
in the time interval (𝑡𝑡) is given by the hazard rate 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) and multiplied by the survival function 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�. The survival function captures all events that could have occurred at time (𝑡𝑡) 
but did not (Butts, 2008; Lerner et al., 2013, 2013; Malang et al., forthcoming). The question 
is: Why did a specific event occur and not another one? The probability function of a specific 
event is written as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)!  
The probability density function is then represented by a multiplication over all dyads and 
all time intervals in the observed events sequence 𝐸𝐸 = (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛): 
𝑓𝑓𝜆𝜆�𝐸𝐸;𝜃𝜃𝜆𝜆� = �� � 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)!𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎) �
𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�−� 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
�, 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) represents all dyads in which an event occurred and D represents all events 
that could have potentially happened. The estimated model parameters reflect which factors 
cause an increase or decrease in the frequency of interaction (rate parameters,𝜃𝜃𝜆𝜆). Like other 
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inferential network models, it is possible to include both network statistics and actor or dyadic 
covariates as explanatory factors. Endogenous network statistics are calculated for each event 
in the event sequence.  
To estimate the rate parameter, a stratified conditional logit model estimates the hazard 
time of an event until the next event occurs. Thence, coefficients are estimated for the 
variables of interest conditional on the risk sets. Positive significant parameter estimates are 
associated with an increased risk that cooperative interaction occurs. Negative significant 
parameter estimates are associated with a decreased risk that cooperative interaction occurs. 
Parameter estimates can be interpreted in terms of log odds. 
The Data Set 
REMs require input data in form of an event sequence that consists of dyadic and typed 
events. In the literature, there is a broad discussion about what an event exactly is (compare 
Schrodt, 1994). We define an event as a ‘discrete incident that can be located at a single [point 
in] time (usually precise to a day) and a set of actors, usually a dyad of a source and target’ 
(Schrodt, 2012b, p. 548). In more formal terms, each event is defined as a tuple 𝑒𝑒 =(𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 , 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 ,𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 , 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) where 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 is the initiating political actor (the source), 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒is the addressed actor 
(the target), 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 is the quality of an event (the event type), and 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  the time when 𝑒𝑒 happens. 
We coded our new POLICLIMATE event dataset on country interactions related to 
international climate change politics using the software TABARI (Text Analysis by Augmented 
Replacement Instructions, Schrodt, 2011) based on news reports from Agence France Presse 
(AFP) between 1995 and 2015. 3 AFP provides a rich data source for monitoring and analysing 
the international politics of climate change, as it has frequently reported on international 
political events on the climate change issue. After several rounds of manual coding, the 
software can identify the date of an event, its initiators and targets, and the quality of each 
event on an automated basis. To determine the event type, the software relies on the ‘Conflict 
and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO)’ (Schrodt, 2012a) scheme as the coding 
framework. The CAMEO coding scheme is a codebook for verbs and verb constructions. 
Nominal event codes reflect 10 different categories (with many subcategories) of cooperation 
ranging from positive verbal comments to an exchange of material resources and 10 different 
categories of conflict ranging from verbal comments to different kinds of military violence. To 
identify the type of a political event, category and subcategory codes are assigned to verbs 
                                                            
3Strengths and weaknesses of event data for empirical analysis have been comprehensively discussed 
in the literature. Compare for example Gerner, Schrodt, and Yilmaz (2002), Huxtable and Pevehouse  
(1986), King and Lowe  (2003), Schrodt  (1994), Schrodt and Gerner (1994), Hirschi (2009). 
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and verb constructions. As the original codebook was created to analyse violent conflict, we 
had to adjust the coding framework for international climate policy by adding the relevant 
political actors and a fine-tuning of verbs and verb constructions. We also aggregated the 
CAMEO sub-categories into twelve main event categories, ranging from positive statements 
to substantial cooperation on the cooperative side, and ranging from negative statements to 
substantial conflict on the conflict side (compare Appendix A). This reduces the number of 
distinct event type categories to a manageable number. In addition, the effect of coding errors 
is reduced by avoiding misclassification within ambiguous categories (Schrodt & Gerner, 
2004).4 Now each event code can be clearly assigned to one of the CAMEO event categories.  
The raw event sequence is the basis for several different variables to be used for the 
analysis.5 Firstly, it provides the main dependent variable, which is the stream of cooperative 
interactions happening between two countries over time among all other events that could 
have been occurred. For this purpose, we first calculated the event sequence for both 
cooperative and conflictive events in the event sequence. Next, we created a subset of the 
event sequence that only contains cooperative events. This subset of cooperative events is 
now the foundation to calculate the REM data set. The REM data set contains, among others, 
an event dummy variable that is coded as 1 for cooperative events that have happened in the 
event sequence and 0 for all null events (all events that could have happened). Secondly, the 
REM data set contains an event weight variable that reflects the intensity of cooperation for 
each event ranging from 1 (verbal cooperation) to 6 (material cooperation) according to the 
above specified CAMEO sub-categories. In the analysis, we used this variable to control for the 
intensity of cooperation. Thirdly, the REM data set contains an event time variable that reflects 
for each event on what day in the event sequence the event has occurred. The event time 
variable is used as strata in the conditional logit model. 
In our model, we use two different types of independent variables. The first set of 
independent variables are preference homophily variables that capture whether two countries 
in a dyad hold the same policy preferences on different, crucial aspects of international 
climate policy. We coded the policy preferences for all countries present in the event 
sequence. We identified the most important issues discussed in international climate change 
                                                            
4Coding the POLICLIMATE event data set based on the original CAMEO coding scheme led to many 
problematic misclassifications. Expressions such “combat climate change”, for example, resulted in 
events that were classified as military conflict. We inspected the data set for these kinds of problems 
and adjusted the verb dictionary accordingly. We continued this process until no such misclassifications 
occurred. 
5All calculations were done in R with the “rem” package Brandenberger (2017a). A detailed description 
of the REM date set and its components can be found in the related manual Brandenberger (2017b). 
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politics by consulting the relevant literature in the field (Bernauer, 2013; Betzold et al., 2012; 
Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014; Hallding et al., 2013). We condensed the main contestations to 
three variables that cover the most important aspects: (1) the fundamental position towards 
the distribution of responsibilities and capabilities (CBDR-principle); (2) the fundamental 
position on how the importance of climate change and climate policy is assessed in contrast 
to other important policy areas (impacts); (3) and the position on the most important policy 
objectives and instruments (instruments).  
To test our Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we used three variables that cover these main 
contestations. We operationalized the first variable accordingly on how a country thinks about 
the CBDR-principle. We differentiated four realizations: equal (all countries must contribute 
to climate change mitigation and must be treated the same way), equal flex (all countries must 
contribute, but are differentiated according to their background), major emitters (only major 
emitters must contribute), developed countries (only OECD countries must contribute). 
Variable 2 reflects how important a country assesses the impacts of climate change on society 
as opposed to other important issues, such as the socio-economic development. We observed 
three different levels: medium, high, and very high. Countries that were coded as ‘medium’ 
regard climate change is an important problem, but there are other more pressing issues on 
their agenda. For countries that were coded as ‘high’ climate change is an important problem 
and assessed at least as equally important to other issues. Finally, for some countries the 
impacts of climate change belong to the most pressing problems. They were coded as ‘very 
high’. Variable 3 captures the different ways to approach climate change mitigation. The final 
variable captures the main policy objective and related instruments. We coded for each 
country on which policy objective it lays its focus: the ‘commitment’ to international 
agreements enforced by legally-binding targets and sanction mechanisms, the defeat of 
‘asymmetries’ between developed and developing countries by financial and technology 
transfer, the reduction of ‘uncertainties’ by the increased use of flexibility mechanisms, and 
the promotion of ‘technology’-based solutions. For our hypothesis to be supported, we expect 
a negative, and significant relationship linked to these variables and the prospect of 
cooperation. Henceforth, we expect countries holding the same policy preferences are less 
likely to cooperate.  
We developed coding guidelines (compare Appendix B for coding examples) based on 
previous work dealing with the issue (e.g. Sewell, 2005). In a pilot coding phase, we coded 
several countries representing all important country groups – to be specific: developed 
countries, emerging economies, developing countries, least developed countries and small 
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island developing states (SIDS) to formulate coding rules. For example, we coded the CBDR 
principle ‘equal’ when a country referred to ‘the necessity to overcome the CBDR principle or 
the divide between the developed and developing world’, or ‘the need to stop blaming each 
other, but to collaborate’, or ‘the urgency that all countries alike must fulfil their 
commitments’, and the need to ‘change or evolve responsibilities and capabilities of 
countries’. Compare Appendix B for a complete overview on all coding guidelines and example 
statements from this pilot coding phase. 
After the pilot coding phase, we fine-tuned the coding guidelines and coded the policy 
beliefs for all the countries. As data source, we used statements made by high-level country 
representatives (High-level segment statements by Heads and Governments) at selected UN 
Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (COPs). Specifically, we used written and audio-
visual statements made at the COP meetings between 1997 and 20146. We coded beliefs for 
two phases from 1997 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2015, arguing that international climate 
politics has significantly changed after the Copenhagen disaster (Blühdorn, 2012). For each 
country, all actors were crosschecked for at least three years per period (beginning of the 
period, middle of the period, end of the period). This allows us to believe that policy 
preferences are rather stable within the two periods. All written and audio-visual statements 
are available on the individual COP meeting websites hosted by the website of the UNFCCC7. 
Secondly, reciprocity describes the degree to which an actor has mutual connections to 
other actors. This effect measures the tendency of senders to reciprocate earlier events if 
other senders targeted them in return. Therefore, it captures whether actor A adapts its 
behaviour towards actor B in accordance to how B treated A in the past. It is an endogenous 
network statistic and calculated based on the event sequence given by the following formula: 
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) = (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡), 
where 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 is the network of past events including all events E that consist of a sender A and 
target B and a weight function 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡. Here, a positive parameter implies that political actors tend 
to reward cooperative behaviour. A negative parameter on the other hand, would imply that 
reciprocation does not increase the likeliness for the occurrence of cooperative events. 
In terms of our control variables, we used both exogenous covariates and endogenous 
network statistics. As for our exogenous controls, we included several factors that cover 
important characteristics of nation states affecting country behaviour in international climate 
                                                            
6In fact, statements prior to 2001 were difficult to access. 
7http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6240.php 
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change politics. According to Sprinz and colleagues (1994, 2001), two factors are important: 
the level of climate-related vulnerability and the magnitude of abatement costs. We included 
several covariates that cover different aspects of these two factors i.e. a country’s vulnerability 
and its abatement costs. As vulnerability indicator, we used the GDP adjusted ND Gain 
vulnerability country index that measures a country’s exposure, sensitivity, and ability to adapt 
to the adverse impacts of climate change8. We expect that the level of a country’s vulnerability 
towards climate-related risks influence a country’s cooperative behaviour. A country facing 
high climate-related vulnerability is likely to act as a ‘pusher’ (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, 
p. 69) in favour of combatting climate change and is subsequently expected to cooperate more 
likely.  
Here, abatement costs are the costs of reducing climate mitigation related negatives such 
as the price of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They are difficult to capture, as 
there is no comparable index to the ND Gain vulnerability index described above. Instead, we 
controlled for a set of variables that affect the level of abatement costs: GDP per capita, 
democracy (polity 2), absolute CO2 emissions, and natural rents.9 The basic intuition is that 
countries with high abatement costs of climate change mitigation action behave as ‘draggers’ 
(Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, p. 69) and are expected to cooperate less likely but are maybe 
targeted more often by cooperative initiatives. Starting with the GDP per capita, we expect 
that richer countries can afford climate change mitigation action more so than poorer 
countries. On that account, even if these countries face high abatement costs due to high 
levels of CO2 emissions, for instance, they may cope with emission reduction better, because 
they have more financial resources to do so. A similar argument applies to the level of 
democracy. Democratic countries are usually institutionally better equipped than autocracies 
and are, therefore, more capable to deal with the climate change issue. Hence, we expect rich 
countries and democracies to cooperate more likely and also to be more often the target of 
cooperative initiatives. Moreover, high levels of absolute CO2 emissions adversely affect a 
country´s abatement costs. Taking climate change mitigation action increases abatement 
costs and, thereupon, decreases the likelihood to show cooperative behaviour. However, 
there is also a different way to approaching the effect of high CO2 emissions. In traditional 
realist thinking, imbalances in the power structure also create imbalances in influence (Milner, 
1992). Influential countries, thus, often adopt the position of organizing powers that can 
                                                            
8Compare: Notre Dame's Environmental Change Initiative (ND-ECI) (2015). Notre Dame Global 
Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) Available online: URL: https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/. 
9For all other variables, we used the 2016 World Development Indicators as data source.  
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punish defective behaviour, for example, by exerting military or economic power. In the 
context of climate change, power might be understood as the ability to affect the global 
atmosphere (Rowlands, 2001). Along these lines, countries are powerful if cooperation is 
essential for a successful climate policy and their veto has the strength to block international 
action. One could argue that countries with high absolute CO2 emissions tend to have a higher 
leverage for promoting or blocking international climate change politics than countries with 
low absolute CO2 emissions. Without the cooperation of high emission countries, any 
endeavour to protect the global climate is rendered pointless. In consequence, it is also likely 
that countries with high absolute CO2 emissions will more likely be involved in cooperative 
interaction. Like so, we expect our model to show no clear effect for the level of CO2 emissions. 
Finally, we controlled for the natural rents of a country. Countries with high natural rents face 
rather high abatements costs as their economy depends on fossil fuel resources. We expect 
these countries to behave less cooperatively. On the other hand, in a similar vein to the level 
of CO2 emissions, these countries are important for the success of international climate 
politics. We therefore expect these countries to more likely be the target of cooperative 
interactions. 
In terms of endogenous network effects10, we controlled for a number of network statistics 
(Lerner et al., 2013). The simplest network dependency is captured by the social inertia 
network statistic. The statistic measures the tendency of actors to keep behaving just as they 
did in the past. In the model, a significant, positive inertia parameter indicates that past 
cooperative events between A and B increase the likelihood of cooperative events between A 
and B in the future.  
Countries behave differently in political processes; so, they take on different roles and hold 
different positions. The term ‘position’ here, refers to a set of social actors, which are similarly 
embedded in a network of relations, whereas the term ‘role’ refers to the patterns of relations 
between social actors. Actors who are similar in their social activity towards other actors hold 
a similar position and are consequently structurally equivalent (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
This effect describes the tendency to maintain and create ties to other countries that make 
similar choices (Burt, 1982). Structural equivalence has always been an important element in 
international relations theory and particularly studied in the context of conflict and war as a 
stabilizing factor for homophile blocs of opponents (Griffiths, 2007; e.g. Maoz, Kuperman, 
Terris, & Talmud, 2006). In the case of global climate change, this behaviour is not desirable, 
                                                            
10Compare Brandenberger (2017b) for a description on how to calculate these statistics. 
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as the divide into opposing blocs runs contra to the achievement of a universal climate regime. 
To control and test for these differences, we use a set of two statistics, i.e. sender similarity 
and target popularity. The target popularity statistic measures the popularity of targets, hence 
how often the current targets was targeted by senders in the past. In the model, a significant, 
positive parameter estimate means that being a popular target increases the likelihood of 
being involved in cooperative events by other senders in the future. Sender similarity 
measures how many targets the current sender has in common with other senders that 
targeted the current target in the past. In other words, how likely is it that two senders show 
the same pattern of behaviour towards the same set of targets? A significant, positive 
parameter estimate points to an increased probability of senders to initiate cooperation 
towards the same set of targets. In other words, there is a tendency of senders to cluster 
together or inhibit the same behaviour towards the same set of targets. Compare Appendix C 
for an overview on variables and data sources. 
4. Results 
We estimated our models using the ‘rem’ package implemented in R (Brandenberger, 
2017a). The subset of the REM data set with only cooperative events has 521196 observations 
from which 1582 are true events. We tested several model set-ups with different variable 
combinations and conducted several robustness checks.  
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Table 1: Parameter estimates models 1-6 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 
ULNERABILITY SENDER   0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
VULNERABILITY 
TARGET 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
ABSOLUTE CO2 
EMISSIONS SENDER 
(LOGGED) 
  0.02 
(-0.02) 
  0.02 
(-0.02) 
  0.00  
(-0.02) 
 -0.01 
(-0.02) 
 -0.01 
(-0.02) 
 -0.01 
(-0.02) 
ABSOLUTE CO2 
EMISSIONS TARGET 
(LOGGED) 
  0.06 *** 
(-0.02) 
  0.05 ** 
(-0.02) 
  0.04 * 
(-0.02) 
  0.04 
(-0.02) 
  0.04 
(-0.02) 
  0.04 
(-0.02) 
NATURAL RENTS 
SENDER 
  0.00 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 
  (0.00) 
NATURAL RENTS 
TARGET 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
GDP PC LOGGED 
SENDER 
  0.19 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.18 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.16 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.13 ** 
(-0.04) 
  0.15 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.13 ** 
(-0.04) 
GDP PC LOGGED 
TARGET 
  0.18 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.17 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.15 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.19 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.17 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.18 *** 
(-0.04) 
POLITY 2 DEMOCRACY   0.00 
(-0.01) 
 -0.01 
(-0.01) 
 -0.01 
(-0.01) 
 -0.01 
(-0.01) 
 -0.01 
(-0.01) 
 -0.01 
(-0.01) 
SAME INSTRUMENT 
PREFERENCES 
  -0.04 
(-0.07) 
 -0.03 
(-0.07) 
 -0.02 
(-0.07) 
 -0.02 
(-0.07) 
 -0.02 
(-0.07) 
SAME IMPACT 
PREFERENCES 
   0.21 *** 
(-0.06) 
  0.19 ** 
(-0.06) 
  0.18 ** 
(-0.06) 
  0.19 ** 
(-0.06) 
  0.18 ** 
(-0.06) 
SAME CBDR 
PREFERENCES 
  -0.20 ** 
(-0.07) 
 -0.21 ** 
(-0.07) 
 -0.22 ** 
(-0.07) 
 -0.22 *** 
(-0.07) 
 -0.22 *** 
(-0.07) 
RECIPROCITY     7.98 * 
(-3.1) 
 -8.30 
(-8.36) 
  8.37 * 
(-3.64) 
 
TARGET POPULARITY     -0.86 
(-0.89) 
 -0.6 
(-0.88) 
 -0.96 
(-0.89) 
SENDER SIMILARITY    24.61 * 
(-10.12) 
26.41 ** 
(-10.05) 
24.86 * 
(-10.11) 
INERTIA    18.29 * 
(-8.04) 
 11.05 ** 
(-3.56) 
EVENT ATTRIBUTE  
 
     
INSTRUMENTS*EVENT 
ATTRIBUTE 
      
IMPACTS*EVENT 
ATTRIBUTE 
      
CDBRS*EVENT 
ATTRIBUTE 
      
AIC   17808.69   17791.9   17787.52   17781.11   17784.2   17780.11 
NUM. EVENTS   1582   1582   1582   1582   1582   1582 
NUM. OBS.   521196   521196   521196   521196   521196   521196 
MISSINGS   1160   1160   1160   1160   1160   1160 
NOTES   (P < 0.001 ***, P < 0.01 **, P < 0.05 *) 
  STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates model 7-10 
 
MODEL 7 
(HLP 30) 
MODEL 8 
(WG, HLP 30) 
MODEL 9 
(SUBSET 1) 
MODEL 10 
(SUBSET 2) 
VULNERABILITY 
SENDER 
  0.00 *  
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *  
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.01* 
  (0.00) 
VULNERABILITY 
TARGET 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 *** 
  (0.00) 
ABSOLUTE CO2 
EMISSIONS SENDER 
(LOGGED) 
 -0.03 
(-0.02) 
 -0.03 
(-0.02) 
 -0.07 *** 
(-0.02) 
  0.08 * 
(-0.03) 
ABSOLUTE CO2 
EMISSIONS TARGET 
(LOGGED) 
  0.01 
(-0.02) 
  0.01 
(-0.02) 
  0.01 
(-0.02) 
  0.07 * 
(-0.02) 
NATURAL RENTS 
SENDER 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.00 
(-0.01) 
  0.01 
(-0.01) 
NATURAL RENTS 
TARGET 
  0.01 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 * 
  (0.00) 
  0.01 
  (0.00) 
  0.02 
(-0.01) 
GDP PC LOGGED 
SENDER 
  0.14 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.14 ** 
(-0.04) 
  0.17 *** 
(-0.05) 
  0.09 
(-0.08) 
GDP PC LOGGED 
TARGET 
  0.12 ** 
(-0.04) 
  0.12 ** 
(-0.04) 
  0.17 *** 
(-0.04) 
  0.06 
(-0.08) 
POLITY 2 DEMOCRACY  -0.03 * 
(-0.01) 
 -0.02 * 
(-0.01) 
 -0.02 
(-0.01) 
  0.03 
(-0.01) 
SAME INSTRUMENT 
PREFERENCES 
  0.01 
(-0.07) 
 -0.08 
(-0.15) 
  0.01 
(-0.08) 
 -0.42 ** 
(-0.15) 
SAME IMPACT 
PREFERENCES 
  0.12 * 
(-0.06) 
  0.21 
(-0.13) 
  0.1 
(-0.07) 
  0.61 *** 
(-0.16) 
SAME CBDR 
PREFERENCES 
 -0.20 ** 
(-0.07) 
 -0.15 
(-0.15) 
 -0.27 *** 
(-0.07) 
  0.52 ** 
(-0.17) 
RECIPROCITY   8.24 *** 
(-0.9) 
  2.74 *** 
(-0.33) 
  8.50 *** 
(-0.93) 
 21.05 *** 
(-5.31) 
TARGET POPULARITY   0.00 
(-0.09) 
  0.01 
(-0.09) 
 -0.01 
(-0.10) 
 -0.41 
(-0.77) 
SENDER SIMILARITY   6.75 *** 
(-1.4) 
  6.77 *** 
(-1.39) 
  8.78 *** 
(-1.36) 
-22.65 ** 
(-8.62) 
INERTIA     
EVENT ATTRIBUTE   -0.01 
  (0.03) 
  
INSTRUMENTS*EVENT 
ATTRIBUTE 
  -0.02 
(-0.04) 
  
IMPACTS*EVENT 
ATTRIBUTE 
  -0.02 
(-0.04) 
  
CDBRS*EVENT 
ATTRIBUTE 
  -0.02 
(-0.04) 
  
AIC   17672.35   17690.08   15235.32   2370.75 
NUM. EVENTS   1582   1582   1292   290 
NUM. OBS.   521196   521196   497612   23584 
MISSINGS   1160   1160   1160   0 
NOTES   (P < 0.001 ***, P < 0.01 **, P < 0.05 *) 
  STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES 
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Table 1 and 2 show the estimated model parameters with standard errors in parentheses. 
As variables are not scaled, parameter estimates are not interpreted in terms of their size but 
only in terms of significance and direction. We started with a model only containing the actor 
covariates (Model 1) for the whole event sequence. We then added the policy preference 
homophily variables (Model 2) and eventually included the endogenous networks statistics 
(Model 3 to 7). As the reciprocity and social inertia variables are correlated (Model 4), we 
controlled for inertia (Model 6) and reciprocity (Model 5) in separate models. Comparing 
parameter estimates shows that the results are robust across different model set-ups with 
respect to the models based on the whole event sequence. In addition to different variable 
combinations, we also tested different variations of the same model (Model 8 to 10). We used 
the set-up of Model 6 as starting point, which we ran on the whole event sequence, which 
does not control for the intensity of cooperation, and which has a half-life parameter of 366. 
The half-life parameter entails information about how important past events are for future 
events, hence how long the shadow of the past casts on the future. A half-life parameter of 
366 (about one year) implies that events that happened 366 days ago are half as important as 
events that happened earlier. Testing different half-life parameters revealed the best model 
fit for a half-life parameter of 30 days (Model 7) in the terms of AIC11 values. Model 8 shows 
the results for controlling for the intensity of cooperation. For this purpose, we calculated a 
new set of endogenous networks statistics that is weighted by the event weight variable. This 
means that in the calculation of network statistics, events with more intense cooperation 
count more. The respective statistics get higher values for highly cooperative events, and 
lower values for less cooperative events. Compare Appendix A for the coding of the event 
weight variable. 
We also included interaction effects with the preference homophily variables and the 
event weight that indicate whether intense cooperation is more likely with actors that share 
the same policy preferences. We see that including the event weight does not affect 
parameter estimates for the endogenous network statistics and the interaction terms are not 
significant. Yet, the preference homophily variables lose their significance. This implies that 
the effect of the preference homophily variables are independent of the intensity of 
cooperation. 
                                                            
11The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a parsimony-adjusted measure of fit. A larger value of the AIC 
indicates a worse model fit.  
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In the following, we discuss Model 8, 9 and 10 as our final models. Model 8 is non-weighted 
with a half-life parameter of 30 days and the best value concerning the AIC value. Running 
separate models for the two subsets (1997 – 2009 and 2010 – 2015), revealed different results 
for some variables for the two phases. This signifies that in line with our expectations 
cooperation patterns changed in some regards after the Copenhagen disaster in 2009.  
Despite the democracy indicator, the included controls did not surprise and behaved in line 
with our expectations. The models show that countries, which are vulnerable to climate 
change, cooperate more often and are more often targeted by cooperative interaction. The 
effect is small, but significant, and robust across all model variations, including both subsets 
(before and after Copenhagen). Also, richer countries cooperate more often, both in their 
roles as senders as well as targets. This effect is also highly significant and robust across all 
models that are based on the whole event sequence. However, the effect clearly changes after 
2009. For the subset covering the period between 2010 and 2015, there is no significant 
effect; hence, wealth is now not any more decisive for cooperative behaviour. This finding is 
congruent with the assumption that the strict divide between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries lost its importance, since the split between the two country groups reflects the 
divide between the rich and the poor. 
Moreover, we see that countries with high absolute CO2 emissions do not act more often 
as senders of cooperative events, but they are more often targeted by cooperative initiatives. 
But, the significance of these effects vanishes by including the target popularity and sender 
similarity statistics in Model 4. This points to a possible link between the level of CO2 emissions 
and the position that a country holds in the network of related events. Position here refers to 
a country’s patterns of interaction – with whom does it interact and when? It is reasonable to 
assume that countries with a similar level of CO2 emissions behave similarly in terms of their 
cooperation patterns as they might hold similar interests and preferences12. Like for the GDP 
variable, the effect is different after 2009. Now the parameter estimate related to the levels 
of absolute CO2 emissions of the senders is positive and significant, indicating that big polluters 
start to engage more in the climate change issue. In addition, in line with our expectations, we 
find now clear effect for the natural rents variable, across all models. Countries with high 
natural rents neither are more likely targeted with cooperative interactions nor initiate 
cooperation more often than countries with low rents. Although, Model 8 shows a small, 
                                                            
12Running pairwise correlation reveals a moderate correlation (r=0.33) between absolute CO2 emissions 
and the sender similarity variables. Variance inflation coefficients are well below 2.  
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positive, and significant effect related to the natural rents, there is no such effect showing up 
in the models for both subsets.  
Finally, we controlled for the effect of democracy. We tested both, whether democracies 
in general more likely tend to cooperate (results not shown in Table 1 and 2) and whether they 
tend to cooperate more with other democracies. The results show no effects of the polity 2 
variable neither for the general effect nor for the homophily variable in both subsets. In 
contrast, Model 8 shows a small, negative, and significant effect. These findings are in contrast 
to our expectations and the results of Bernauer and colleagues (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; 
Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013) that find a link between the climate policy performance and the 
level of democracy. However, when it comes to the efforts of policy coordination, cooperation 
happens more between the developed and developing world. This last finding is interesting 
and nicely underlines the difference between two perspectives. Whereas Bernauer and 
colleagues operationalize cooperation as policy output (higher performance, higher level of 
cooperation), cooperation is here understood as the process to mutually adjust policies. 
For the preference homophily variables, we find that, prior to the Copenhagen summit in 
2009, countries cooperated less likely, when they shared the beliefs on the CBDR-principle. 
This is in line with our hypothesis 1a: Cooperation arises rather from discord than from 
harmony. As discussed, the CBDR principle was the most important ordering principle of the 
climate regime until 2009, but also the biggest contestation dividing the political landscape 
into two opposing blocs. Cooperation across these camps was important to coordinate climate 
protection endeavours. Moreover, there is no effect related to the instrument preference and 
impact homophily variables until 2009. Therefore, these issues were apparently not decisive 
enough to affect cooperation patterns. However, everything changes after 2010. We see that 
our results are identical for the whole event sequence and the first phase, but that they 
change in the second phase. This stresses our assumption that the political landscape has 
changed with the Copenhagen climate conference and cooperation patterns change during 
altered contestations. This provides evidence for our hypothesis 1b.  
More specifically, in the second subset, we see that the parameter estimates related to 
CBDR principle and impact homophily variables are now significant and positive, while the 
parameter estimate related to the instrument preference homophily variable is now 
significant and negative. Accordingly, after 2009, countries are more likely to cooperate with 
countries that share their view on the CBDR principle and the impacts of climate change, as 
well as the ones disagreeing on policy objectives and instruments. On that account, these 
findings support our assumptions that cooperation patterns have changed after the 
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Copenhagen disaster. Loosening the ‘dysfunctional’ (Depledge & Yamin, 2009) divide between 
North and South changed incentives and priorities of cooperation. This finding is also well in 
line with the fact that after 2009 the landscape of country coalitions has changed dramatically. 
While before 2009 country groups were neatly separated along the Annex I and non-Annex I 
divide, after 2009 new country groups emerged that are located across this artificial line 
(Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014). Subsequently, new incentives and necessities for cooperation 
arose. We now see that countries cooperate more, when they disagree over rather technical 
issues, like policy objectives and instruments, in order to increase commitment to the treaty. 
With respect to our second independent variable, reciprocity, the result shows that 
cooperation over climate change is largely about expectations of the future. On the one hand, 
political actors’ willingness to cooperate is clearly influenced by the belief that an interaction 
will continue in the future. Consequently, they are inclined to collaborate with previous 
cooperation partners. In game theoretic terms, this kind of behaviour is referred to as an 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma; and it is explained by using the value of continued cooperation 
that outweighs the benefits of defection at any point of time (Milner, 1992). On the other 
hand, cooperation over climate change follows a tit-for-tat strategy. However, the explanation 
is a lot like repeated cooperation. Again, it is all about the anticipated behaviour of others. 
Climate change politics and negotiations may be regarded as a game of repetition. Agreeing 
on an international treaty will not singlehandedly solve the problem but it is only the first step 
in a rather long drawn process. In this setting, cooperation is a rational behaviour, knowing 
that others pursue a tit-for-tat strategy, too. As a result, cooperation is rewarded with 
cooperation and defection is punished by defection. The parameter estimate related to the 
reciprocity variable is positive and significant across all models and periods. Hence, we are 
confident to confirm our Hypothesis 2. 
In terms of the endogenous network controls we find that, just as expected, countries tend 
to repeat cooperation as indicated by the positive and significant model parameter related to 
the inertia effect in Model 6. With respect to structural equivalence network variable, our 
analysis reveals interesting results. For all models including the first subset, there is no effect 
related to the target popularity variable, but a significant and positive effect related to the 
sender similarity variable. The latter points towards a tendency of actors to make similar 
choices as structurally equivalent others. Hence, they preferably cooperate with countries that 
are structural equivalent. For the time until 2009, this indicates the existence of homophile 
blocs that oppose each other. This, however, significantly changes with 2009. From there on, 
the effect is negative and significant. This discovery is highly interesting, as it point to a 
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dismantling of rigid political structures that determined the politics of international climate 
change for more than two decades. 
5. Conclusions 
This research emphasises on bi- or multilateral political interactions that transpire beyond 
or in preparation to the yearly climate summits. Studying these processes is important, since 
the success of the climate conferences to a large part depends on the willingness of countries 
to negotiate an agreement. The more substantial “work” (e.g. settling disputes) is done 
beyond the COPs, the more effective their outputs are expected to be. Often, the responsible 
presidency of a specific COP initiates this preparatory work. For example, France did an 
impressive job in advance to the Paris summit in 2015, among others by bringing together the 
United States and China. This essentially contributed to the successful adoption of the Paris 
Agreement in 2015 (Brun, 2016). 
The results confirm and extend major axioms of the international relations literature. The 
analysis has shown that cooperation ensues more often when countries disagree over 
important principles, policy objectives, or implementation procedures. Hence, cooperation 
arises from discord, not harmony (Keohane, 1984). When countries are harmonious with 
respect to their policy preferences no adjustment of policies is necessary. Vice versa, when 
countries disagree over important aspects, they must coordinate their policies, thus they must 
cooperate. Nevertheless, the need to cooperate to overcome disagreements does not suffice 
to ensure cooperation in an environment of insecurity about other country’s behaviour. 
Trustful relationships among countries prosper over time only in the light of positive 
experiences and mutuality. Conversely, tit-for-tat strategies not seldom mount in an 
escalation of international conflicts. Our results underpin the importance of reciprocity, which 
is one the core concepts discussed in many international relations theories (Axelrod, 1984; 
Keohane, 1986; Larson, 1988).  
The key findings of this the analysis reveal major and very interesting changes in the 
behavioural patterns, over time. The Copenhagen climate summit of 2009 was a turning point 
in the international climate negotiations and abruptly ended a phase of increased, 
international interest in the climate change problem. The conference was the final stage of 
two years of negotiations towards a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. But, instead 
of producing a convincing strategy and new binding targets for the next commitment period 
starting in 2013, ‘insurmountable discrepancies of interests between negotiation partners’ 
(Blühdorn, 2012, p. 12) were revealed. Controversies arose above all about the responsibility 
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of emerging economies to reduce their swelling carbon emissions and the rigid divide of the 
world in Annex I and non-Annex I countries that did not account for the changed socio-
economic realities. In fact, many industrialised states criticised that emerging economies, like 
Brazil, China, or India, were still classified as non-Annex I parties and refused to pledge to any 
further commitments until these countries would take up their responsibility, too. In contrast, 
the majority of the developing world insisted on the industrialised world to carry the main 
burden in terms of cutting down GHG emissions, providing financial and technical support to 
developing countries to adapt to climate impacts, and to compensate for ensuing losses and 
damages. Ultimately, the irreconcilable positions mounted in the meagre output of the 
Copenhagen summit that was nothing more than a lukewarm declaration about the intention 
to take further actions in the future. Nevertheless, 2009 also remarked the begin of a new era 
in the climate negotiations that paved the way for a novel agreement (Brun, 2016). In the 
years to come, the international community step-by-step abolished the strict divide as 
introduced by the principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ (CBDR, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992) and developed new mechanisms 
related to climate finance, adaptation, monitoring, and transparency.  
These developments are reflected in our results. Prior to Copenhagen, national 
governments more actively involved in interactions with countries that disagreed about the 
CBDR principle. With the iterative disentanglement from the rigid Annex I/ non-Annex I 
division in the aftermath of the Copenhagen summit, implementation issues gained in 
importance. Among them measures to ensure the commitment to the international 
agreement, the design and use of flexibility mechanisms, approaches to reduce asymmetries 
across countries such as adaptation aid, finance or loss and damage, or the application of 
technological solutions to mitigate climate change. In addition, the Copenhagen shock was 
apparently large enough to dismantle the tendency to interact with structural equivalent 
partners. In fact, the results indicate that national governments started to cooperate 
progressively across the homophile building blocks that have dominated international 
climates politics before 2009.  
While this perspective add an important aspect the literature on environmental regimes., 
these findings also speak to a small number of studies that demonstrate the empirical 
applicability of the punctual equilibrium framework to the empirical enquiry of international 
regimes (Colgan, Keohane, & Van de Graaf, Thijs, 2012). It shows that institutional innovations, 
like the shift from the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol to the bottom-up approach 
of the Paris Agreement inhibit the potential to break gridlocked behavioural patterns. This are 
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good news, however, future research on the issue must keep track with old and new 
controversies that are likely to stagnate the process, such as the recent debate on Loss and 
Damage. These phenomenon are also discussed in a literature in the context to effectiveness 
regimes (Castro et al., 2014; Grundig & Ward, 2013) offering a starting point for future 
research. 
The event data set used in the study is bound to few restrictions that must here be named. 
Event data always only covers a small fraction of the events that occur on any given day and 
is therefore never able to deliver a complete network, capturing all relations among all 
involved actors. This is because media sources are not able to draw a comprehensive picture 
of reality. Also, event data collection must deal with the bias introduced by the selection of 
media sources and coding errors. So, event data are neither a full nor a random sample 
(Schrodt, 1994). Hence, important relationships might be missing, political actors ignored, or 
interactions or single actors emphasized, which are less decisive. Nevertheless, event data 
provides a rich data source for the analysis of political behaviour as the press reports it, which 
goes beyond formal institutional links. Thus, it offers data on political processes on which 
systematic quantitative data is usually not available. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Adjusted CAMEO Scheme   
EVENT TYPES 
NOMINAL 
EVENT 
TYPES 
DESCRIPTION EVENT 
DUMMY 
POSITIVE 
STATEMENT  
1 Optimistic or emphatic comments, symbolic acts, 
express accord, consider policy option, acknowledge 
responsibility 
Cooperation 
CONCRETE 
ACTION  
2 Consult, make or host a visit, meet, mediate, negotiate, 
discuss 
Cooperation 
APPEAL 
POSITIVE 
ACTION  
3 Appeal for material cooperation (economic, judicial, 
information), diplomatic cooperation, aid, political 
reform, to yield (e.g. easing sanctions, dissent), to 
negotiate, to settle dispute, to mediate 
Cooperation 
INTEND 
POSITIVE 
ACTION  
4 Express intends to engage in material cooperation 
(economic, judicial, information), diplomatic 
cooperation, aid, political reform, to yield (e.g. easing 
sanctions, dissent), to negotiate, to settle dispute, to 
mediate 
Cooperation 
YIELD 
COOPERATION  
5 Ease sanctions, political dissent, agree on political 
reform 
Cooperation 
SUBSTANTIVE 
COOPERATION  
6 Provide aid or engage in material cooperation 
(economic, judicial, information, intelligence), engage in 
diplomatic cooperation (praise or endorse, rally support 
on behalf of, grant diplomatic recognition, apologise, 
forgive, sing agreement) 
Cooperation 
NEGATIVE 
STATEMENT 
-1 Decline or make pessimistic comment, deny 
responsibility 
Conflict 
DEMAND 
COOPERATION  
-2 Demand for material cooperation (economic, judicial, 
information), diplomatic cooperation, aid, political 
reform, to yield (e.g. easing sanctions, dissent), to 
negotiate, to settle dispute, to mediate 
Conflict 
CRITICIZE, 
ACCUSE, 
DISAPPROVE 
-3 Disapprove, criticise, accuse, rally opposition against, 
complain officially, lawsuit, find guilty or liable 
Conflict 
REJECT 
COOPERATION, 
VETO 
-4 Reject material cooperation (economic, judicial, 
information), diplomatic cooperation, aid, political 
reform, plant, proposal, to yield (e.g. easing sanctions, 
Conflict 
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dissent), to negotiate, to settle a dispute, to mediate. 
Defy norms, laws, and to veto. 
THREATEN -5 Threaten to reduce or stop aid, with sanctions, boycott, 
embargo, with political dissent or repression, to halt 
negotiations or mediation. Give ultimatum.  
Conflict 
SUBSTANTIAL 
CONFLICT 
-6 Protest, strike, or boycott, engage in political dissent. 
Reduce relations, stop material aid, halt negotiations or 
mediations, impose an embargo, boycott, or strike, 
coerce, and assault. 
Conflict 
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, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
‘L
et
 u
s 
st
op
 a
 b
la
m
e 
ga
m
e.
 L
et
 u
s s
to
p 
st
an
di
ng
. L
et
 e
ac
h 
of
 u
s 
– 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
 
th
e 
la
rg
e 
em
er
gi
ng
 e
co
no
m
ie
s,
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
os
t v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s a
lik
e 
– 
co
m
e 
ou
t o
f o
ur
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
co
co
on
s.
 W
e 
m
us
t c
om
pr
om
ise
 to
 s
av
e 
ou
r f
ut
ur
e.
 A
ll 
of
 u
s 
liv
e 
in
 o
ne
 v
ill
ag
e.
’ 
(K
en
ya
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
). 
‘W
e 
ne
ed
 c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 fr
om
 a
ll 
co
un
tr
ie
s -
 c
om
m
on
 b
ut
 d
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
, 
re
fle
ct
in
g 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s 
as
 th
ey
 e
vo
lv
e 
ov
er
 ti
m
e.
 W
e 
ne
ed
 a
 re
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
m
bi
tio
us
 a
nd
 e
qu
ita
bl
e 
at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e’
 (A
us
tr
ia
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l 
se
gm
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
‘I 
am
 s
ur
e 
th
at
 n
ob
od
y 
w
ill
 b
ac
k-
do
w
n 
fr
om
 a
 s
ol
ut
io
n 
th
at
 fo
re
se
es
 b
al
an
ce
d 
an
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 f
or
 a
ll,
 a
nd
 I
 s
ay
 A
LL
, 
th
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 O
ur
 f
ut
ur
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
m
us
t 
al
so
 
in
co
rp
or
at
e 
th
e 
lo
w
 c
ar
bo
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
op
tio
n 
fo
r 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s:
 a
 s
ol
ut
io
n 
st
ro
ng
ly
 s
up
po
rt
ed
 a
nd
 p
ro
m
ot
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
in
du
st
ria
liz
ed
 w
or
ld
’ 
(It
al
y,
 H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
).  
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 …
 
 
- t
he
 n
ec
es
sit
y 
to
 o
ve
rc
om
e 
th
e 
CB
DR
/R
C 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
or
 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
– 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 d
iv
id
e,
 
O
R 
- t
he
 n
ee
d 
to
 s
to
p 
bl
am
in
g 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
, b
ut
 to
 
co
lla
bo
ra
te
, 
O
R 
- t
he
 u
rg
en
cy
 th
at
 a
ll 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
al
ik
e 
m
us
t f
ul
fil
 
th
ei
r c
om
m
itm
en
ts
,  
AN
D 
 
- c
ha
ng
in
g 
or
 e
vo
lv
in
g 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 c
ou
nt
rie
s.
 
 
EQ
U
AL
_F
LE
X 
De
sp
ite
 h
ist
or
ic
 d
iv
er
ge
nt
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s,
 a
ll 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
ar
e 
eq
ua
lly
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 to
 ta
ck
le
 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
. H
ow
ev
er
, o
nl
y 
‘O
f c
ou
rs
e,
 w
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 th
at
 n
at
io
n 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
m
us
t b
e 
ta
ke
n 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 (…
). 
Th
at
 
is 
w
hy
 C
an
ad
a 
su
pp
or
ts
 C
BD
R.
 A
ny
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 fl
ex
ib
le
 [a
nd
] a
llo
w
 fo
r 
al
l c
ou
nt
rie
s t
o 
ch
oo
se
 th
e 
po
lic
ie
s t
ha
t s
ui
t t
he
ir 
po
lit
ic
al
 re
al
iti
es
 ‘(
Ca
na
da
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l 
se
gm
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
13
) 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 ..
. 
- n
at
io
na
l d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
an
d 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
78
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
m
ad
e 
w
ith
 d
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
ta
rg
et
s 
an
d 
fu
ll 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
fo
r a
ll 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 n
at
io
na
l 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s.
 
 
 
AN
D 
- f
le
xi
bi
lit
y 
fo
r A
LL
 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 
M
AJ
O
R_
EM
IT
TE
RS
 
Sh
ar
ed
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 a
m
on
g 
al
l 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, m
aj
or
 
em
itt
er
s 
– 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 e
m
itt
ed
 
m
os
t i
n 
th
e 
pa
st
 a
nd
 th
os
e 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r f
ut
ur
e 
em
iss
io
ns
 –
 m
us
t t
ak
e 
th
e 
le
ad
 a
nd
 
ar
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 to
 ta
ck
le
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
nd
us
tr
ia
liz
ed
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
em
er
gi
ng
 
ec
on
om
ie
s 
m
us
t c
om
m
it 
to
 le
ga
lly
 
bi
nd
in
g 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
ly
 
co
or
di
na
te
d 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
. F
ul
l-
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
ta
rg
et
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
gr
an
te
d 
to
 le
as
t d
ev
el
op
ed
 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
  
‘W
hi
le
 w
e 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 re
sp
ec
t t
he
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
 o
f t
he
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
tio
n,
 w
e 
ne
ed
 to
 a
pp
ly
 th
es
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 to
da
y'
s e
co
no
m
ic
 a
nd
 
ge
op
ol
iti
ca
l r
ea
lit
ie
s’
 (E
U
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 
‘A
nd
 th
is 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 e
m
iss
io
ns
 c
an
 o
nl
y 
be
 a
ch
ie
ve
d 
if 
al
l c
ou
nt
rie
s,
 n
am
el
y 
al
l m
ai
n 
em
itt
er
s,
 a
ct
. C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 d
oe
s 
no
t s
to
p 
at
 n
at
io
na
l b
or
de
rs
. C
ro
ss
-b
or
de
r p
ro
bl
em
s 
th
er
ef
or
e 
re
qu
ire
 g
lo
ba
l s
ol
ut
io
ns
. N
at
io
na
l e
ffo
rt
s 
ar
e 
go
od
, b
ut
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 
co
or
di
na
te
d 
an
d 
bi
nd
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
be
tt
er
’ (
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
19
). 
 ‘(…
) t
he
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
w
ith
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
Ky
ot
o 
pr
ot
oc
ol
 c
au
se
 3
0%
 o
f g
lo
ba
l e
m
iss
io
ns
. 
Ev
en
 d
ra
st
ic
 re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 th
es
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
en
ou
gh
. T
he
re
fo
re
, t
he
 n
ew
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
m
us
t i
nc
lu
de
 a
ll 
m
aj
or
-e
m
itt
er
s.
 (…
) ‘
(N
or
w
ay
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
13
) 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
…
 
- t
he
 C
BD
R/
RC
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
bu
t 
ch
an
ge
d 
so
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 
re
al
iti
es
, 
O
R 
- e
m
er
gi
ng
 e
co
no
m
ie
s 
as
 
ne
w
 m
aj
or
 s
ou
rc
e 
of
 
em
iss
io
ns
, 
O
R 
- t
he
 n
ee
d 
to
 a
ct
 b
y 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
AN
D 
em
er
gi
ng
 e
co
no
m
ie
s 
AN
D 
- t
he
 n
ee
d 
fo
r s
oc
io
-
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
po
ve
rt
y 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 le
as
t 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
 
O
R 
- t
he
 fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 fo
r l
ea
st
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 
DE
VE
LO
PE
D 
Sh
ar
ed
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 a
m
on
g 
al
l 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
to
 m
iti
ga
te
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
. H
ow
ev
er
, i
nd
us
tr
ia
liz
ed
 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
pr
ed
om
in
at
el
y 
ca
us
ed
 g
lo
ba
l 
w
ar
m
in
g 
in
 th
e 
pa
st
, a
re
 th
e 
on
es
 
to
 ta
ke
 th
e 
le
ad
 in
 m
iti
ga
tin
g 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 s
up
po
rt
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
in
 ta
ki
ng
 
ac
tio
n.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, i
nd
us
tr
ia
liz
ed
 
Th
e 
ne
w
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t ‘
(…
) s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 a
dd
re
ss
 th
e 
ge
nu
in
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 o
f t
he
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s b
y 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
th
em
 w
ith
 e
qu
ita
bl
e 
ca
rb
on
 s
pa
ce
 to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
 e
ra
di
ca
te
 p
ov
er
ty
. (
…
) T
he
 b
ea
ut
ifu
l b
al
an
ce
 o
f c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ac
tio
n 
– 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f e
qu
ity
 a
nd
 c
om
m
on
 b
ut
 d
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s -
 s
ho
ul
d 
fo
rm
 th
e 
ba
sis
 
of
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
ac
tio
n.
 O
ur
 a
m
bi
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
po
st
-2
02
0 
pe
rio
d 
is 
di
re
ct
ly
 li
nk
ed
 w
ith
 a
m
bi
tio
us
 
ac
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
pr
e-
20
20
 p
er
io
d 
by
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s;
 o
th
er
w
ise
 th
e 
po
or
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
w
ill
 n
ot
 g
et
 th
e 
ca
rb
on
 sp
ac
e 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t’.
  
(…
) W
e 
fir
m
ly
 b
el
ie
ve
 th
at
 th
e 
IN
DC
s 
ar
e 
to
 b
e 
‘n
at
io
na
lly
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
’. 
W
e 
do
 n
ot
 s
ee
 a
ny
 
ro
le
 fo
r a
ny
 e
x-
an
te
 re
vi
ew
 in
 th
is 
pr
oc
es
s’
 (I
nd
ia
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
…
 
- t
he
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
of
 e
qu
ity
 a
nd
 
co
m
m
on
 b
ut
 d
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
, 
- im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 d
iv
id
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 w
or
ld
 
AN
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co
un
tr
ie
s 
m
us
t c
om
m
it 
to
 le
ga
lly
 
bi
nd
in
g 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
ly
 
co
or
di
na
te
d 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
. F
ul
l-
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
ta
rg
et
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
gr
an
te
d 
to
 a
ll 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
 a
s 
th
ey
 s
til
l m
us
t c
at
ch
 
up
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 s
oc
io
-e
co
no
m
ic
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
‘D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s i
s e
ss
en
tia
l t
o 
en
su
re
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 le
ve
l o
f a
m
bi
tio
n 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 k
ee
p 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 in
cr
ea
se
 b
el
ow
 a
n 
ag
re
ed
 th
re
sh
ol
d.
 
(…
) W
hi
le
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
am
bi
tio
n 
is 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 fr
om
 a
ll 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 w
e 
m
us
t e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 a
re
 s
af
eg
ua
rd
ed
 a
nd
 th
at
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
ar
e 
ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
le
ad
 in
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 e
ffo
rt
 a
ga
in
st
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
, w
hi
le
 a
llo
w
in
g 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
to
 g
ra
du
al
ly
 
as
su
m
e 
fu
rt
he
r o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
, i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
ei
r d
ev
el
op
m
en
t c
irc
um
st
an
ce
s’
 (B
ra
zi
l, 
H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
‘F
or
 u
s,
 th
at
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t m
us
t b
e 
le
ga
lly
 b
in
di
ng
, w
ith
 fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 fo
r L
DC
’s
 a
nd
 S
ID
S.
 (…
) i
n 
th
e 
gl
ob
al
 f
ig
ht
 a
ga
in
st
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
, h
ist
or
ic
al
 p
ol
lu
te
rs
 m
us
t 
ta
ke
 t
he
 le
ad
 w
ith
 e
co
no
m
y 
w
id
e 
em
iss
io
n 
re
du
ct
io
n 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
, a
nd
 th
at
 h
ist
or
ic
al
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 sh
ou
ld
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
ba
sis
 o
f t
he
ir 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
’ (
G
uy
an
a,
 H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
)  
- t
he
 n
ee
d 
fo
r s
oc
io
-
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s,
  
O
R 
- p
ov
er
ty
 re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
  
O
R 
- ‘c
ar
bo
n 
sp
ac
e’
, t
he
 
po
llu
te
r p
ay
s 
pr
in
ci
pl
e,
 o
r 
th
e 
(h
ist
or
ic
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 
of
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
O
R 
- t
he
 fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 fo
r 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s.
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IM
PA
CT
S:
 H
O
W
 A
RE
 T
H
E 
RI
SK
S 
AN
D 
IM
PA
CT
S 
O
F 
CL
IM
AT
E 
CH
AN
G
E 
AN
D 
CL
IM
AT
E 
PO
LI
CY
 A
SS
ES
SE
D 
AN
D 
VA
LU
ED
 W
H
EN
 C
O
M
PA
RE
D 
TO
 O
TH
ER
 C
RI
TI
CA
L 
AR
EA
S 
SU
CH
 A
S 
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
 
DE
VE
LO
PM
EN
T 
AN
D 
PO
VE
RT
Y 
RE
DU
CT
IO
N
? 
CA
TE
G
O
RY
 
De
fin
iti
on
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
St
at
em
en
t 
Co
di
ng
 R
ul
es
 
U
N
CL
EA
R 
Ri
sk
s 
of
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
re
 u
nc
le
ar
 
– 
po
sit
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
s 
ar
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 
N
o 
ex
am
pl
e 
fo
un
d 
N
A 
LO
W
 
Cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 b
ea
rs
 ri
sk
s 
an
d 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
s,
 b
ut
 o
th
er
 is
su
es
 
(e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s,
 e
tc
. …
)  
ar
e 
m
or
e 
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
o 
ex
am
pl
e 
fo
un
d 
N
A 
M
ED
IU
M
 
Cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 b
ea
rs
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l 
ris
ks
 a
nd
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
s.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 c
os
ts
 o
f r
es
po
nd
in
g 
ar
e 
al
so
 h
ig
h 
an
d 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s 
(e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s,
 e
tc
. …
) a
re
 a
t 
le
as
t e
qu
al
ly
 im
po
rt
an
t a
nd
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
t b
e 
co
m
pr
om
ise
d 
by
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
or
 a
da
pt
io
n 
ac
tio
n.
 
‘C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 a
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
fo
r u
s 
al
l, 
w
ith
 s
er
io
us
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l, 
so
ci
al
 a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
. I
nd
iv
id
ua
lly
 a
nd
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
el
y 
w
e 
m
us
t d
el
ib
er
at
e 
ca
re
fu
lly
 a
nd
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
be
st
 c
ou
rs
e 
of
 a
ct
io
n 
to
 re
du
ce
 e
m
iss
io
ns
. T
hi
s a
ct
io
n 
m
us
t d
el
iv
er
 re
al
 c
ut
s i
n 
em
iss
io
ns
 a
nd
 n
ot
 p
ut
 c
ou
nt
rie
s a
t a
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
. A
nd
 it
 m
us
t w
or
k 
al
on
gs
id
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s’
 p
la
ns
 fo
r s
tr
on
g 
ec
on
om
ic
 g
ro
w
th
, j
ob
s,
 a
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t’ 
(A
us
tr
al
ia
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l 
se
gm
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 ‘B
an
gl
ad
es
h,
 th
ou
gh
 a
n 
LD
C,
 h
as
 e
xp
re
ss
ed
 it
s 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
e 
in
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
if 
su
pp
or
te
d 
w
ith
 fi
na
nc
e 
an
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
. B
an
gl
ad
es
h 
ne
ed
s 
hu
ge
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
of
 e
ne
rg
y 
to
 fu
el
 
its
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
 a
nd
 a
t p
re
se
nt
 w
e 
ha
ve
 la
rg
e 
sh
or
tf
al
ls 
in
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 e
ne
rg
y.
 (…
) 
W
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 c
om
pr
om
ise
 o
ur
 e
ffo
rt
s t
ow
ar
ds
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
bu
t w
e 
ar
e 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 to
 p
ut
 
ou
r e
ffo
rt
s 
fo
r m
iti
ga
tio
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
’ (
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
) 
 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 b
ot
h 
- t
he
 s
er
io
us
ne
ss
 o
f c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 im
pa
ct
s 
AN
D 
- t
he
 n
ec
es
sit
y 
to
 c
on
sid
er
 
ot
he
r f
ac
to
rs
 s
uc
h 
as
 
so
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l. 
H
IG
H 
Cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 b
ea
rs
 h
ig
h 
ris
ks
 
an
d 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
s,
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 im
pa
ct
s c
le
ar
ly
 o
ut
w
ei
gh
 
th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 re
sp
on
ds
. H
ow
ev
er
, 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s 
(e
co
no
m
ic
 
‘In
 a
dd
iti
on
 to
 a
ll 
th
es
e 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 A
fg
ha
ni
st
an
 is
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 te
n 
co
un
tr
ie
s i
n 
th
e 
w
or
ld
 
id
en
tif
ie
d 
as
 m
os
t v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e 
to
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
. W
e 
ar
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
s 
of
 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
is 
la
nd
-lo
ck
ed
, m
ou
nt
ai
no
us
, a
nd
 le
as
t d
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
ry
. T
he
 n
ew
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t h
im
se
lf 
ha
ve
 re
ce
nt
ly
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
s 
of
 c
lim
at
e 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 …
 
- c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
s 
an
 
ad
di
tio
na
l a
nd
 m
aj
or
 
bu
rd
en
 fo
r s
oc
io
-e
co
no
m
ic
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
 81
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s,
 
et
c.
 …
) a
re
 a
lso
 im
po
rt
an
t. 
ch
an
ge
 a
s 
a 
m
aj
or
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 h
ur
dl
e 
in
 a
ch
ie
vi
ng
 o
ur
 s
oc
io
-e
co
no
m
ic
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
’ 
(A
fg
ha
ni
st
an
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 ‘C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 a
 g
lo
ba
l c
ha
lle
ng
e 
w
ith
 s
er
io
us
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
fo
r n
at
io
ns
 a
cr
os
s t
he
 
gl
ob
e.
 T
he
 c
os
t o
f i
na
ct
io
n 
fa
r o
ut
w
ei
gh
s t
ho
se
 o
f t
ak
in
g 
co
nc
re
te
 m
ea
su
re
s’
 (I
ra
n,
 H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 ‘V
ie
tn
am
 b
el
on
gs
 t
o 
th
e 
gr
ou
p 
of
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
th
at
 a
re
 m
os
t 
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
, a
lso
 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
its
 s
oc
io
-e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t’.
 (V
ie
tn
am
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
CO
P 
13
) 
O
R 
- t
he
 s
er
io
us
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
, 
O
R 
- t
he
 h
ig
h 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 o
f a
 
co
un
tr
y 
to
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
, 
O
R 
- c
os
t o
f i
na
ct
io
n 
is 
hi
gh
er
 
th
an
 o
f t
ak
in
g 
co
nc
re
te
 
m
ea
su
re
s.
 
 
VE
RY
_H
IG
H 
Cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 h
as
 m
os
t 
sig
ni
fic
an
t r
isk
s 
an
d 
th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
im
pa
ct
s 
ar
e 
w
el
l e
xc
ee
di
ng
 th
e 
co
st
s 
re
sp
on
ds
. C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
im
pa
ct
s 
ar
e 
am
on
g 
th
e 
m
os
t 
im
po
rt
an
t t
hr
ea
ts
 to
 s
oc
io
-
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 s
af
et
y.
  
‘F
or
 A
fr
ic
a,
 C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 in
de
ed
 a
 c
ha
lle
ng
e.
 (…
) m
os
t A
fr
ic
an
 e
co
no
m
ie
s 
re
ly
 o
n 
cl
im
at
e-
se
ns
iti
ve
 s
ec
to
rs
 h
ig
hl
y 
ex
po
se
d 
to
 c
lim
at
e 
va
ria
bi
lit
y,
 d
ro
ug
ht
, f
lo
od
in
g,
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
di
sr
up
tin
g 
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 e
nd
an
ge
rin
g 
liv
el
ih
oo
ds
, a
nd
 h
ea
lth
, (
…
)’ 
(A
fr
ic
an
 
U
ni
on
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
, L
im
a)
 
 ‘T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
ed
 fu
tu
re
 im
pa
ct
s 
pr
es
en
t c
at
as
tr
op
hi
c 
sc
en
ar
io
s f
or
 K
en
ya
, A
fr
ic
a 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
vu
ln
er
ab
le
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
(K
en
ya
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
) 
‘C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 th
e 
sin
gl
e 
gr
ea
te
st
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
fa
ci
ng
 m
y 
co
un
tr
y’
 (T
uv
al
u,
 H
ig
h-
le
ve
l 
se
gm
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
)  
Cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 im
pa
ct
s 
cl
ea
rly
 
ra
ng
e 
am
on
g 
th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t 
th
re
at
s 
in
di
ca
te
d 
fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
by
 
su
pe
rla
tiv
e 
fo
rm
ul
at
io
ns
, a
dj
ec
tiv
es
 
su
ch
 a
s 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
ic
, o
r a
n 
en
um
er
at
io
n 
of
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
s.
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IN
ST
RU
M
EN
TS
: W
H
AT
 A
RE
 T
H
E 
M
O
ST
 IM
PO
RT
AN
T 
PO
LI
CY
 O
BJ
EC
TI
VE
S 
AN
D 
W
IT
H
 W
H
AT
 K
IN
D 
O
F 
IN
ST
RU
M
EN
TS
 S
HO
U
LD
 B
E 
AD
DR
ES
SE
D?
 R
ES
PE
CT
IV
E 
CA
TE
G
O
RY
 H
AS
T 
TO
 C
LE
AR
LY
 D
O
M
IN
AT
E 
O
VE
R 
O
TH
ER
 C
AT
EG
O
RI
ES
 T
O
 B
E 
CO
DE
D.
 
CA
TE
G
O
RY
 
De
fin
iti
on
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
St
at
em
en
ts
 
Co
di
ng
 R
ul
es
 
CO
M
M
IT
M
EN
T 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
 is
 g
iv
en
 to
 th
e 
m
at
te
r 
of
 re
du
ci
ng
 p
ol
iti
ca
l u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 a
s 
ca
us
ed
 b
y 
no
n-
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
to
 
na
tio
na
l c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 a
nd
 fr
ee
 
rid
in
g.
 T
he
 p
os
sib
le
 p
ol
ic
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 to
 a
dd
re
ss
 th
is 
m
at
te
r 
ar
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d 
re
po
rt
in
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 th
at
 c
on
tr
ol
, l
eg
al
ly
 
bi
nd
in
g 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
, a
nd
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
(s
uc
h 
as
 
sa
nc
tio
ns
). 
‘(.
.) 
w
e 
ne
ed
 c
la
rit
y 
on
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 P
ar
tie
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 a
re
 tr
an
sp
ar
en
t a
nd
 u
nd
er
st
an
da
bl
e;
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 a
lso
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
a 
pr
oc
es
s 
on
 a
 
pr
oc
es
s 
to
 c
on
sid
er
 a
nd
 a
na
ly
se
 th
os
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 b
ef
or
e 
Pa
ris
’ (
EU
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
). 
 
A 
gl
ob
al
 le
ga
lly
 b
in
di
ng
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t ‘
(…
) w
ill
 p
ro
vi
de
 re
as
on
ab
le
 a
ss
ur
an
ce
 th
at
 th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
re
ci
pr
oc
ity
 o
f a
ct
io
ns
 a
m
on
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s a
nd
 in
st
il 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 in
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
to
 im
pl
em
en
t t
he
ir 
ow
n’
 (S
in
ga
po
re
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
). 
 An
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t m
us
t ‘
de
liv
er
 a
ct
io
n 
ov
er
 ti
m
e.
 O
ne
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
w
ay
 to
 d
o 
th
at
 is
 to
 a
llo
w
 
co
un
tr
ie
s t
o 
co
op
er
at
e 
in
 fu
ll-
fil
lin
g 
th
ei
r o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
’ (
N
or
w
ay
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
) 
 Th
e 
Pa
ris
 p
ro
to
co
l ‘
ha
s 
to
 s
at
isf
y 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
cr
ite
ria
. I
t h
as
 to
 b
e 
le
ga
lly
 b
in
di
ng
. 
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
ill
 o
nl
y 
be
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 m
ak
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
, i
f t
he
y 
ca
n 
be
 su
re
 th
at
 a
ll 
ot
he
r 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
ill
 s
ta
nd
 b
y 
(…
). 
W
e 
ne
ed
 a
 c
re
di
bl
e 
re
vi
ew
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 fo
r c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 a
nd
 a
 
ro
bu
st
 tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 sy
st
em
’ (
G
er
m
an
y,
 H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
) 
Pr
io
rit
y 
m
us
t b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 a
t l
ea
st
 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
iss
ue
s:
 
- t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
or
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d 
re
po
rt
in
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
, 
- t
he
 le
ga
lly
-b
in
di
ng
 
ch
ar
ac
te
r o
f c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 
th
at
 e
ns
ur
es
 th
e 
re
ci
pr
oc
ity
 o
f a
ct
io
n 
am
on
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
  
O
R 
- f
le
xi
bi
lit
y 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
in
 
th
e 
se
ns
e 
th
at
 th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 is
 e
ns
ur
ed
. 
 
AS
YM
M
ET
RI
ES
 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
 is
 g
iv
en
 to
 th
e 
m
at
te
r 
of
 re
du
ci
ng
 a
sy
m
m
et
rie
s 
of
 
in
te
re
st
s 
an
d 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 a
nd
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 P
os
sib
le
 p
ol
ic
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 to
 a
dd
re
ss
 th
is 
iss
ue
 
ar
e 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 o
r f
in
an
ci
al
 tr
an
sf
er
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s,
 c
ap
ac
ity
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
an
d 
Lo
ss
 &
 D
am
ag
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
.  
‘It
 is
 e
qu
al
ly
 e
vi
de
nt
 th
at
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
co
ul
d 
do
 m
or
e 
if 
fin
an
ce
, t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
su
pp
or
t a
nd
 c
ap
ac
ity
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
is 
en
su
re
d’
 (I
nd
ia
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 ‘W
e 
ne
ed
 a
 n
eu
tr
al
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 fa
ir 
sh
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
hu
ge
 g
lo
ba
l 
ef
fo
rt
 o
f e
ac
h 
pa
rt
y,
 b
ot
h 
to
 m
in
im
iz
e 
th
e 
ris
k 
of
 d
an
ge
ro
us
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 e
na
bl
e 
ad
ap
ta
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 w
ar
m
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 a
lre
ad
y 
be
en
 c
au
se
d 
pr
im
ar
ily
 b
y 
th
e 
An
ne
x 
1 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
’ (
Af
gh
an
ist
an
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
20
). 
 ‘C
lim
at
e 
fin
an
ci
ng
 is
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 k
ey
 e
le
m
en
ts
. C
lim
at
e 
fin
an
ci
ng
 is
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
ab
ou
t f
un
di
ng
. I
t 
is 
al
so
 a
bo
ut
 b
al
an
ci
ng
 e
co
no
m
ic
 in
te
re
st
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s.
 A
nd
 o
f c
re
at
in
g 
tr
us
t 
Pr
io
rit
y 
m
us
t b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 a
t l
ea
st
 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
iss
ue
s:
 
- d
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
th
at
 
su
pp
or
t d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
fin
an
ci
al
 
or
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 tr
an
sf
er
, o
r 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 b
ui
ld
in
g,
 
- c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
pa
ym
en
ts
 
fo
r c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
m
iti
ga
tio
n 
ac
tio
n 
an
d 
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be
tw
ee
n 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
at
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t’ 
(N
or
w
ay
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
). 
 
im
pa
ct
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
Lo
ss
 a
nd
 
Da
m
ag
e 
or
 R
ED
D,
 
AN
D 
 
- e
qu
ity
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 a
 fa
ir 
sh
ar
e 
of
 e
ffo
rt
s a
nd
 
be
ne
fit
s 
of
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
or
 
ad
ap
ta
tio
n 
ac
tio
n.
 
-  
U
N
CE
RT
AI
N
TY
 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
 is
 g
iv
en
 to
 re
du
ce
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
he
ig
ht
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic
 c
os
ts
 im
po
se
d 
by
 s
pe
ci
fic
 c
om
m
itm
en
ts
. P
os
sib
le
 
po
lic
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 to
 a
dd
re
ss
 th
is 
iss
ue
 a
re
 a
ll 
ki
nd
s 
of
 fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
ac
tio
n 
is 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t g
oa
ls.
 
‘A
s 
fo
r a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
an
ot
he
r s
en
sit
iv
e 
an
d 
es
se
nt
ia
l i
ss
ue
, n
am
el
y 
th
e 
su
rp
lu
s 
an
d 
ca
rr
y-
ov
er
 
of
 K
yo
to
 u
ni
ts
, t
he
 s
ol
ut
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 in
to
 c
on
sid
er
at
io
n 
al
l a
sp
ec
ts
: a
ck
no
w
le
dg
e 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
ef
fo
rt
s 
of
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 re
sp
ec
tin
g 
th
e 
KP
 p
ro
vi
sio
ns
, a
ss
ur
e 
fa
irn
es
s f
or
 a
ll 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 a
nd
 c
or
re
ct
ly
 a
ss
es
s t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
, f
in
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s o
f r
ed
uc
in
g 
em
iss
io
ns
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 F
or
 a
ch
ie
vi
ng
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
in
 a
 c
os
t-
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
m
an
ne
r, 
w
e 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
 c
ar
bo
n 
m
ar
ke
t i
s 
an
 e
ss
en
tia
l t
oo
l’ 
(R
om
an
ia
, H
ig
h-
le
ve
l s
eg
m
en
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
CO
P 
16
). 
 ‘L
at
vi
a 
w
as
 v
er
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
ab
ou
t i
ts
 p
os
sib
le
 c
om
m
itm
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Appendix C: Research Design 
RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
VARIABLE EXPLANATION DATA SOURCE REM 
VARIABLE 
HYPOTHESIS 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
Cooperation 
dummy 
(cooperation = 
1; conflict =0 
 
This variable reflects 
all true cooperative 
events in the event 
sequence. It is 
coded as dummy 
variable with true 
cooperation = 1 and 
potential 
cooperation = 0. 
 
Event data set Based on 
event 
sequence 
all 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
3 preference 
homophily 
variables 
(CDBR-
principle, 
impact, 
instruments) 
These variables 
capture whether 
two countries share 
preferences on the 
CDBR-principle, 
climate change 
related impacts, or 
policy objectives 
and instruments. 
Statements 
made by high-
level country 
representatives 
made at 
selected 
UNFCCC Climate 
Change 
Conferences at 
two periods 
(1997 – 2009 
and 2010-2015) 
 
Dyadic 
variable 
H1a, H1b 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Reciprocity Tendency of actors 
to reciprocate 
cooperative 
behaviour. 
 
Event data set Network 
statistic 
H2 
 
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Inertia Tendency of past 
contacts to become 
future contacts or 
social inertia. 
 
Event data set Network 
statistic 
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE  
Sender 
similarity 
Tendency of 
senders to target 
the same 
cooperation 
partners. 
 
Event data set Network 
statistic 
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Target 
popularity 
Tendency for 
targets to be 
targeted by others 
with cooperative 
initiatives. 
 
Event data set Network 
statistic  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Absolute GHG 
emissions 
The variable 
captures the level of 
absolute GHG 
emissions for each 
year between 1997 
and 2015. Absolute 
emissions are 
measured in CO2 
Ktons per year. 
 
World 
development 
indicators 
Actor 
covariate 
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Vulnerability The variable reflects 
the GDP adjusted 
vulnerability of a 
country to climate 
ND Gain 
Vulnerability 
Index 
Actor 
covariate 
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change. The index is 
composed of a 
countries exposure 
to climate-related 
hazards, its 
sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity. 
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Per capita GDP The variable reflects 
the logged GDP for 
each year between 
1997 and 2015. 
 
World 
development 
indicators 
Actor 
covariate  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Polity 2 The variable reflects 
the level of 
democracy of a 
country for each 
year between 1997 
and 2015. 
 
World 
development 
indicators 
Actor 
covariate  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
Natural rents The variable reflects 
the average rents 
from coal, oil, and 
natural gas 
production (% GDP) 
in period for each 
year between 1997 
and 2015. 
World 
development 
indicators 
  
Actor 
covariate 
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II. What drives the Adoption of Climate Change Mitigation Policy? A 
Dynamic Network Approach to Policy Diffusion, by M. Kammerer & C. 
Bagchi 
Abstract 
The Paris Agreement envisages bottom-up action from all countries to protect the global 
climate. Therefore, studying the factors influencing policy adoption is more important now 
than ever. This article lines into the policy diffusion literature to shed light on the conditions, 
which incentivises countries to adopt climate change related mitigation policies. The 
theoretical argument elaborates on the unified model of government innovation that includes 
both internal and external factors as explanations for the adoption of policies. Previous 
applications of this model usually operationalise the latter by spatial proximity or 
international, institutional ties to account for the interdependencies among countries and use 
them to explain policy diffusion. In contrast, this research highlights the benefit of studying 
the relations between countries as they arise in the context of international interactions, over 
time. The findings indicate that internal determinants and time-invariant international factors 
give important insights about why some countries more likely adopt (more) climate policies 
than others, but they cannot explain how these policies have diffused across countries in the 
past two decades. In contrast, the inclusion of dynamically, evolving relations between 
countries shows that policy adoption is a matter of social influence. In the context of political 
interactions related to international climate policy, countries communicate, compare with 
each other, and coordinate their behaviour, leading to a diffusion of political practices. 
 
Keywords. Climate change, social network analysis, policy diffusion, cooperation, temporal 
network autocorrelation model 
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1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement of 2015 is the first ever international treaty in the history of climate 
change politics where all the countries in the world agreed to act together to fight climate 
change. Unlike its predecessors, the treaty is based on the principle of self-determination 
requiring ambitious national climate protection policies. While the Paris Agreement is a 
momentous development in climate change policy, it requires bottom-up action from all the 
countries. Therefore, countries, on their own accord, must adopt domestic policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or mitigate climate change.  
However, countries on their own have little incentive to adopt climate change mitigation 
policies since global climate change is considered to be a classic 'tragedy of the commons‘ 
(Hardin, 1968). Investing resources to adopt climate change mitigation policies provides a 
common pool resource by contributing to a cleaner atmosphere around the globe. Climate 
change mitigation is hence, a global public good with non-excludable benefits. This aspect of 
mitigation often encourages free-riding behaviour, i.e. enjoying the benefits of other 
countries’ climate protection efforts, while avoiding costly policies yourself. Understanding 
the free-riding incentives of others increase the non-likelihood of adopting climate change 
policies due to potential economic losses and expected competitive disadvantages in the short 
run. Nevertheless, despite having the ability to free ride on mitigation action by others, we do 
observe countries adopting a substantial number of national legislations on climate change 
mitigation. The GLOBE Climate Legislation Study (2016; 2014) finds that between 2009 and 
2014, the number of climate change policies adopted almost doubled in the 99 countries they 
studied. In this article, we aim to investigate the factors that influence the domestic adoption 
of climate change mitigation policies. 
Some authors claim that countries adopt climate change mitigation due to the associated 
co-benefits (Dolšak, 2009). Co-benefits are defined as the benefits accruing locally due to the 
adoption of a climate change mitigation policy (IPCC, 2007). For instance, if a country adopts 
renewable energy programs, the global benefit will be the overall GHG reduction. Additionally, 
it will also generate economic benefits and reduce local air pollution. Irrespective of the 
generation of such co-benefits, the motivation behind the adoption of climate change related 
mitigation legislation is targeted towards a more general reduction of GHGs, principally at a 
global scale. In fact, many countries pass a ‘flagship law’ (Townshend et al., 2013) that specifies 
an emission target or unifies different policies under an inclusive legislation. Moreover, the 
extent of co-benefits from a mitigation policy is often not enough to incentivise high levels of 
GHG emission reductions. For instance, because of the global nature of mitigation countries, 
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like the US and China, often find themselves in a deadlock, where both of them wait for the 
other to take action (Thurston, 2013). Hence, we expect that co-benefits alone cannot drive 
countries to adopt climate change mitigation policies. It is rather the nature of international 
relations and the anticipation of the behaviour of other countries that foster or hinder the 
adoption of climate change mitigation policies. 
Based on this argument, the article lines into the policy diffusion and adoption literature 
by questioning how international interdependencies can lead to a diffusion of climate change 
mitigation policies and thereby influence domestic decision-making. The next section of the 
paper discusses developments in the policy diffusion literature. It explores the factors that 
influence the adoption of a domestic policy, keeping in view the connection between 
international relations and domestic politics. We also discuss the current research on climate 
policy diffusion. Furthermore, we explain why the current literature has not satisfactorily 
covered the issue of country interdependencies and highlight the advantages of a dynamic 
network perspective to explore policy diffusion. In the succeeding section, we introduce the 
‘unified model of government innovation’ (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2014) to derive and explain 
the analytical approach. Methodologically, we apply a temporal network autocorrelation 
model (Leenders, 2002; Leifeld & Cranmer, 2016). We chose this model since it allows us to 
disentangle the different factors that might lead to the adoption of climate change mitigation 
policies, such as the internal motives, resources, or constraints of a country and its 
international relations, and to assess them over time. By studying cooperative political 
interactions that happened in the context of the global climate change issue between 1995 
and 2015, we demonstrate that the adoption of climate policies is a matter of social influence. 
Our results show, that countries are more likely to adopt policies if they interact with other 
countries that already have adopted a few climate policies. In addition, countries tend to 
behave akin to those countries that are in a similar structural position. 
2. Theoretical Approaches to Policy Diffusion 
The interconnectedness between international relations and domestic policy innovation is 
often analysed in the context of transnational diffusion processes or clustered decision-
making, which can be understood as a ‘dispersion or dissemination’ (Elkins & Simmons, 2005, 
p. 36) of political practice. These processes are studied in the context of a wide range of 
phenomena, such as the diffusion of specific policy instruments, institutions, or policy 
frameworks. To name a few, we can consider the studies on neoliberal models, democracy 
standards and certifications, or labour rights (Gilardi, 2012). Rogers (1983, p. 6) defines policy 
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diffusion as a ’process by which [policy] innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among members of a social system‘. The patterns of policy innovation by diffusion 
are often expressed through two levels: the unit of analysis (e.g. countries) and the social 
structure (e.g. a policy domain) (True & Mintrom, 2001). The mechanisms that induce policy 
innovation are either due to the internal characteristics of the unit of analysis (e.g. socio-
economic conditions) or due to the ’unit’s interaction with others in the broader social system‘ 
(True & Mintrom, 2001, p. 34). Diffusion is usually understood as a mechanism of social 
influence that manifests either through the vertical mechanism of coercion or the horizontal 
mechanisms of competition, social learning, or emulation (Berry & Berry, 2007; Gilardi, 2012). 
Coercion is carried out through conditionality and can either be from federal governments to 
the state or local governments (Shipan & Volden, 2006) or imposed on nation-states by 
hegemons, supranational or intergovernmental organisations (Biersteker, 1990; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Competition is defined as ’the process whereby 
policymakers anticipate or react to the behaviour of other countries to attract or retain 
economic resources’ (Gilardi, 2012, p. 15). Learning happens when policymakers go through 
a process of Bayesian updating to deal with the uncertain consequences arising from the 
introduction or modification of a policy (Gilardi, 2010). Lastly, emulation or imitation occurs 
when policymakers learn from one another’s ‘good policy practices’ or adapt to commonly 
accepted norms (Jordan & Lenschow, 2000). Regardless of quality or motive, the common idea 
behind these causal mechanisms of policy diffusion is that the adoption of a certain kind of 
behaviour depends on the behaviour of other actors.  
Based on the mechanisms of policy diffusion, Berry and Berry (2007) claim that internal 
and/or external determinants might drive the adoption of a policy. For example, a combination 
of internal factors (social or political) may influence a country to impose a tax on its citizens. 
On the other hand, external factors such as joining an international agreement may encourage 
it to impose a regulation to phase out on certain industrial pollutants. Following this approach, 
most of the early diffusion studies often implicitly assumed that policy diffusion arises from 
interdependencies and interactions between related actors. Expressed differently, these 
studies understood diffusion as a process where countries observe the policy behaviour in 
related countries and then implement similar policies back home (Berry & Berry, 1990; 
Mintrom, 1997). 
A network perspective in studying the diffusion of policies allows us to integrate explicitly 
interdependencies resulting from social interactions of actors in a policy domain. Increasingly, 
scholars across different policy areas started to assimilate a more refined analytical approach 
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to understand interdependencies where the behaviour of one actor can be dependent on the 
actions of other actors (Cao, 2010; Dorussen, Gartzke, & Westerwinter, 2016) and not 
necessarily only due to geographical proximity or organizational similarity. To name only a few 
of the most recent advancements: Chyzh (2016) studied human rights diffusion via trade 
networks; Haim (2016) investigated how a network of international political alliances influence 
trade flows and Mohrenberg (2017) used a social network analysis approach to study the 
diffusion of foreign trade policies through bilateral trade flows.  
Typically, studies in climate policy continue to explain the adoption of new climate policies 
either by policy diffusion between geographically neighbouring countries (Matisoff, 2008), the 
influence of international organisations (Oberthür & Tänzer, 2002) and/or by internal 
determinants (Regens, 1980). Climate policy studies, more recently are tending to incorporate 
international factors along with domestic ones, to study the process of policy diffusion. Some 
noteworthy studies investigate the adoption of climate policies by using Berry and Berry’s 
(2014) ‘unified model of government innovation’ that combines external factors and internal 
determinants. For instance, Dolšak (2009, 2013) examines how internal factors (such as, 
domestic air pollution, the level of income, democracy levels) in conjunction with external 
factors (for example, a country’s embeddedness in different networks of intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) affects policy diffusion. She concludes that countries have an incentive 
to implement international climate protection agreements when emission reduction policies 
create domestic co-benefits such as reduced domestic pollution. In a similar vein, 
Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) point out that while external factors such as learning from 
other international organisations influence the adoption of climate policies, internal factors, 
such as political preferences, too, are pivotal for diffusion to occur. Stadelmann and Castro 
(2014) also develop an integrated model to study energy policy adoption in developing 
countries to come to a similar conclusion - both external and internal factors influences policy 
adoption. Frankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins (2015) contrast policy diffusion, which is more 
of a bottom-up process, with the more top-down nature of international treaties, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol. They conclude that whether a country passes any climate change legislation 
or not depends substantially on whether other countries do the same. Another extension to 
traditional climate policy diffusion studies is that of Matisoff and Edwards (2014). They study 
how clean energy policies diffused across different states in the United States to finally 
conclude that policy learning and diffusion happens when states are imitating ‘cultural 
cohorts, rather than geographical cohorts’ (Matisoff & Edwards, 2014, p. 798). 
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A network perspective in the literature on policy diffusion in climate policy is rare and 
climate policy studies that have used network analysis do not focus on policy diffusion (Ingold 
& Fischer, 2013; Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila, & Broadbent, 2017; Stein, 2008). On the other hand, 
as already discussed above, studies in climate policy that attempt to analyse policy diffusion, 
do not adopt a network perspective but rather focus on internal/external determinants. It is 
imperative to take this into account, because as an issue area, climate policy itself is an 
interdependent process where actions taken by one country may very well have effects on 
other countries. This gap created in the climate policy diffusion literature by the absence of 
the consideration interdependencies arising out of interactions between actors is precisely 
what we aim to fill in this study. The main aim of our research is to assess the extent to which 
policy adoption is a function of interactions between countries. To this end, we extend the 
traditional approaches by including country interactions in the realm of international climate 
policy, thereby integrating a network perspective on policy diffusion. Our expectation is that 
meetings in common forums such as the UNFCCC to agree on common goals in climate policy 
can facilitate an exchange of ideas and promote policy learning among different actors. We 
explain how we expand on Berry and Berry’s model of ‘unified government innovation’ (1990, 
2014) to incorporate network ties as an additional external determinant of policy diffusion in 
the succeeding section. 
3. The Extended Model of Government Innovation 
We base our analytical framework on the ‘unified model of government innovation’ as 
proposed by Berry and Berry (1990, 2014, p. 325). The model combines internal and external 
determinants to explain the adoption of new policies as a function of the motivation (M) of 
country officials to adopt a certain policy, the available resources, or obstacles (R), the 
existence of other policies (POL), and external factors (EXT). While M, R, and POL all refer to 
domestic characteristics, EXT captures variables such as the spatial proximity of two countries 
or their institutional similarity. In its original version, the model is expressed as follows: 
ADOPT = f ((DOM = M + R + POL) + EXT)     Equation 1 
Applications of the ‘unified model of government innovation’ usually operationalise the 
external effects that trigger diffusion processes by neighbouring or peer group effects that 
capture physical or cultural closeness (Dolšak, 2009, 2013; Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 
2014). Similarly, trade relations, common membership in international organisations, etc. 
create direct and indirect links between countries and result in social influence. Many of these 
applications use an event history analysis (EHA) model. In an EHA, the main dependent 
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variable is the risk of adopting a new policy. The unit of analysis is usually state-years, country-
years, city-years, and so on. The problem of this approach is that although EHA models include 
neighbouring effects, they are unable to capture appropriately interdependencies between 
countries. This is because the observations in these studies are, by assumption, independent 
from each other. All kinds of traditional regression models are based on the same assumption. 
Therefore, arguing that policy adoption is a matter of interdependencies between the 
countries stands in direct contrast to the assumption of independent observations.  
Gilardi and Füglister (2008) react to this problem by proposing a dyadic approach, in which 
the dependent variable is coded as 1 when country A makes its policy more similar to country 
B. According to them, ‘the dependent variable does not record policy change or the influence 
of one state over another, but simply indicates an increased similarity in the policies of two 
states’ (Gilardi & Füglister, 2008, p. 419). While we acknowledge that this approach is 
appealing, it is not without certain drawbacks. Firstly, the dependent variable cannot be 
observed directly but needs to be constructed indirectly. This makes the process of data 
collection cumbersome and particularly so, with geographically large data sets. Secondly, this 
approach still neglects dependence structures of higher order as imposed by the network 
context. 
Our approach takes into consideration the drawbacks of the existing literature and 
proposes extending the ‘unified model of government innovation’ by including network 
dependencies over time as an additional external determinant of policy diffusion. A crucial 
assumption of the network approach is that the existence and emergence of ties between the 
units of analysis depend on the existence of other ties (network dependence assumption) and 
exogenously given actor attributes (social selection assumption). Put differently, many social 
phenomena are ‘embedded within networks of interdependencies, the so-called ‘context’ of 
these phenomena’ (Leenders, 2002, 21). This means that social actors are responsive to the 
context by contemplating on the behaviour of others.  
The occurrence of specific attributes or behaviour often depends on direct and indirect 
network ties as well as on the distribution of actor-specific characteristics and behaviour 
across the network. Leenders (2002, p. 26) argues that social influence occurs ‘(…) when an 
actor adapts his behaviour, attitude, or belief, to the behaviours, attitudes, or beliefs of other 
actors in the social system’. Whether the influence is intentional or not does not matter here. 
The priority is the availability of information about the behaviour and attitude of other actors 
to be able to mutually compare and learn. In our research context, this implies that countries 
have a higher probability of adopting a climate policy when they are directly or indirectly linked 
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to other countries that have already adopted climate policies. This argument is in line with 
findings from Bernstein and Cashore (2012) and Kern, Jörgens, and Jänicke (2001) and has 
been widely accepted within the policy diffusion literature (Gilardi, 2010). 
Leenders (2002) breaks down the horizontal mechanisms behind social influence into two 
main processes – communication and comparison. Communication ‘refers to social influence 
through direct contact between ego and alter’ (Leenders, 2002, p. 27). Consequently, 
countries use other countries as their frame of reference, with which they have direct ties. For 
the diffusion of climate policies this entails that countries are more likely to innovate their 
climate policy, when they have direct links to other countries (i.e. diplomatic interactions, 
meetings of country officials, exchange of material and human resources and so on) that have 
already adopted climate policies. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Countries with direct ties to other countries that have already adopted 
climate policies, should adopt climate more policies. 
On the other hand, the adoption of new policies might be triggered by a comparison with 
structurally similar countries. In the process of searching for a ‘social identity,' a country 
ascribes to itself the same characteristics as structurally similar countries and adopts a similar 
behaviour. Studies on international conflict support this claim by showing that countries tend 
to follow a similar behaviour to structurally equivalent alters (Maoz, Kuperman, Terris, & 
Talmud, 2006). In other words, structural equivalence can be described as the tendency to 
have and create ties with other actors that make similar choices. Thus, countries that are 
similar in their relations with other countries hold a similar structural position and are 
structurally equivalent. For the diffusion of climate policies, we expect countries to imitate 
other countries that are akin to themselves. In other words, these countries are structurally 
equivalent if they interact in similar ways, i.e. they have similar diplomatic relations, meet, and 
exchange information with the same countries. We expect these countries to also behave 
likewise with respect to their climate mitigation policy. We therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2: A country will more likely adopt a climate policy if structurally equivalent 
countries also adopt climate policies. 
This approach also has its limitations, as it is not possible to solve the ‘chicken and egg’ 
problem and disentangle comparison from communication. In principle, however, countries 
with direct ties could compare themselves with each other and countries with indirect ties 
could have overlooked the channels of communication. In addition, one cannot truly know 
whether the similarity of two structurally equivalent countries arises from comparison and/or 
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communication. The results of this study are not meant to offer an empirical solution to 
separate these two distinct, but interconnected theoretical concepts. However, it points to 
the importance of interdependent decision-making in a more general sense. 
Based on these hypotheses, we propose to redefine the ‘unified model of government 
innovation’ (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2007) in the following way: 
ADOPTit = f (INTit = (Mit + Rit + POLit) + EXTit = (PROXit + NETit))  Equation 2 
Hence, the adoption of (climate) policies is now a function of: 
• Internal determinants (INT) that encompass the country-specific motivation 
and problem severity (M), the available resources and capacity of a country 
to implement climate change mitigation policies (R), existing policies (POL) 
• External factors (EXT) that reflect the adoption behaviour of others that are 
in spatial proximity (PROX) or the political relation of countries expressed as 
direct and indirect network ties (NET). 
4. Research Design and Data 
This section outlines our data set based on the reformulated version of the ‘unified model 
of government innovation’ (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2007).  
Climate policy data 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the adoption of mitigation policies. It is based on 
data from the Grantham Research institute’s Global Climate Legislation Study of 2015 
(Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics, 2016). The study captures climate 
change laws and policies for mitigation as well as adaptation. This information is available for 
98 countries and the European Union (EU). Together, these countries are responsible for 
almost 93 percent of world emissions including the 46 of the world's top emitters and are 
home to 90 percent of world’s forests. The dataset includes 33 developed and 66 developed 
countries including the EU. It contains a list of about 800 climate-related policies and detailed 
country chapters with background information on key indicators. From this data set, we use a 
subset of 91 countries including the EU (compare Online Appendix A). 
We only focus on the adoption of mitigation policies based on the expectation that 
international factors influence its adoption since mitigation of climate change is a collective 
action issue. Mitigation policies refer to those policies aimed the reduction in emission of 
GHGs, energy supply and demand, renewable energy, transportation and so on. These policies 
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were coded as 1. In total, we consider 667 climate policies that have been adopted between 
1995 and 2015.  
Network data 
To collect information on country interactions, we have used the POLCLIMATE (Politics on 
Climate Change) event data set (cp. for more details Author(s), 2016, Hirschi, 2008). The 
dataset contains information on dyadic political, cooperative, and conflictive events related to 
climate change issues that occurred between 1995 and 2015. The current version of the event 
data set codes political event data based on lead sentences of news reports from Agence 
France Presse (AFP) for the period from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2015.  
The dataset describes interaction patterns between countries over time by encoding their 
participation in a conflictive or cooperative political event. Conflict or cooperation between 
countries can range from something small to something significantly important. For example, 
it can be something small, like a country making a comment on another country’s reformed 
policies, to something substantial, like offering financial support and agreeing to exchange 
confidential information. The dataset breaks down the complex political processes that occur 
beyond and in preparation to the yearly climate negotiations into a series of single events and 
therefore, captures ‘who did what to whom, when’ (Hirschi, 2009, p. 90; Schrodt, 1994). Each 
of these dyadic events can be understood as a political interaction operationalised as a tie in 
a political network. For this study, we used a subset of the same 98 countries including the EU 
that are available in the Global Legislation Study (2015). These countries cover more than 90% 
of the political interactions contained in the POLCLIMATE data set.  
Moreover, we focused on cooperative ties to disentangle possible contrary effects from 
conflict on policy diffusion. We decided to study policy diffusion based on cooperative 
interactions for several reasons: countries often meet and exchange views and opinions in 
international negotiation forums. More often than not, they have opposing views but for 
mutual profitability reasons, they try to cooperate and find a common ground. This can be a 
precursor to political coordination between countries (Keohane, 1984). We argue that these 
cooperative interactions are a good proxy for international interdependencies in climate 
politics since one country’s decisions might be influenced by these cooperative events. This 
reflects a completely different aspect of interdependencies in comparison to spatial proximity 
or institutional similarity. For exact definitions of types of cooperative and conflictive events 
that we consider in our analysis, compare Online Appendix B. 
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Based on the cooperative interactions (we made no distinction between the different types 
of cooperation), we transformed the event sequence, as created by event data analysis, into 
four weighted network matrices that only reflect cooperative ties in four subsequent time 
phases. These networks contain aggregated information about all cooperative interactions 
between countries occurring in the respective time phase. We constructed these time phases 
as per major events that have transpired in the history of climate policy. Compare Table 3 and 
Appendix C for a detailed description and justification of the periods. 
Table 3: Description of phases used in the analysis 
PHASE  NAME PERIOD 
T1 Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol 1995-2004 
T2 Implementing the Kyoto  
Protocol 
2005-07 
T3 Post Bali Enthusiasm 2008-09 
T4 Towards a New Agreement 2010-15 
 
Explanatory variables 
The policy adoption behaviour of other countries is one of our two explanatory variables. It 
enters the model as a net-lagged variable for weighted graphs. The ’weightlag’ (Leifeld 
& Cranmer, 2016) model term captures spatial autocorrelation in the four cooperation 
networks. The intuition behind the construction of this variable is that the policy adoption 
behaviour of a linked country affects a country’s policy adoption behaviour. If the value of the 
autocorrelation variable is significant, the country shows a similar adoption behaviour 
compared to the countries with which it cooperates most. The variable is constructed by a 
multiplication of the weighted matrices, one matrix for each phase, with the policy adoption 
variable of the respective phase. The resulting vectors reflect the level of spatial 
autocorrelation for each country in each phase. For example, between 1995-2004, Japan and 
Germany have cooperated intensively and hence have a direct, weighted tie with a high value. 
In line with our expectations, these countries also show similar policy adoption behaviour in 
terms of the climate policies they have adopted during this time phase. Consequently, the 
variable interprets the policy adoption behaviour of other countries in a network perspective. 
We expect the model parameter to be significant and positive to support hypotheses 1. 
To test hypothesis 2, we use a model term that encompasses the structural similarity of 
actors in terms of their cooperative interactions. We consider actors that are similar in their 
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social activity towards other actors to be structurally equivalent (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 
p. 348). The ‘structursim’ (Leifeld & Cranmer, 2016) model term is constructed as a similarity 
matrix based on Euclidian distance, which reflects the structural equivalence of two actors in 
terms of their cooperative ties. It is then multiplied by the policy adoption variable. This is 
computed for each of the four networks. Analogous to the weightlag variable, the resulting 
vector reflects how far a country shows similarity in their adoption behaviour compared to 
other structural equivalent countries. As an example, consider the countries Bangladesh and 
Bolivia. The two countries are highly structurally equivalent in time phase 4 i.e. between the 
year 2010-15 and both adopt a significant number of policies. For our hypothesis 2 to be 
supported, we expect the model parameter to be significant and positive. 
Control variables 
The first set of control variables reflects the motivation of a country to adopt climate 
policies. Therefore, we account for vulnerability, the level of absolute CO2 emissions, and 
natural resource rents. Countries that are more vulnerable to climate change are possibly 
those, which have contributed less to the problem and have lower levels of GHG emissions. 
It is expected that they will probably focus more on adapting to climate change rather than 
mitigate it. We utilise the vulnerability component of the ND-GAIN Index, since it is 
comprehensive, covers many countries, and adjusts for GDP, reducing our chances of 
encountering multicollinearity.13 We anticipate that high levels of vulnerability are negatively 
correlated with the adoption of mitigation policies. We also control for the absolute level of 
CO2 emissions since we expect that countries with higher levels of CO2 emissions are more 
likely to introduce climate change mitigation policies. Nachmany et al. (2014) claim that 
almost all countries with significantly higher emissions have taken up mitigation policies to 
reduce GHG emissions. Lastly, we control for natural resource rents that often form a sizeable 
part of the GDP and can influence the policy behaviour of a country. Since climate protection 
requires that countries reduce their carbon emission, it should result in a reduced use of 
fossil fuels. Therefore, countries with higher natural resource rents should adopt more 
climate change mitigation policies. We use the World Bank’s natural resource rent indicator 
                                                            
13Compare: Notre Dame's Environmental Change Initiative (ND-ECI) (2015). Notre Dame Global 
Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) Available online: URL: https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/.  
The vulnerability component, measures the extent to which a country is susceptible to the adverse 
effects of climate change. Specifically, it captures a country’s exposure to climate hazards, its sensitivity 
to climate impacts, and its adaptive capacity.  
100 
to control for the effect of natural resource rent on climate change policy adoption and 
expect a positive correlation between the two variables. 
The next set of variables reflects the resources available to a country and capacity of a 
country to adopt climate policies. Firstly, we control for GDP per capita. While countries often 
adopt climate change mitigation policies to access the co-benefits associated with them, the 
motivation to do so is less for countries that have fewer resources to procure and often the 
costs of introducing these expensive mitigation policies offset the benefits accruing from it. 
Therefore, we expect that countries with more financial resources will introduce more climate 
change mitigation policies.  This anticipation is also because higher growth in GDP levels is 
usually associated with higher levels of GHG emissions. Secondly, we control for the level of 
democracy of a country. Some studies such as Dolšak (2013) stated that democracy is an 
important determinant of climate change mitigation policy adoption since democratic 
governments are accountable to their people and more likely to adopt policies amenable to 
public opinion in their country. We use the Polity2 index and expect that the more democratic 
a country is, the higher will be its rate of policy adoption.  
Furthermore, existing mitigation policies might be positively correlated with whether a 
country adopts more mitigation policies. For instance, the existence of flagship laws may 
encourage countries to adopt more climate change mitigation. An additional motivation 
provided by existing policies may be because countries realise the co-benefits accruing from 
adopting climate change mitigation policies in the past that make them more likely to adopt 
climate change mitigation policies in the present. Lastly, we also control for the regional 
proximity of countries to capture neighbouring effects. For this purpose, we coded a variable 
that assigns countries to world regions as defined by the World Bank. In our model we included 
the region as a homophily term same region. A significant positive parameter estimate related 
to this variable would indicate that countries from the same region show a similar policy 
adoption behaviour. 
5. Model Specification 
Understanding the structure and effect of networks on the behaviour of social actors is 
important, because social processes, such as diffusion, may be potentiated by network ties 
(Daraganova & Robins, 2013). Social influence models serve to assess how the individual 
behaviour is constrained by the position of a social actor in a network and by the behaviour of 
other actors (and their position). The so-called autologistic actor attribute models or network 
autocorrelations models take the network tie as an exogenous explanatory factor, as well as 
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independent covariates, to model a specific behaviour (here: the adoption of climate change 
mitigation policies).  
Table 4: Overview of Variables and Data Sources 
VARIABLE TYPE VARIABLE EXPLANATION DATA SOURCE RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
DEPENDENCY 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Policy adoption  Number of 
adopted climate 
change mitigation 
policies in period 
t 
Global Climate 
Legislation 
Study 
  
DYAD-
INDEPENDENT 
COVARIATES 
Own past 
policy 
adoption 
behaviour 
Number of 
adopted climate 
change mitigation 
policies in period 
t 
Global Climate 
Legislation 
Study 
Control 
variable 
Covariate-
Dependent 
Assumption 
Time-lagged 
 Vulnerability Average 
vulnerability of 
country towards 
climate change 
risk in period t 
ND-GAIN Index 
of vulnerability 
Control 
variable 
Covariate-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 CO2 emissions 
(log) 
Average absolute 
emissions (ktCO2 
e, logged) in 
period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
Covariate-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 Natural Rents Average rents 
from coal, oil, and 
natural gas 
production (% 
GDP) in period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
Covariate-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 Polity2 Average level of 
democracy in 
period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
Covariate-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 Income Average GDP per 
capita PPP in 
period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
Covariate-
Dependent 
Assumption 
DYAD-
DEPENDENT 
COVARIATES 
Weightlag Adoption 
behaviour of 
directly linked 
countries 
Global Climate 
Legislation 
Study & 
POLCLIMATE 
data set 
H1 Network-
Attribute-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 Structursim Adoption 
behaviour of 
structurally 
equivalent actors 
Global Climate 
Legislation 
Study & 
POLCLIMATE 
data set 
H2 Network-
Attribute-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 Same region Regional 
proximity 
captured as 
homophily 
variable 
Own coding 
according to 
World Bank 
regions 
Control 
variable 
Network-
Attribute-
Dependent 
Assumption 
 
Autocorrelation models are based on four possible dependence assumptions (Daraganova 
& Robins, 2013). The simplest is the assumption of attribute independence, i.e. the network 
has no effect on the distribution of a specific attribute or behaviour across the social actors 
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resulting in no social influence effects. The covariate-dependence assumption is that the 
attribute or behaviour is conditionally dependent on other covariates (here: vulnerability, CO2-
emissions, democracy status, income, natural rents) relating to the same actor. On its own, 
this assumption produces models equivalent to standard logistic regression where several 
covariates predict policy behaviour. The network-dependent assumption is that an attribute 
or behaviour depends on the structural position of an individual in a social network, e.g. 
reflected by the level of activity or the involvement in transitive relationships. Finally, the 
network-attribute-dependent assumption arises when an attribute or behaviour of an 
individual is conditionally dependent on the tie to another individual with the same attribute 
or behaviour (here: the policy adoption behaviour of a country’s cooperation partner). Besides 
direct ties, the dependence structure can be extended to more complex network structures, 
such as indirect links (k-order dependencies) or network positions or roles (e.g. structural 
equivalence). We use an extension of a cross-sectional autocorrelation model that allows 
assessing policy diffusion patterns over time. The temporal network autocorrelation model as 
proposed by Leenders (2002) has a general form as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝜌𝜌1𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌2𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    Equation 3 
In this model, yit is our dependent variable – the adoption of mitigation policies for every 
country in the dataset at time t (ADOPTit).14 It is a count variable defined as the number of 
climate-related policies a country has adopted in the four consecutive periods (compare 
Appendix C). The first model term captures the set of covariates that reflect the relationship 
between the internal determinants of a country and its policy adoption behaviour (INTit = (Mit 
+ Rit + POLit)). The second model term hinges on the specification of the weight matrix W at 
time t (i.e. the network of cooperative interactions at time t) interacting with the dependent 
variable yit. This interaction term represents the external factors, i.e. the policy adoption 
behaviour of other actors in the network at time t, EXTit = (PROXit + NETit). In our model, the 
specification includes the effect of direct ties, structural equivalence, and the homophily or 
same region variable. The third model term contains network statistics related to the activity 
level or structural position and roles (These model terms are not used for this analysis.). 
Compare Table 4 for an overview of all variables, the research design. 
                                                            
14 Equation 2: ADOPTit = f (INTit = (Mit + Rit + POLit) + EXTit = (PROXit + TIESit)) 
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6. Results  
We estimated the model in R using the ‘tnam’ package (Leifeld and Cranmer 2016) and the 
‘pglm’ package (Croissant, 2017). As our dependent variable is a count variable, we ran the 
temporal network autocorrelation model using a negative binomial distribution function for 
panel data with time fixed effects based on a maximum-likelihood estimation. We started 
analysing our results by running several pooled models that average the effects over time and 
countries. We do this to account for the time invariant variables that cannot be estimated in 
a fixed effects setup. The effect of geographical regions, for instance, cannot be estimated in 
a fixed effects model.  
Table 5: Results temporal autocorrelation model 
 POOLED  
MODEL 1 
POOLED  
MODEL 2 
POOLED  
MODEL 3 
POOLED  
MODEL 4 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
INTERCEPT   -5.18 * 
(2.11) 
 -2.68 
(1.82) 
 -1.67 
  (1.09) 
 -3.01 
(-1.84) 
 -1.85 
(2.99) 
PAST POLICY ADOPTION   0.03 
(0.04) 
  0.08** 
(0.03) 
  0.08* 
  (0.04) 
  0.07* 
(0.03) 
  -0.15*** 
(0.04) 
DEMOCRACY STATUS  0.03 
(0.02) 
  0.05 
(0.03) 
  0.05 
  (0.03) 
  0.05 * 
(0.02) 
 - 0.02 
(0.04) 
GDP PER CAPITA (LOG)  -0.13 
(0.85) 
 -0.60 
(0.77) 
 -0.57 
  (0.77) 
 -0.77 
(0.77) 
 0.25 
(1.40) 
CO2 EMISSIONS (KT) 
(LOG) 
 2.34*** 
(0.46) 
 1.44** 
(0.45) 
  1.69*** 
  (0.46) 
  1.61 *** 
(0.46) 
  1.07 
(0.68) 
NATURAL RENTS  -0.01 
(0.01) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
  0.00 
(0.10) 
VULNERABILITY  0.00 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 
SIGMA  1.39*** 
(0.25) 
0.71*** 
(0.17) 
 0.70*** 
(0.17) 
 0.65*** 
(0.17) 
 
SAME REGION  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
     
STRUCTURISM    0.05*** 
(0.00) 
 0.05*** 
(0.00) 
  0.05 *** 
  (0.00) 
WEIGHTLAG     0.04** 
(0.01) 
  0.06 ** 
  (0.02) 
LOG LIKELIHOOD    -500.613   -463.59   -461.20  -458.38  -213.86 
AIC     1017.23    945.19    940.40   936.77   443.72 
NUM. OBS.    273    273    273   273   273 
NOTES   (P < 0.001 ***, P < 0.01 **, P < 0.05 *) 
  STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES 
We expect this could be an impediment to precise estimation of the factors leading to 
policy diffusion. The advantage of using political interactions to study diffusion is that they 
vary over time, what offers a much more precise estimation. It is also consistent with fixed 
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effects. Ultimately, accounting for political interactions allows us to understand the effect of 
international interdependencies on the diffusion of climate change mitigation policies across 
countries. 
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of our models with standard errors in 
parentheses. Comparing the models reveals four main findings. First, whereas the Pooled 
Model 1 displays no effect for the past adoption behaviour, Pooled Models 2-4 show a positive 
and significant effect on the parameter estimate related to the past adoption behaviour. 
Similarly, the democracy status parameter becomes significant only in model 4. This shows 
that there is an omitted variable bias, which is resolved by controlling for spatial proximity 
(model 2) or the policy adoption behaviour of structurally equivalent and directly linked 
countries (model 4). This finding is further confirmed by the improved model fit as reflected 
by the decreased Akaike information criterion (AIC) values when comparing Pooled Model 1 
with the other models.  
Second, in the averaged perspective of the pooled models, countries adopt more policies 
if they can build on existing ones. The fixed effects model that controls for the time periods 
has a significant but negative parameter estimate related to the past policy adoption 
behaviour of a country. This change in parameter sign can be well explained. It demonstrates 
that if countries have adopted many climate change mitigation policies in the previous period, 
it is very likely that they will not adopt many policies in the next period again. From an 
averaged perspective, however, countries that are already actively engaged in adopting 
climate policies in the past tend to be more active in the future, too, thereby increasing the 
overall number of policies adopted more than for more passive countries. 
Third, parameter estimates for all other covariates related to the internal determinants of 
a country turn insignificant in the fixed effects model. Hence, internal determinants give 
valuable insights about why countries adopt more policies than others, but reveal nothing 
about the change of the policy adoption behaviour over time. The pooled models indicate that 
contrary to our expectations, countries with a higher GDP per capita do not adopt more 
mitigation policies. GDP per capita is negative in sign and not significant. One possible 
explanation is the greater capacity of richer countries to formulate and administer more 
‘overarching framework laws and policies’ (Fankhauser et al., 2014; Nachmany et al., 2014), 
while poorer countries tend to formulate a greater number of sector-specific policies. In 
addition, in many richer countries, climate-related laws are already in place rendering the 
need for further legislation unnecessary. Results of the Global Climate Legislation (Grantham 
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Research Institute, London School of Economics, 2016) study supports this consideration and 
show that the most recent growth of climate policies has predominantly taken place in the 
developing world. For the democracy status model term, we find a positive effect for the 
parameter estimate (model 4). This finding is highly consistent with earlier literature about 
the effect of democracy on climate policy (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer, 2013). Overall, 
however, these studies show that ‘democracies are, ceteris paribus, [more] likely to adopt 
more ambitious climate policy commitments relative to other countries’ (Bernauer, 2013, 
p. 435). Taken together, the GDP and democracy status model terms account as indicators for 
a country’s resources and capabilities to adopt climate change mitigation. The findings 
indicate that countries, like Saudi Arabia, that are rich and not democratic adopt, in total, the 
smallest number of climate policies. On the other hand, democracies implement more climate 
change mitigation policies. However, as argued above, the quantity of climate change 
mitigation policies does not necessarily imply high standard policies. Thus, emerging 
democracies, such as India, tend to adopt a larger number of sector-specific policies; richer 
democracies tend to adopt more encompassing flagship policies or frameworks.  
We also tested for a country’s motivation to mitigate climate change and how this affects 
its climate policy adoption behaviour. For this purpose, we included three indicators: natural 
rents, vulnerability, and absolute CO2 emissions. We get a non-significant effect for the natural 
rents model term. This finding makes sense as the effect of the variable can be interpreted 
ambiguously. Some countries with higher natural rents, such as China, might be more inclined 
to adopt more mitigation policies to compensate for their polluting behaviour. They do so 
either to show goodwill at the international scale, or due to high local pollution levels that 
make them aware of the co-benefits that arise from climate change mitigation policies. At the 
same time, some countries with higher natural rents, like the oil-exporting countries of the 
Middle East are more concerned with economic growth-related issues rather than with 
environmental quality and are, therefore, less inclined to adopt climate change mitigation 
policies. In addition, we find no effect related to the vulnerability to climate change as 
expected. A country like Tuvalu, which is highly vulnerable to climate change, has 
implemented five policies targeting disaster or risk management and climate change adaption 
issues since 2008 but has adopted only one policy addressing climate change mitigation in the 
same period. Finally, we controlled for the level of absolute CO2 emissions, since we expected 
that countries with higher levels of CO2 emissions are more likely to introduce climate change 
mitigation policies. Our results show, that countries with higher CO2 emissions are indeed 
more likely to adopt climate legislation. We explain this finding among others with local co-
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benefits such as the reduction of local air pollution, energy efficiency, and so on. For example, 
China faces several environmental problems related to air pollution and experiences the 
adverse effects of climate change. Hence, it is ever more aware of the necessity to combat 
climate change and its own role therein. Moreover, big polluters are under immense 
international pressure to act and adopt effective climate legislation. 
Fourth, even in the averaged perspective of the pooled models including network 
dependencies, i.e. our two main explanatory variables – structural equivalence (structursim) 
and direct cooperative ties (weightlag), to control for interdependencies between countries is 
superior to the spatial proximity indicator, alone. The superiority of the network dependency 
model is reflected in the improved model fit of models 3 (and 4), as indicated by the decreased 
AIC. Also, as discussed, including the weightlag variable reduces the omitted variable bias of 
the internal determinants model (model 1). A high variance inflation factor (VIF) related to the 
structursim variable and the same region variable, indicates multicollinearity between them. 
As a result, we cannot include both terms in the same model without confounding the 
results15. This makes a separate discussion of the models necessary. Pooled Model 2 includes 
the geographical proximity of the countries. The same region variable enters the model as 
‘homophily’ (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) term, that captures whether countries 
of the same region tend to show a similar policy adoption behaviour. We find a positive and 
significant effect. This result confirms the finding of many earlier diffusion studies that policy 
diffusion transpires across spatially close countries. Both the structursim and weightlag 
variable have positive and significant parameter estimates that are robust across all model 
variations including the fixed effects model. This implies that structurally equivalent countries, 
                                                            
15 This also makes sense intuitively, as countries of the same region often tend to behave in a similar 
way. For instance, Nordic countries tend to have rather progressive policies for climate change 
mitigation. The countries have similar domestic background conditions, as they are all wealthy 
democracies, with plentiful resources of renewable energies such as hydropower, wind power, and 
geothermal energies, and they are affected by climate change in a similar way. Moreover, these 
countries are represented in the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), which is a forum for governmental 
co-operation on climate change-related issues. In line with our expectations, these countries also show 
high levels of structural equivalence in our interaction networks. On the other hand, structural 
equivalence does not need regional proximity. For example, according to our analysis, Vietnam and 
Cuba are both communist countries, and have very similar cooperation partners in our interaction 
networks. This might be triggered by the specifics of their political system, but may also be due to 
common patterns of cooperation related to climate change. Both countries are, for instance, members 
of the group of Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC) in the climate change negotiations under the 
UNFCCC and negotiate with other countries in a unified voice. Hence, regional proximity is also captured 
by the structural equivalence term to a certain extent.  
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i.e. countries with similar patterns in their international relations, and countries that are 
engaged in cooperative interactions affect a country´s policy adoption behaviour. Hence, 
network dependencies are an important explanatory factor for the diffusion of climate change 
mitigation policies. What stands out here is that whereas the attribute network dependence 
terms remain significant and positive, most of the covariates are not significant in the fixed 
effects model. This finding highlights the importance of considering these network 
dependencies to explain the policy adoption over time. The results show that network 
dependencies do not only account for similar policy adoption behaviour in general, but they 
are also relevant when considering important periods in the development of the international 
climate regime. 
In sum, these findings are in line with our expectations that including a network perspective 
improves the explanatory power of diffusion studies, in general, and the ‘unified model of 
government innovation’, in particular. As suggested in our first hypothesis, direct ties such as 
an exchange of resources, personal interactions, and knowledge transfer trigger mutual social 
learning that might lead to similar climate change mitigation behaviour. Moreover, repeated 
cooperation fosters trust, which reduces the likelihood of a free-riding behaviour, and 
increases the propensity for coordinated action in the context of climate change mitigation. 
In addition, hypothesis 2 states that being in cooperative relationships with the same 
cooperation partners significantly increases the likelihood of same policy adoption behaviour, 
as well. This is because countries are facing similar framework conditions in terms of how they 
are embedded in the international context. This causes comparable incentives for adopting 
climate policies, thereby leading to similar policy adoption behaviour. On the one hand, these 
countries possibly compare with each other triggering policy learning. On the other hand, 
other countries set benchmarks for the own behaviour in a positive as well as a negative sense. 
In a setting, where countries fear competitive disadvantages from adopting national policies, 
as it is in the case for climate policy, they face an imperative not to surpass others in their 
engagement for the mitigation of climate change. Conversely, if others are particularly active 
with regards to climate change mitigation, social pressure might increase the need to adopt 
own policies. Overall, these results provide evidence for both of our hypotheses. 
7. Concluding Comments 
In this article, we demonstrate how international relations can influence national policy 
adoption. Along with other contributions (e.g. Mohrenberg, 2017), our research highlights the 
value added of informing the policy diffusion literature with a dynamic social network 
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perspective., Our inquiry demonstrates that analytical frameworks, such as the ‘unified model 
of government innovation’ (Berry & Berry, 2014), increase in their explanatory power when 
they include temporal network dependencies. Direct and indirect ties between countries, as 
they arise from bi- or multilateral political events, reflect international relations in a different 
and more overarching way than traditional approaches of the diffusion literature. Specifically, 
assessing the evolution of countries’ interactions over time reflects political developments in 
a specific policy domain much better than static measures, like the spatial closeness of two 
countries or their common membership in an institution. 
To analyse our argument, we have used the case of climate change mitigation policy 
adoption and reviewed the interdependencies in the form of cooperative, political 
interactions that occurred in the realm of global climate change issues between 1995 and 
2015. We have chosen this case, as combatting climate change is a topic of high relevance 
that depends on the engagement of all countries. As no country alone can save the global 
climate, it necessarily depends on policy decisions of other countries. Hence, countries need 
to interact regularly to coordinate their climate mitigation policies. They do so in the context 
of the international climate negotiation process, but also based on bi-or multilateral initiatives. 
Earlier studies on climate policy diffusion have not yet considered these political 
developments satisfactorily. We have found two related mechanisms of social influence 
mechanisms at work. Firstly, countries adopt more policies when they are directly tied to 
countries that have adopted climate change mitigation policies. The theoretical underpinning 
of this finding is social influence by communication. Countries interact, learn from each other, 
and in consequence are more likely adopt similar policies. Secondly, countries in similar 
structural positions, although not necessarily linked by a direct tie, often compare themselves 
with one another and react by adopting similar policies. While our main contribution is to 
overcome the existing limitations of the current analytical and methodological approaches to 
study policy diffusion in climate change, our work also has important ramifications for studying 
policy diffusion processes in other international or national policy domains that are 
characterised by high levels of interdependencies of between involved actors. 
However, we do acknowledge that our study has some drawbacks related to the data used. 
To begin with, the data on climate change related mitigation legislation from the Global 
Climate Legislation Study does not include sub-national laws or amendments to the current 
laws and this could have led to a valuable loss of observations. In addition, the analysis might 
have profited from a qualitative differentiation between different climate mitigation policies 
to understand more about what kind of policies diffuse more likely. In relation to this, 
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weighting policies with respect to their outreach (sector-specific vs. flagship laws) would 
possibly improve the estimation of diffusion processes, by avoiding an underestimation of 
comprehensive legislation. All these issues raise potential for future research in this area. 
Additionally, the use of event data is not without complications. The most common threats 
to validity (Hirschi, 2009; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994) in event data coding are biases introduced 
by the media sources that provide the raw material and biases due to the coding scheme or 
coding process. Source related validity issues mostly arise in course of the editorial selection 
process, for example, when conflictive events dominate the reporting (conflict orientation), 
when media attention towards a specific issue decreases (media fatigue), or due to duplicate 
stories that emerge when multiple reports on the same event are published by different media 
sources or repeated in different reports. We tried to reduce these validity issues by using the 
electronic wire services Agence France Press, as they are usually less affected by editorial 
choices than other journalistic sources like newspapers (Schrodt, 2012). An integration of 
other wire services also from other continents might improve the validity of the dataset by 
increasing the number observations. Finally, the present study is restricted to cooperative 
interactions, only, and does not distinguish between different intensities of cooperation. 
Therefore, a possible follow up project could work towards refining the policy networks and 
testing for different kinds of interaction that may also include conflictive events. 
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Appendix A: Country List and Coding 
COUNTRY NAME UN  
COUNTRY 
CODE 
STATUS IN 
UNFCCC 
GAIN 
VULNERABILITY 
RANK 
POLICY 
ADOPTION 
    t1 t2 t3 t4 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE non-Annex I 34 0 0 1 1 
ARGENTINA ARG non-Annex I 44 1 5 0 3 
AUSTRALIA AUS Annex I 1 1 1 1 8 
AUSTRIA AUT Annex I 17 1 2 0 5 
BELGIUM BEL Annex I 59 4 2 0 3 
BANGLADESH BGD non-Annex I 143 1 0 2 4 
BULGARIA BGR non-Annex I 39 3 1 2 3 
BELARUS BLR Annex I 53 1 4 2 3 
BOLIVIA BOL non-Annex I 79 1 0 1 4 
BRAZIL BRA non-Annex I 23 2 4 3 3 
CANADA CAN Annex I 2 1 0 1 4 
SWITZERLAND CHE Annex I 12 2 0 1 3 
CHILE CHL non-Annex I 23 3 0 3 6 
CHINA CHN non-Annex I 28 1 1 0 5 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
CONGO 
COD non-Annex I 161 0 0 0 4 
COLOMBIA COL non-Annex I 42 2 1 0 5 
COSTA RICA CRI non-Annex I 65 1 0 3 4 
CUBA CUB non-Annex I 82 1 1 1 0 
CZECH REP CZE Annex I 18 2 0 0 2 
GERMANY DEU Annex I 13 3 3 2 5 
DENMARK DNK Annex I 14 0 1 4 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM non-Annex I 109 2 1 1 2 
ALGERIA DZA non-Annex I 69 3 3 0 6 
ECUADOR ECU non-Annex I 74 0 0 1 4 
EGYPT EGY non-Annex I 75 2 3 0 15 
SPAIN ESP Annex I 15 1 0 0 3 
ETHIOPIA ETH non-Annex I 146 0 0 1 8 
EUROPEAN UNION EU Annex I 0 6 0 10 8 
FINLAND FIN Annex I 10 2 1 0 4 
FRANCE FRA Annex I 9 1 2 1 5 
GABON GAB non-Annex I 86 0 0 0 4 
UNITED KINGDOM GBR Annex I 3 6 4 2 10 
GHANA GHA non-Annex I 126 1 1 0 5 
GREECE GRC Annex I 32 2 2 0 7 
GRENADA GRD non-Annex I 91 0 1 0 4 
GUATEMALA GTM non-Annex I 119 1 0 1 2 
GUYANA GUY non-Annex I 135 0 0 1 0 
HUNGARY HUN Annex I 42 0 0 3 4 
INDONESIA IDN non-Annex I 87 0 3 8 9 
INDIA IND non-Annex I 115 3 4 1 2 
 115 
IRELAND IRL Annex I 19 3 2 1 6 
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF) 
IRN non-Annex I 53 1 1 2 4 
ISRAEL ISR non-Annex I 56 2 0 0 6 
ITALY ITA Annex I 23 8 5 3 7 
JAMAICA JAM non-Annex I 94 1 0 1 2 
JORDAN JOR non-Annex I 101 1 0 0 2 
JAPAN JPN Annex I 27 3 1 0 2 
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ non-Annex I 30 1 2 1 1 
KENYA KEN non-Annex I 148 0 1 1 2 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA KOR non-Annex I 32 0 1 1 3 
KUWAIT KWT non-Annex I 103 1 0 0 0 
MOROCCO MAR non-Annex I 91 0 0 2 6 
MADAGASCAR MDG non-Annex I 160 0 0 0 2 
MALDIVES MDV non-Annex I 0 0 0 0 0 
MEXICO MEX non-Annex I 47 1 2 0 4 
MYANMAR MMR non-Annex I 134 0 0 0 1 
MONGOLIA MNG non-Annex I 76 1 2 0 5 
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ non-Annex I 145 0 0 4 4 
MALAYSIA MYS non-Annex I 31 0 1 0 4 
NIGERIA NGA non-Annex I 130 0 1 0 3 
NETHERLANDS NLD Annex I 49 3 2 0 2 
NORWAY NOR Annex I 4 1 0 1 3 
NEPAL NPL non-Annex I 131 1 0 0 1 
NEW ZEALAND NZL Annex I 5 5 0 0 0 
PAKISTAN PAK non-Annex I 111 0 0 0 8 
PERU PER non-Annex I 71 3 1 2 7 
PHILIPPINES PHL non-Annex I 95 1 2 3 6 
POLAND POL Annex I 22 1 1 2 3 
PORTUGAL POR Annex I 45 1 3 0 4 
ROMANIA ROU Annex I 84 2 1 0 7 
RUSSIA RUS Annex I 6 2 0 4 2 
RWANDA RWA non-Annex I 168 1 0 0 4 
SAUDI ARABIA SAU non-Annex I 63 0 0 1 1 
SINGAPORE SGP non-Annex I 40 4 0 0 3 
EL SALVADOR SLV non-Annex I 118 0 2 0 2 
SLOVAKIA SVK Annex I 37 1 3 2 8 
SWEDEN SWE Annex I 11 1 0 2 5 
THAILAND THA non-Annex I 70 0 2 1 7 
TAJIKISTAN TJK non-Annex I 102 0 1 1 1 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO non-Annex I 66 0 2 0 3 
TURKEY TUR Annex I 41 0 4 0 3 
TUVALU TUV non-Annex I 0 0 1 0 1 
TANZANIA TZA non-Annex I 140 0 0 0 3 
UGANDA UGA non-Annex I 166 1 1 0 1 
UKRAINE UKR Annex I 50 3 1 0 1 
UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
USA Annex I 7 0 3 4 5 
UZBEKISTAN UZB non-Annex I 62 0 0 1 1 
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VENEZUELA VEN non-Annex I 38 0 1 1 1 
VIET NAM VNM non-Annex I 117 0 3 0 7 
VANAUTU VUT non-Annex I 156 1 0 0 0 
SOUTH-AFRICA ZAF Annex I 51 0 0 2 2 
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Appendix B: Coding of Event Types 
EVENT TYPES NOMINAL EVENT 
TYPES 
DESCRIPTION EVENT 
DUMMY 
POSITIVE STATEMENT  1 Optimistic or emphatic comments, symbolic acts, 
express accord, consider policy option, acknowledge 
responsibility 
Cooperation 
CONCRETE ACTION  2 Consult, make or host a visit, meet, mediate, 
negotiate, discuss 
Cooperation 
APPEAL POSITIVE 
ACTION  
3 Appeal for material cooperation (economic, judicial, 
information), diplomatic cooperation, aid, political 
reform, to yield (e.g. easing sanctions, dissent), to 
negotiate, to settle dispute, to mediate 
Cooperation 
INTEND POSITIVE 
ACTION  
4 Express intends to engage in material cooperation 
(economic, judicial, information), diplomatic 
cooperation, aid, political reform, to yield (e.g. easing 
sanctions, dissent), to negotiate, to settle dispute, to 
mediate 
Cooperation 
YIELD COOPERATION  5 Ease sanctions, political dissent, agree on political 
reform 
Cooperation 
SUBSTANTIVE 
COOPERATION  
6 Provide aid or engage in material cooperation 
(economic, judicial, information, intelligence), engage 
in diplomatic cooperation (praise or endorse, rally 
support on behalf of, grant diplomatic recognition, 
apologise, forgive, sing agreement) 
Cooperation 
NEGATIVE STATEMENT -1 Decline or make pessimistic comment, deny 
responsibility 
Conflict 
DEMAND 
COOPERATION  
-2 Demand for material cooperation (economic, judicial, 
information), diplomatic cooperation, aid, political 
reform, to yield (e.g. easing sanctions, dissent), to 
negotiate, to settle dispute, to mediate 
Conflict 
CRITICIZE, ACCUSE, 
DISAPPROVE 
-3 Disapprove, criticise, accuse, rally opposition against, 
complain officially, lawsuit, find guilty or liable 
Conflict 
REJECT COOPERATION, 
VETO 
-4 Reject material cooperation (economic, judicial, 
information), diplomatic cooperation, aid, political 
reform, plant, proposal, to yield (e.g. easing sanctions, 
dissent), to negotiate, to settle a dispute, to mediate. 
Defy norms, laws, and to veto. 
Conflict 
THREATEN -5 Threaten to reduce or stop aid, with sanctions, 
boycott, and embargo, with political dissent or 
repression, to halt negotiations or mediation. Give 
ultimatum.  
Conflict 
SUBSTANTIAL 
CONFLICT 
-6 Protest, strike, or boycott, engage in political dissent. 
Reduce relations, stop material aid, halt negotiations 
or mediations, impose an embargo, boycott, or strike, 
coerce, and assault.  
Conflict 
  
118 
Appendix C: Time Periods 
T1: Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol (1995-2004)  
The first network (t1) stage is characterised by events leading to the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The release of the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) report 
in 1990 was integral to the drafting of the UNFCCC in 1992. The UNFCCC consequently came 
into force two years later during the year 1994. The predominant key principles enshrined in 
the Climate Convention are the North-South divide and the principle of ‘Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR/RC)’, which distinguishes 
between Annex I countries (with greater historical responsibility and capability to combat 
climate change) and non-Annex I countries with relatively less (or no) such responsibility or 
capability to combat climate change (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014). However, the UNFCCC did 
not contain binding or specific targets leading to a disappointment of several 
environmentalists and brought to the fore the need for a more stringent agreement. 
Consequently, the first Conference of Parties (COP-1) was expected to take strong action 
leading to the adoption of the Berlin Mandate whose focus was to promote legally binding 
reduction commitments intended to be adopted at COP-3 in 1997 at Kyoto (Gupta, 2010). The 
adoption of the Berlin Mandate ultimately led to countries becoming a party to the UNFCCC 
and adopting what came to be known as the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was the first 
internationally binding treaty that contained provisions for developed country parties to take 
up legally binding emissions targets for period 2008-12. Unfortunately, enforcing the 
ratification was much more difficult than expected with the United States, which was a key 
player in the negotiations, pulling out in 2001. However, parties tried to salvage the effects of 
United States S pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol during the negotiations in Bonn in 2001 
leading to the adoption of the Marrakech accords16. The Marrakech Accords set the rules for 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol and detailed the flexibility mechanisms such as the Joint 
Implementation (JI), Emissions Trading and Clean Development Mechanisms (Betzold et al., 
2012). This hallmark phase in the climate policy architecture ends with the entering into force 
of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005. 
  
                                                            
16Marrakech Accords. Available at: http://unfccc.int/ cop7/. 
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T2: Implementing the Kyoto Protocol (2005-07) 
During the second stage (t2), the most important issues were to implement the Kyoto Protocol 
and to negotiate its successor. With respect to the institutional framework conditions, the 
important milestones must be mentioned: (1) The adoption of the Bali Road Map in 2007, 
which paved the way for a post- 2012 agreement; (2) The release of the IPCC's Fourth 
Assessment Report in 2007, which brought the climate change issue on top of the 
international agenda. It instilled great enthusiasm among the Parties ahead of COP 15 in 
Copenhagen with respect to agreeing on a new international legally binding agreement and a 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This period is also significant due to the 
fact that the CDM witnessed a growth and increasing focus on adaptation related issues 
(Gupta, 2010). 
T3: Post-Bali Enthusiasm (2008-09) 
The high expectations during stage three (t3) from the Copenhagen summit remained 
unfulfilled due to the parties failing to agree on much and erosion of trust over rumours about 
several different initiatives leading parties. With the Copenhagen Accord, the parties only 
submitted non-binding emission reduction pledges or mitigation action pledges at a later point 
in time. In general, this phase started with high political and public attention towards the 
climate change issue because of the release of the fourth IPCC report and former US Vice-
President and environmentalist Al Gore winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. It, 
unfortunately, ended with disappointment over the ‘Copenhagen disaster’ (Blühdorn, 2012). 
Similar to the previous phase, the static North-South divide between countries positions 
remained, with developing countries and emerging economies seeing themselves as having 
little (or no) responsibility as well as the capability to combat climate change.  
T4: Towards a New Agreement (2010-15) 
Stage 4 (t4) spans from 2010 to 2015 and is the most important phase in the history of climate 
change. It started with the adoption of the Cancun Agreements in 2010, which advanced 
important mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, the Technology Mechanism, and the 
Cancun Adaptation Framework. Despite the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009, 
countries continued negotiating with the goal to achieve a legally binding international treaty 
that is applicable to all Parties and comes into effect from 2020. Negotiations on the design of 
the agreement mainly took place under the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action (ADP). Its main goals were to achieve progress towards implementing 
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clear mitigation contributions by all parties and assisting parties to adapt to a changing climate 
(Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014). The time after COP 15 brought a proliferation of institutions and 
arrangements under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. Moreover, it also called for a 
reinterpretation and questioning of the UNFCCC key principles, as well as a rearrangement of 
country groups (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014; Brenton, 2013). The divide now remained 
between three main antagonistic camps. The emerging powers stuck to the key principle of 
CBDR/RC and the North-South divide. They demanded that industrialised countries must carry 
the heavier burden, as they are historically responsible and are comparatively more capable 
in combatting climate change. Alongside a broad range of vulnerable (least) developing 
countries, the EU pressed for sharp emission reduction and called for joint action of all 
involved countries. In this perspective, all parties, but industrialised and emerging economies, 
in particular, must take action. The United States and other developed nations such as Russia 
and Canada were more reluctant to accept legally binding emission reductions. However, all 
the negotiations finally led to the Paris agreement being adopted in 2015, with the latter 
imposing not only the condition of limiting global temperatures well below 2 degrees 
centigrade but also taking into account the needs of the climate vulnerable nations. The Paris 
agreement is deemed a success and a first of its kind since it could ensure that it is not rigid 
enough to demotivate any country to not join but in parallel maintained that certain 
characteristics remained legally binding. 
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Appendix D: Overview on Variables and Data Sources 
VARIABLE TYPE VARIABLE EXPLANATION DATA SOURCE HYPOTHESIS 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Policy adoption  Number of adopted 
climate change 
mitigation policies in 
period t 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
 
DYAD-
INDEPENDENT 
COVARIATES 
Past policy 
adoption 
Number of adopted 
climate change 
mitigation policies in 
period t 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
Control 
variable 
 Vulnerability Average vulnerability 
of country towards 
climate change risk in 
period t 
ND-GAIN Index 
of vulnerability 
Control 
variable 
 CO2 emissions 
(log) 
Average absolute 
emissions (ktCO2 e, 
logged) in period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
 Natural Rents Average rents from 
coal, oil, and natural 
gas production (% 
GDP) in period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
 Polity2 Average level of 
democracy in period 
t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
 Income Average GDP per 
capita PPP in period t 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Control 
variable 
DYAD-
DEPENDENT 
COVARIATES 
Weightlag Adoption behaviour 
of directly linked 
countries 
POLCLIMATE 
data set 
H1 
 Structursim Adoption behaviour 
of structurally 
equivalent actors 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
& 
POLCLIMATE 
data set 
H2 
 Same region Regional proximity 
captured as 
homophily variable 
Own coding 
according to 
World Bank 
regions 
Control 
variable 
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III. Towards a Feasible Climate Policy: The Difficile Stance of a Carbon Tax 
in Switzerland, by M. Kammerer 
Abstract 
This paper reconstructs two decision-making processes related to the planned introduction 
of a carbon levy on combustibles and fuels in Switzerland between 2004 and 2013. 
Particularly, it focuses on the reasons of why there is still no carbon levy on fuels, albeit the 
levy on combustibles was already introduced a decade ago. In a two-step analytical 
framework, this study examines how influential actors modified the selection of policy 
instruments. The key assumption is that the decision-making style and the structure of the 
policy subsystem are decisive factors determining the feasibility of policy instruments. A mixed 
methods approach helps to disentangle the complex policy processes. Specifically, the paper 
advocates a combination of a process-based, qualitative case study and quantitative, 
descriptive policy network analysis. The results show, that due to the political opportunity 
structure of conflicting coalitions in the policy process and a strong business, energy, and 
traffic sector, the introduction of a carbon tax on fuels was never viable and its introduction 
will remain unlikely in the future.  
Keywords. Switzerland, Climate policy, Policy networks, Market-based instruments, Actor-
Process-Event Scheme 
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1. Introduction 
One important aspect of any climate policy design is its political feasibility. According to 
Majone (1975, 261) a policy is feasible, ‘insofar as it satisfies all the constraints of the problem 
which it tries to solve, where “constraint” means any feature of the environment that (a) can 
affect policy results, and (b) is not under the control of the policy maker’. Often, however, 
there tends to be a gap between the theoretically desirable and the politically feasible 
(Meltsner 1972; Skodvin, Gullberg, and Aakre 2010). Research often explains this observation 
with the unequal distribution of costs and benefits among the affected target groups and 
contrasting opinions on how a problem should be solved (Bresser and O'Toole 1998; Carter 
2007; Stavins 1997; Underdal 1998).  
Swiss climate policy provides an illustrative case study. Although in Switzerland, a CO2 
levy17 is widely respected as an effective policy instrument to reduce domestic CO2 emissions; 
its implementation has been limited. Although a levy on combustibles has been implemented 
over a decade ago, the introduction of a carbon levy on motor fuels has been successfully 
prevented by the skilful manoeuvring of business groups in fear of increased costs and 
diminished international competitiveness. 
Preceding studies scrutinised the implementation and functionality of climate policy 
instruments (Bahn 2001; Baranzini, Thalmann, and Gonseth 2004; Ingold 2007; Niederberger 
2005) in Switzerland. These studies made their contribution to the apprehension of the 
decision-making processes and the effectiveness of specific policy instruments. The work of 
Ingold and colleagues gave valuable insight into the significant role of actor constellations and 
policy networks to comprehend policy choices (e.g. Ingold 2011, Ingold & Fischer 2013). This 
paper continues this projection by analysing the link between structural characteristics of 
decision-making style and the policy subsystem and policy output (Howlett 2014). 
Simultaneously, it accompanies the literature that links subsystem characteristics (e.g. Fischer 
2014; Howlett 2014) with prospects of policy change and the nature of the policy output. The 
benefit of this research is an innovative framework for the analysis of the decision-making 
context. 
This study conducts a two-step approach to study the Swiss climate policy process between 
2004 and 2013. Specifically, it advocates a combination of a process-based, qualitative case 
study and quantitative, descriptive policy network analysis. Offering a process-centred 
                                                            
17In the following, the term levy is used, since in Switzerland the revenues from the CO2 levy are 
redistributed to the population and industry sector. Therefore, it is not a tax in a strict sense. 
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perspective, it inspects the development over time to fathom the continuous processes of 
selecting and implementing specific policy instruments. Providing a network perspective, this 
analysis (van Beuren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003)reflects on how changing political 
configurations effect the policy outcome. To execute decisions, actors from the public and 
private scope, must coordinate their policy preferences and cooperate (Klijn and Koppenjan 
2000). The decision making style (Howlett 2007) and the structure of a subsystem (Adam and 
Kriesi 2007) define the means of coordination and cooperation and eventually the feasibility 
of a policy output. This approach is inspired by earlier research that uses the Actor Process 
Event Scheme (APES, Serdült et al. 2012). APES is an analytical approach and software tool 
that helps to visualise political processes and to convert this information into policy network 
data.  
Section two proceeds with a brief outline of Switzerland’s climate policy history and sets 
historical developments into a theoretical context by formulating expectations about the 
absence of the CO2 levy on motor fuels in section three. Section four presents the 
methodological approach, whereas section five conducts a detailed and systematic analysis 
and the resulting policy output. It explores the involvement of various actors throughout the 
decision-making process, particularly focusing on the interplay between corporate actors 
(Coleman 1974). The results show, that the involvement of many actors in the decision-making 
processes prompts compromise solutions, as balancing is an imperative in multi-actor 
settings. However, the power structure in the climate policy subsystem has changed over 
time, what influenced the policy output. During the implementation of the CO2-Act, many 
actors from both the public and private sector exerted influence on the policy-making process. 
This led to an innovative compromise solution that replaced the carbon levy with the climate 
cent. The revision of the CO2-Act, nonetheless, was mostly executed by the administration and 
the legislative branch. The involvement of private actors only came sparingly. Apparently, this 
rather homogenous decision-making environment dominated by a smaller number of actors 
is no ideal breeding ground for innovations. In consequence, the revised CO2-Act revamped 
the first version with minor changes.  
2. The Difficile Stance of a Carbon Levy on Fuels 
The roots of the CO2-Act date back to the 1980s. To achieve better air quality, an issue 
linked to the forest dieback debate, CO2 emissions and other pollutants should be reduced by 
introducing a carbon levy on combustibles and motor fuels. Most stakeholders regarded the 
levy as an efficient policy instrument, but it was harshly criticised and continuously opposed 
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by the economy. After several unsuccessful attempts to introduce the levy, the Federal Council 
(FC) had to change its strategy. It developed an overall program to reduce GHG (greenhouse 
gas) emissions that targeted a broader range of sectors such as traffic, building, industry, and 
a wider scope of policy instruments. This can be regarded as the birth of the CO2-Act and the 
first version entered into force in 2000. Its main target was to implement Kyoto Protocol 
requirements. Switzerland agreed to reduce its total GHG emissions by 8% as compared to 
emission levels in 1990 and its CO2 emissions from combustibles and motor fuels by 10% 
(FOEN 2010). The act focused on voluntary instruments, but also included a subsidiary carbon 
levy, which was only to take effect, when the targeted CO2 emission reduction could not be 
reached. Already in 2002, CO2 inventories pointed in this direction. In consequence, the 
federal government intended to introduce the carbon levy on both motor fuels and 
combustibles. However, cunning lobbying by the energy and transport sector under the 
auspices of the oil association prevented the introduction of a carbon levy on motor fuels 
(Niederberger 2005). Instead, the oil association promoted the introduction of the climate 
cent – a voluntary levy of 1.5 Swiss cent per litre petrol and diesel. Revenues from this charge 
were supposed to be used to support emission reduction projects and to sponsor a state-level 
building modernization subsidy program (Stiftung Klimarappen 2013). Backed by the 
parliament, with the CO2-Regulation of 2007, the federal government introduced a 
compromise solution: the climate and carbon levy on combustibles, but not on motor fuels. 
The implementation of the climate cent can be regarded as a policy innovation, since the 
instrument was not included in the CO2-Act but introduced afterwards to replace crucial parts 
of an already set up legislation. 
The next revision process of the CO2-Act started in 2008. The main intention of the act was 
to create a new legal basis for the Post-Kyoto phase (Kyoto II) from 2012 to 2020. Switzerland 
had to formulate new reduction targets for this period. An amendment of policy instruments 
was planned. Once again, the federal government suggested the introduction of a carbon levy 
on motor fuels. The federal proposal went into parliament, but eventually, the levy was 
banned. Specifically, economiesuisse, Switzerland’s leading business sector organisation, 
threatened with a referendum that would have endangered the whole CO2-Act, which came 
into force in 2013. It is rather ambitious in terms of reduction targets, but unprogressively 
with respect to its policy mix. While the first CO2-Act allowed for a mixture of domestic and 
foreign measures to reach emission reduction targets, the revised act raised reduction targets 
to 20% by 2020 (baseline 1990) relying on domestic measures, only (FOEN 2014). With respect 
to policy instruments, the revised CO2-Act maintains the status quo: only tried and trusted 
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instruments like the emission trading scheme and the carbon levy on combustibles are 
continued, yet new regulative instruments such as emission standards and emission 
compensation mechanisms were introduced. Like previously, a carbon levy on motor fuels did 
not gain acceptance. To substitute the carbon levy, importers of petrol and diesel are now 
obliged to compensate CO2 emissions, domestically. This approach, however, does not affect 
consumption patterns in the traffic sector, enough. Since traffic is accountable for the highest 
CO2-emission in Switzerland, by far, this is a real caveat. 
As empirical basis of this analysis, I use a ‘thick description’ (Serdült and Hirschi 2004) of 
two linked but distinct policy processes. The first phase covers the implementation of the CO2 
levy and the climate cent between 2004 and 2008. The second phase reflects the revision 
process of the CO2-Act.  
3. Theoretical Background 
What policy instruments are selected? Who selects? Why and how are they selected? 
Public policy scholars have argued that the selection of instruments depends on the prevailing 
power relations between important actors in a policy subsystem (Bresser and O'Toole 2005; 
Majone 1975; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Powerful, yet losing target groups often 
prevent the implementation of specific instruments. This is possible, because the balance of 
power in a subsystem is usually not entirely static, and by ‘the tactical manipulation of power 
differences in different policy processes or at different times (…) a shift in the balance may be 
obtained’ (Bresser and O'Toole 2005, 133). Bresser and O’Toole (2005) explain this 
phenomenon with what they call ‘contextual-interaction’ theory. The policy analyst must 
consider all activities and interactions between the responsible authorities and affected 
societal actors in a long-term, process-based perspective. This also includes factors that hinder 
a successful implementation. Often, authorities and target groups mutually exert influence on 
each other to determine how and if a policy is implemented. In addition, a new policy usually 
is tightly bound to its context. It does not replace ongoing processes, but adds new elements. 
It is important to analyse policy implementation in a networked and contextual manner to 
understand the factors determining present and future processes. Considering this at an early 
stage in the formulation process may lead to more effective and efficient policy-making 
(Howlett 2014). 
Similarly, Howlett and Ramesh (1995) argue that instrument selection and implementation 
is a systematic activity composed of a series of interlinked choices involving multiple actors 
with specific institutional backgrounds, perceptions, and preferences regarding the policy 
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outcomes that may be obtained (Scharpf 1997). While governmental actors are often the 
protagonists in decision-making and show a stable level of activity, non-governmental actors, 
like interest and civil sector groups, rather tune into the process when their interests are 
affected by providing expertise or lobbying for specific collective interests (Howlett et al., 
2009). How policy decisions originate depends on the context and the actors involved. Howlett 
and Ramesh (1995) identify four different decision-making types characterised by the severity 
of political constraints and the complexity of the policy issue (compare Table 6) that 
(2007)influence the kind typically expected policy outcomes. 
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Table 6: Decision-making styles represented after Howlett & Ramesh 1995 
 
 
Constraints on Decision-Makers 
 Low 
[Limited Actor, Single Level, 
Single Round] 
High 
[Multi-Actor, Multi-Level, 
Multi-Round] 
Co
m
pl
ex
ity
 o
f P
ol
ic
y 
Co
nt
ex
t 
Low 
[Clear Problem Definition, 
Available Information, 
Available Time] 
Type I 
Rational decision-making 
 
Type III 
Multiple round, decision-
accretion decision- making 
High 
[Poor Problem Definition, 
Limited Information, 
Limited Time] 
Type II 
Incremental decision- 
making 
Type IV 
Garbage can decision- 
making 
Source: (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995) 
Type I, the rational decision-making style, usually occurs when the policy context is 
straightforward and the constraints of the authorities are low, leading to a maximization of 
resources and efficient solutions. Type II, the incremental decision-making style typically 
occurs when the context is simple, but constraints are high. Only few actors are involved, but 
they face high constraints, such as inferior problem definition, missing information, or time 
restraints (Aden 2012; Jänicke, Kunig, and Stitzel 2003). Type III, multiple round, decision-
accretion decision-making, typically emerges in settings when the problem complexity is low. 
The new policy area is well-known and suitable policy instruments well-understood, but 
powerful target groups prevent their implementation. The resulting output is usually a 
compromise solution developed from deliberations of many actors in a complex decision-
making process. Finally, Type IV, ‘garbage can’ decision-making ensues when both the 
constraints and complexity of a policy issue are high. Often this style can be found in new 
policy fields, calling for new solutions. This means that the problem is ill defined and policy 
objectives are unclear. Trial and error then select policy instruments. In consequence, the 
result is, ‘at best, satisfying’ (Howlett 2007, 664). 
The decision-making process in Swiss climate policy is best reflected by Type III. Over time, 
many actors have interfered in a complex policy setting, involving multiple actors from 
different levels in numerous rounds of decision-making. Climate protection was already well-
established in Switzerland, when the implementation of the CO2-Act commenced. Also, the 
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policy field is bound to the international context that sets firm framework conditions for 
national climate policy to be formulated. Hence, climate policy decision-making took place 
within clear-cut boundaries with little room for manoeuvring. In this set policy environment, 
preferences of powerful interest groups must be balanced out, ultimately leading to 
compromise solutions. With respect to why the carbon levy on motor fuels was never 
introduced, I argue that the observed output is a typical compromise solution caused by long 
and complex decisions, involving a respective number of actors in a clear-cut policy context 
(Hypothesis 1). 
Besides the style of the decision-making process, the structure of the subsystem also helps 
to understand what kind of output may be expected. Earlier studies investigated links between 
the policy subsystem and prerequisites for policy change (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Fischer 2014; 
Howlett 2002) or policy learning (Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier 2010). Specific structural 
characteristics, such as the coalition structure, the degree of centralisation, or the number 
and nature of policy venues, explain the likelihood for policy change or learning.  
Based on previous frameworks, I developed a typology of how different subsystem 
structures are linked to policy innovation. As illustrated in Table 7, I combine two dimensions 
to characterise the policy subsystem as endorsed by previous research: the distribution of 
power among actors (Adam & Kriesi 2007) and the type of interaction (Howlett 2002). The 
distribution is concentrated if power is in the hands of a small number of actors or one group. 
On the contrary, power structures are fragmented when there are many actors or groups 
competing for influence. The type of interaction reflects the level of propensity for conflict or 
cooperation of the subsystem.  
A high level of conflict is given when actors in influential positions have different views on 
the policy issue and/or belong to different advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988). Conversely, a 
high level of cooperativeness is prevalent when actors in power positions predominantly 
belong to the same coalition or share beliefs. In terms of the resulting policy outputs, four 
scenarios are thinkable. In a cooperative and centralised policy environment, effective 
solutions are possible, but the innovation potential is low as policy-making is in the hands of 
few and new ideas are improbable. In a cooperative environment with fragmented structures, 
the innovation potential is higher, due to the diversity of actors involved. Conflictive 
interactions are related to compromise solutions, as different policy options need to be 
negotiated. In a conflictive and centralised policy environment, compromise solutions with 
low innovation potential are presumable. Lastly, in a conflictive setting with fragmented 
power structures compromise solutions develop with a higher potential for innovation. 
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Table 7: Influence of policy network structure on policy output 
 
 
Types of Interactions 
 Cooperative 
[No opposing coalitions, 
powerful actors mostly 
agree on policy issues] 
Conflictive 
[Opposing coalitions, 
powerful actors do not 
agree on policy issues] 
Di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 P
ow
er
 
Concentration 
[Clear domination of the 
policy network by one or 
more influential actors] 
Rational I 
Efficient solutions with 
low potential for 
innovation 
 
Compromise I 
Compromise solutions 
with low potential for 
innovation  
Fragmentation 
[No clear domination of 
the policy network by one 
or more influential 
actors] 
Rational II 
Efficient solutions with 
high potential for 
innovation 
 
Compromise II 
Compromise solutions 
with high potential for 
innovation 
Source: Adjusted from Adam and Kriesi (2007) and Howlett (2002) 
For Swiss climate policy, I argue, that during the two decision-making processes related to 
the implementation (from 2004 to 2008) and the revision (from 2008 to 2013) of the CO2-Act, 
the policy subsystem is conflictive, as important actors are members of different advocacy 
coalitions with different beliefs on climate policy (Ingold, 2010, 2011). However, with respect 
to the distribution of power, the two decision-making processes diverge, explaining the 
different levels of innovativeness:  
Hypotheses 2a: The significant innovation potential of the climate policy subsystem 
during the implementation of the CO2-Act between 2004 and 2008, which was caused 
by the fragmentation of power structures, accounted for the climate penny to prevail. 
Hypotheses 2b: Relations in the revision process were more centralised, limiting the 
innovation potential of the climate policy subsystem, and thereby explaining the lack of 
comparable novelties in the revised CO2-Act. 
4. Data & Methods 
This analysis is based on APES (APES, Widmer et al. 2008), which is a non-technical method 
for systematizing qualitative information as provided by case studies into quantitative data. 
The biggest asset related to APES is the possibility of using qualitative case study material for 
a systematic, comparative, and quantitative analysis of network data, thereby enjoying the 
benefits of mixed-method analysis (Fischer 2011). An important assumption of APES is that 
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policy processes, like the implementation and revision of the Swiss CO2-Act between 2004 and 
2013, can be regarded as a sequence of political events (committee sessions, political 
statements, consultations and hearings, parliamentary debates, decisions, etc.) (Serdült et al. 
2012). By a collection of information on these linked events regarding their order, involved 
participants, and nature, the role of involved actors can be analysed and policy processes 
compared. 
The source material of APES on Swiss climate policy is a detailed narration of events related 
to crucial events of the policy process. For the two policy processes at hand18, data was 
collected systematically on events in the pre-parliamentary phase, as well as the 
parliamentary-phase i.e. public initiatives, stakeholder meetings, consultations, political 
statements, governmental messages, decisions, and so forth. The empirical evidence for the 
events and actor participation is based on the written documentation of the Curia Vista – 
Database of Parliamentary Proceedings that contains detailed information of parliamentary 
proceedings, such as Federal Council dispatches, procedural requests, elections, petitions, 
stakeholder statements, summaries, and others. A media analysis was done to compliment 
the Curia Vista data. For this purpose, I searched the SDA news wire service for articles on the 
CO2-Act, available in the Lexis-Nexis database. I also conducted 10 semi-structured interviews 
with selected representatives of the most important actors in the policy subsystem to validate 
the information from the document analysis and to enrich the analysis with anecdotal 
evidence. 
Events and actor participation was systematised with the help of the APES tool (Serdült et 
al. 2012). The software generates a diagram of the policy process. On the vertical axis, it 
displays all actors involved, grouped by actor type (i.e. executive branch, legislative branch, 
political parties, and private sector). On the horizontal axis, the diagram presents a timeline of 
subsequent events that are grouped by the phases of the decision-making process. For each 
event, little dots and triangles19 indicate which actors have participated in the event.20An 
analysis of the policy process based on the APES helps to investigate Hypothesis 1. For this 
                                                            
18Phase 1: 05.057 CO2-Gesetz. Umsetzung (https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-
vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20050057). Phase 2: 09.067 Für ein gesundes Klima. Volksinitiative. CO2-
Gesetz. Revision. URL: https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-
vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20090067. 
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purpose, I assessed the identity and incitement of private and public political actors involved 
in the respective policy processes, such as environmental organisations, interest groups, 
political parties, as well as administrative and legislative bodies. 
Based on the procedural event data, the APES tool allows transferring this information into 
network data. This is possible, as the policy process is understood as a sequence of linked 
events from which a structure can be derived (Widmer et al. 2008). In the SNA literature, this 
idea is often referred to as affiliation networks, bipartite networks, or two-mode networks 
(Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013). Here, the actor-event network reflects the participation 
of actors in political events. Standard transformation routines, as for example implemented in 
R or UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002), are then utilised to convert the actor-
event matrix into a one-mode actor-actor matrix, which links actors when they have 
participated in the same event. Although the underlying assumption that there is some kind 
of interaction between all actors participating in an event is not explicit (Widmer et al. 2008), 
the resulting matrix serves as valuable approximation of the network of political interactions 
that have taken place throughout the two decision-making processes. It is now possible to 
illustrate graphically constellations (compare Figure 3 and 4) and to analyse the influence of 
different actors with the help of network indicators. 
The policy network reflects the actor constellations prevalent in the climate policy 
subsystem. Analysing them is the approach to examine Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
The use of centrality statistics (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013, Chapter 10) gives 
valuable insights in power and influence relations on the micro-level of individual actors or 
groups. In general, it can be stated that the larger the number of actors in central network 
positions, the more fragmented the power structure. To assess this, I consider three statistics 
that express different facets of the centrality concept.  
Degree centrality informs about what actors and actor types hold the most central 
positions, as it simply counts the number of ties an actor has. It is used as a proxy for the 
importance of an actor in a network. In this context, a high degree centrality might indicate 
an influential position in the policy network, which gives the actor power over the decision-
making process.  
Closeness centrality, measures the distance of an actor to all other actors. For example, an 
actor mostly tied to well-connected actors is closer to the centre of the network than one with 
many connections to actors situated at the periphery of the network. Conceptually, the 
statistic helps to identify what actors are closest to each other and represent the inner circle 
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of the subsystem. As such, it is closely related to the degree centrality statistic, but with a 
stronger focus on the clique aspect. If a considerable number of actors is well connected, the 
inner circle of the subsystem is larger and the power structure more fragmented. 
Betweenness centrality is often used as a proxy for actors’ power and influence over 
information or resource flows and its bridging function. The number of shortest paths 
between two nodes including a third actor calculates it. The more often this actor is the 
shortest connection between pairs of nodes, which are not directly linked, the more central 
they are in the network. Therefore, an actor with a high betweenness centrality is often in a 
good position to control information or resource flows and able to connect different parts of 
a network. If only few actors have a high value in their betweenness centrality, opposed to a 
large number of actors with low values, information and resources flows are in the hands of a 
small elite indicating a centralised power structure. 
For this analysis, centrality statistics contribute to the assessment of power structures by 
identifying who is influential. Moreover, in a combined assessment with the preference 
structure of the actors, the statistics also allow evaluating the level of conflict. For the latter, I 
conducted a systematic analysis by running OLS regression models for both phases. I used the 
centralisation statistics (degree, betweenness, closeness centrality) as independent and the 
policy preferences as dependent variables. Significant, positive parameter estimates related 
to specific policy preferences indicate that influential actors tend to support the same policy 
options. The level of conflict is lower, the more policy preferences core actors share. In turn, 
negative, significant estimates imply disagreement and therefore a higher level of conflict.   
I coded data on policy preferences of the actors for both policy networks. For this purpose, 
I used the consultation summary report related to both processes to identify actor positions 
on policy instruments (FOEN 2009). For the first policy processes, I coded the positions for 
four instruments, i.e. voluntary measures, the CO2 levy, tradeable permits, and the climate 
cent. For the second policy processes, I coded three variables, i.e. the position on emission 
reduction targets, the scope of these targets, and the position towards a carbon levy on motor 
fuels. Furthermore, the actor type was included as a control. Compare the supplementary 
material in Appendix B for a more detailed description of the coding scheme. 
The second set of network statistics refers to the macro level of the policy network. 
Specifically, I use two different indicators to assess the power structure of the two networks. 
First, network cohesion measures how knitted the network is. For comparison, it is  advisable 
to use the average degree of the network, which can easily be computed by calculating the 
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degree for each node and then average these values by the number of actors (Borgatti, 
Everett, and Johnson 2013). A higher average degree reflects stronger network cohesion as 
more actors are tied to each other. This indicates a more fragmented power structure as more 
actors are active. On the contrary, a lower average degree reflects weaker network cohesion, 
because less actors are tied. This points to a more centralised power structure, as only a small 
number of actors share numerous ties. 
Secondly, centralisation ‘refers to the extent a network is dominated by a single node’ 
(Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013, 159). Full centralisation implies that one actor is 
connected to all other actors, there are no connections otherwise, and hence resemble a star. 
The contrast is a network in which all nodes are connected to each other. The link to the power 
structures is now straightforward: A highly centralised policy network also shows highly 
centralised power structures, whereas a policy network that is only little centralised is 
connected to fragmented power structures.  
5. Analysis 
Process-based analysis 
As shown in Figure 3, all actor types were involved in all stages of the decision-making 
process during the implementation of the first CO2-Act between 2004 and 2008, but to varying 
degrees. In the pre-parliamentary phase, the protagonist and responsible administration was 
the Federal Council (FC) in collaboration with the Department of the Environment, Transport, 
Energy and Communications, the Federal Office of the Environment (DETEC), and the Federal 
Office for Energy (SFOE). Business groups, science, political parties, and citizen groups were 
also active during this first period. Most importantly, the Foundation Climate Cent (FCC) under 
the auspices of the oil industry developed the climate cent to abolish the CO2 levy on motor 
fuels. In 2004, the FC launched a public consultation to review four different alternatives to 
implement the CO2-Act, among them the climate cent. In consequence of the consultation, 
the FC sent an adjusted policy proposal into parliament that included the carbon levy on 
combustibles combined with the climate cent to replace a levy on motor fuels.  
In 2005, the parliamentary debates started when the message of the FC was sent to the 
Committee for Environment, Spatial Planning, and Energy of the National Council (CESPE-NC). 
The commission debate ended with the advice to return the draft to the FC for revision, 
regarding a potential extension of the climate cent on combustibles (climate cent II) lobbied 
for by industry interest groups. The NC rejected this option after controversial debates and 
assigned the commission to continue with discussions that are more detailed. This led to two 
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events: the commission suggested an iterative introduction of the levy and the FCC presented 
its business plan in the NC. Eventually, both NC and SC accepted the described iterative 
introduction of a CO2 levy on combustibles and the introduction of a climate cent, replacing 
the levy on motor fuels. The new CO2-Regulation, that detailed the implementation of the CO2 
levy on combustibles, entered into force in 2005.  
In terms of the actors involved, Figure 3 shows an active involvement of all types of actors, 
whereby the protagonists were the two councils (NC and SC) and their environmental 
commissions (CESPE-NC and CESPE-SC). However, private actors were also active, in particular 
the FCC, the leading actor in terms of the climate cent. Business groups too tried to influence 
the parliamentary decision-making process.  
Several environmental citizen groups organised themselves under the roof of the Alliance 
for a Responsible Climate Policy (AFRCP), as the limited CO2 levy did not satisfy them. In 
consequence, they planned the launch a public initiative with the perspective of adding 
ambitious climate protection in the Swiss constitution. 
The revision of the CO2-Act between 2008 and 2013 was already set off in the 
implementation phase with the foundation of the AFRCP. The alliance launched the public 
initiative ‘For a healthy climate’ demanding to include a reduction target of 30% until 2020 
(1990 baseline) in the Swiss constitution. The FC, however, opposed this and subsequently 
came up with a federal counterproposal. The FC suggested two different options (cp. Federal 
Council 2009) to be discussed in a public consultation. One suggested a levy on motor fuels, 
again. The consultation was launched in 2008, overwhelmingly supporting the option that 
contained a levy on motor fuels and a 20% emission reduction target, only to be achieved by 
domestic reductions (FOEN 2009). The proposal was rather progressive and chances of the 
levy on motor fuels were high. In pre-parliamentary phase that lasted until late 2009, the 
administration, and the IC-CI (committee of climate initiative) were the key actors. 
Interestingly, neither private actors from the business nor the environmental side lobbied for 
their interests. 
The subsequent parliamentary debates were tough, lasting until 2011. The ESPEC-N invited 
important stakeholders for a consultation. It was soon clear, that the NC would forward the 
governmental draft and reject the climate initiative. In the following, difficult negotiations in 
both parliamentary councils commenced. The debates pointed at an introduction of a CO2 levy 
on fuels. This impression also lasted throughout discrepancies stage. The legislative branch 
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dominated both parliamentary stages. Private actors, only tuned into the processes in the 
scope of the regular lobbying process and occasional statements.  
The tide only turned in the very end of the parliamentary process, when the 
economiesuisse threatened to launch a referendum against the CO2-Act, if the CO2 levy on 
motor fuels was introduced.  In consequence, even the green and left members of parliament 
agreed to cancel the levy on motor fuels to save the CO2-Act. In return, economiesuisse 
withdrew the referendum threat. After the final vote in early 2012, the final version of the 
new act was decided on and entered into force in 2013. 
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Figure 4: Actor-Process-Event Scheme 2008-13 
 
The analysis of APES for the two phases shows several elements. First, both processes 
resemble each other in their overall patterns. Multiple-actors from different levels were 
involved in multiple rounds of decision-making. Therefore, the decision-making context was 
constraint. The implementation process was clearly determined by the objectives formulated 
in the CO2-Act. It can be stated that the policy context was rather simple, as the problem was 
already defined and well known. 
Secondly, the involvement of actors in the two phases was considerably diverse. In the first 
phase, more private actors, above all the FCC, were generally active, but particularly in the 
pre-parliamentary phase. In consequence, the administration had to balance carefully the 
interests of the business and energy sector. It was clever lobbying by the oil association, early 
in the decision-making process, that enabled the climate cent and thereby avoided the 
introduction of a carbon levy on motor fuels. The representatives of the industry and the 
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housing sector, being the main target group, were not very active during the process. This 
explains, why the levy on motor fuels was avoided, while the levy on combustibles was 
introduced. In the second phase, environmental organisations contributed significantly to the 
policy formulation process, especially in the context of the public initiative. The most relevant 
private actor, however, was economiesuisse, which in the end intervened with respect to the 
carbon levy on motor fuels. 
In sum, Hypothesis 1 is hereby confirmed. The involvement of multiple actor from different 
levels, in several subsequent rounds of decision-making led to a compromise solution that 
aimed to balance out the interest from different target groups 
Policy Network Analysis 
During the implementation of the first CO2-Act between 2004 and 2008 a high level of 
conflict developed. As illustrated in Figure 5 and 6, actors that were most central in the 
network had contrasting views on the climate cent and the CO2 levy on motor fuels. During 
this period, they were the FC, the DETEC, AFRCP, and several business and traffic 
organisations, such as the economiesuisse, the House Owner’s Association, and the Oil 
Association (cp. Online Appendix C). (Ingold 2010; Lehmann and Rieder 2002)(Lehmann and 
Rieder 2002) 
Table 8 summarises the regression results for the climate cent and the carbon levy. To 
support the hypotheses, the parameter estimates related to the policy instrument 
preferences should not be significant, as significances would indicate that more central or 
influential actors tend to support the same preferences. Moreover, the regression models 
allow assessing if specific actor types are more central in the network. The results, across all 
models show no significant parameter estimates related to the instrument preference 
variables. Similarly, there are no actor groups that are central to the policy process. However, 
the results show that citizen groups tend to be comparatively less influential as they are 
negatively related to the betweenness centrality statistic. In all, this finding shows that high 
centralisation is neither connected to specific positions nor to actor types. The conclusion is 
that single actor groups or coalitions did not dominate the policy process, which supports the 
process-based analysis in section 5.1. Nevertheless, this points to a more conflictive policy 
subsystem with fragmented power structures. Table 9 also underlines this result: The different 
actor types have similar levels for all centrality statistics, except science. Thus, many actors 
from different levels and types were active and influential during the implementation process. 
As discussed in the theory section, this raises potential for policy innovations. 
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Macro-level statistics point in the same direction. The policy network shows an average 
degree of 24.6 and a density of 0.73. The values indicate that actors tend to be tied to about 
two third of actors, a comparably high value for social networks. Related to the power 
structure, this implies that many actors are tied to many actors. Therefore, the power 
structure is more fragmented. Accordingly, the policy network has a degree centralisation 
value of 0.23, which is relatively low. For our analysis, it shows that the power is not in the 
hands of few actors, but suggests a rather fragmented power structure. 
Table 9: Centrality scores implementation by actor group 
ACTOR TYPE CENTRALITY SCORES 
Degree Betweenness Closeness 
ADMINISTRATION 0.33 0.08 0.57 
CITIZEN GROUP 0.21 0.01 0.54 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 0.28 0.01 0.54 
PARTIES 0.44 0.02 0.63 
PRIVATE SECTOR 0.29 0.01 0.58 
SCIENCE 0.10 0.00 0.50 
14
4 
Fi
gu
re
 5
: P
ol
icy
 n
et
w
or
k 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
20
05
-0
8,
 C
O 2
 le
vy
 
 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 n
et
w
or
k 
gr
ap
h 
is 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
 d
ic
ho
to
m
iz
ed
 v
er
sio
n 
of
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
k.
 T
he
 d
ic
ho
to
m
iz
at
io
n 
w
as
 d
on
e 
at
 c
ut
-o
ff 
va
lu
e 
6.
 
 14
5 
Fi
gu
re
 6
: P
ol
icy
 n
et
w
or
k 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
20
05
-0
8,
 cl
im
at
e 
ce
nt
 
 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 n
et
w
or
k 
gr
ap
h 
is 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
 d
ic
ho
to
m
iz
ed
 v
er
sio
n 
of
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
k.
 T
he
 d
ic
ho
to
m
iz
at
io
n 
w
as
 d
on
e 
at
 c
ut
-o
ff 
va
lu
e 
6.
146 
During the revision process of the CO2-Act between 2008 and 2013, the level of conflict 
was significant. Figure 7 shows that actors, which were most central in the network had 
contrasting views on the CO2 levy on motor fuels. They were the FC, Federal Office for the 
Environment (FOEN), and economiesusisse (cp. Appendix C), which belong to different 
advocacy coalitions. Interestingly, the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), one of the most 
influential actors in Swiss climate policy among the energy, industry, and business sector, is 
only at the periphery. The environmental organisation, however, played a leading role in the 
committee of the public initiative ‘For a Healthy Climate’ and was nominated as an important 
actor by the organisations interviewed. I assume that the importance of the WWF is 
overstated by the representatives interviewed. This phenomenon, known as ‘devil shift’, is to 
paint enemies more dangerous and powerful as they actually are (Fischer et al. 2016).  
Table 10: Regression results revision 
 DEGREE BETWEENESS CLOSENESS 
    INTERCEPT 0.21* (0.08) 0.10* ( 0.04) 0.14*** ( 0.02) 
CO2 LEVY (OPPOSE) 0.18* (0.08) 0.06 ( 0.04) 0.01 ( 0.03) 
CO2 LEVY (SUPPORT) 0.09 (0.08) 0.05 ( 0.04) 0.01 ( 0.02) 
CITIZEN GROUPS -0.25** (0.08) -0.14 ** (-0.04) -0.00 (-0.02) 
INTERNATIONAL -0.20 (0.12) -0.10 ( 0.06) -0.05 ( 0.04) 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH  -0.06 (0.09) -0.08 (-0.04) -0.02 (-0.08) 
PARTIES -0.25** (0.07) -0.15*** (-0.04) -0.05* ( 0.02) 
PRIVATE SECTOR -0.23**(0.07) -0.13*** (-0.04) -0.00 ( 0.02) 
SCIENCE -0.28* (0.13) -0.15* (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.04) 
R2 0.2 0.22 0.14 
ADJ. R2 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 
NUM. OBS. 35 35 35 
RMSE 0.22 0.06 0.11 
    NOTES (p < 0.001 ***, p < 0.01 **, p < 0.05 *) 
STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES 
 
The regression analysis shows (cp. Table 10) that actors in more central positions (degree 
centrality) tend to oppose the introduction of the levy on motor fuels. This implies that actors 
opposing the CO2 levy on motor fuels were more active in terms of lobbying, but they are not 
necessarily in more powerful positions or better connected to powerful actors (closeness and 
betweenness centrality). For the other issues, no such relation was found (cp. Appendix D). In 
terms of the actor types, the results show that citizen groups, parties and business actors tend 
to be in less central positions. With respect to the CO2 levy, central actors were against its 
introduction, which explains, why the levy was not introduced. The policy process was 
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dominated by a small number of actors from the legislative branch, the administration, and 
the economiesuisse. 
Table 11 supports this conclusion. We see, that the most active and influential actors are 
from the administration, followed by the legislation and the private sector. The other groups 
played a subordinated role, both in terms of their presence in the process (degree centrality) 
and being in powerful positions (betweenness centrality). With respect to closeness centrality, 
what measures the extent of actors connected to other important actors, the inverted statistic 
has equally low levels for all actor types. There is a general tendency of actors to be at the 
periphery of the network. All this points to a less fragmented but more centralised power 
structure. 
The analysis of the macro-level statistics supports this. During the revision of the act, the 
policy network shows an average degree of 15.85 and a density of 0.40. In comparison to the 
implementation phase, these values are much lower. The power structure prevalent in the 
policy subsystem was much more centralised than during the implementation. This is also 
highlighted by the lower centralisation score of 0.41. 
Table 11: Centrality scores per actor type revision 
ACTOR TYPE CENTRALITY SCORES 
Degree Betweenness Closeness 
ADMINISTRATION 0,28 0,14 0,14 
CITIZEN GROUP 0,07 0,01 0,14 
INTERNATIONAL 0,01 0,00 0,08 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 0,18 0,03 0,14 
PARTIES 0,09 0,00 0,09 
PRIVATE SECTOR 0,12 0,02 0,14 
SCIENCE 0,03 0,00 0,14 
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In a comparative perspective, we see that the subsystem structure has changed over time. 
The analysis showed that during implementation more actors from different types and levels 
were active during all stages of the process. Conversely, in the revision process less private 
actors from both the business sector and citizen organisations played a central role. In this 
second phase, only two actors from the private sector can be highlighted: the AFRCP and the 
economiesuisse. This indicates that lobbying was less intensive in the revision period between 
2008 and 2013, a finding that is also stressed by a representative of the economy during the 
interviews. An interviewee explained that the revision process was not taken too serious, as it 
was not directly connected to any international developments. As a result, lobbying 
organisations opposing the introduction of the CO2 levy sleepwalked through this decision-
making process until they finally realised the need to intervene at a stage, when it was too 
late.  
In sum, the analysis demonstrates that both decision-making processes were characterised 
by a conflictual environment with core actors disagreeing over crucial topics. The two phases 
differed in terms of the power structure. This supports the formulated hypotheses. In phase 
one, the fragmented power structure led to a compromise solution with an innovative 
moment, namely the introduction of the climate cent as alternative to the carbon levy on 
fuels. In phase two, the more centralised power structure limited the innovative potential. 
Last minute lobbying allowed no room for the development of ground breaking policy 
alternatives to the levy. As a result, the revised act contained no CO2 levy on fuels and no 
convincing replacements. The compensation of oil imports does target consumption patterns 
in the traffic sector equally, as a CO2 levy on motor fuels would have done. 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, the point of departure is that policy instruments are not like an “arrow in a 
quiver (…) awaiting selection and application at appropriate strategic moments by public 
officials” (Bresser and O'Toole 2005, 132). Rather, their effectiveness depends on the social, 
political, economic, and institutional context of their application and so should their selection. 
A careful recognition of the political context can increase the chance of a successful 
implementation. Good policy design has to analyse carefully the aspects of public decision-
making. Paying attention to the problem of political feasibility includes the identification of 
important actors, their beliefs and interests, recourses and venues of interaction (Meltsner 
1972). Therefore, the success and failure of a policy depends on the decision-making process, 
like variances in the decision-making style, and factors related to the structure of the 
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subsystem, i.e. actor constellations and their preferences (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
This analysis shows that the introduction of a carbon levy on motor fuels was politically not 
feasible due to the strong opposition by powerful interest groups. Business, energy, and traffic 
organisations, that represent a large share of the electorate, were among the most 
determined and prominent actors in both policy processes. In contrast, the industry, most 
affected by the carbon levy on combustibles, was meagrely active. Possible explanations for 
the passivity of the industry to avoid the levy stem from the interviews. The industry lobby is 
barely as well appointed with human resources, yet it is the main factor for successful 
lobbying. This probably caused the late reaction in the implementation phase. Whereas the 
climate cent for petrol and diesel was already discussed before 2005 the federal government 
considered to introduce a carbon tax, the climate cent was only discussed when the 
governmental proposal was already in parliament.  
The results of this paper have significant implications for future climate policy in 
Switzerland. Assessing two very recent policy processes confirmed the limited political 
feasibility of a carbon tax on fuels. By introducing a new strategy of Swiss energy policy, it was 
discussed to meticulously integrate climate and energy policy concerns (FFA and UVEK 2015). 
The concept of the energy strategy was the so-called climate and energy steering system to 
replace existing subsidy and funding programs by a levy on electricity, emissions from 
combustibles and fuels. However, like the preceding policy processes an overwhelming 
majority of stakeholders supported the levy on electricity and emissions from combustibles, 
but rejected the levy on fuels. Interestingly, even the left and green parties rejected the 
steering system arguing that the existing mechanisms are already suitably sufficient.  
A further revision of the CO2- Act is now necessary to implement the requirements of the 
Paris Agreement. In 2016, a public consultation was held on three topics: the ratification of 
the Paris Agreement, the integration in the EU emissions trading scheme, and the revision of 
the CO2-Act. The introduction of a CO2 levy was discussed, again. Although the summary report 
of the consultation is not yet released, it is very likely that it will comprise many critical views 
concerning the levy on motor fuels echoing the past 30 years of decision-making on this issue. 
Although it might be the most efficient instrument to reduce emissions in the traffic sector, it 
is also the most implausible to be realised in the future. In consequence, it would be 
commendable to change the strategy by considering other measures, such as programs to 
increase rail traffic and transport, levies and taxes on passenger vehicles, increased road tolls, 
traffic-free zones in cities, and others. 
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This paper conducts an in-depth case study of Swiss climate policy. It also presents an 
innovative framework for analysing structural aspects of the decision-making process (style 
and actor constellations). While this paper makes a valuable contribution to the 
comprehension of Swiss climate politics and answers some previously unacknowledged, yet 
crucial questions, it is also limited. To see whether the developed analytical framework may 
be adapted to any other policy context, it must be applied to other areas and across countries. 
Further research might lead into this direction. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: APES Event List 
 
Phase 1: Implementation of CO2-Act 2004-08 
Pre-parliamentary 
process 
Parliamentary debates Resolving of 
discrepancies 
Entry into force 
1) Signing of target 
agreements with 
EnAW 
2) ECON demands 
more flexibility in 
climate cent 
3) GREEN criticises 
climate cent and 
certificates 
4) BRAT authorizes 
UVEK to start 
consultation 
5) Science conference 
on climate change 
6) SVP introduced 
facultative 
referendum CO2 
levy 
7) Referendum 
denied 
8) UVEK starts 
consultation 
9) Climate Alliance 
publishes 
declaration for the 
introduction of a 
CO2 levy 
10) BRAT decides on 
CO2 levy and 
climate cent 
11) Negotiations on 
climate cent 
12) Adoption CO2-
Regulation 
13) Message on CO2 
levy 
14) Target Agreement 
climate cent 
15) ESPEC-N starts to 
deliberate on CO2 
levy 
16) FCC presents climate 
cent II 
17) ESPEC-N debate on 
federal message 
18) FCC presents 
business plan on 
climate cent 
19) Disagreement on 
CO2 levy among 
stakeholders 
expressed towards 
administration 
20) Parliamentary 
debate on CO2 levy 
in NC 
21) ESPEC--N presents 
iterative 
introduction of CO2 
levy 
22) GREEN protests for 
ambitious climate 
policy 
23) Parliamentary 
debates in NC 
24) Decision NC 
25) ESPEC-S starts 
debate 
26) ESPEC-postpones 
decision 
27) ESPEC-S starts 
debate 
28) SC deliberates on 
proposal 
29) SC decision 
 
30) Resolving of 
discrepancies 
ESPEC-N NC 
decides 
31) Parties demand 
extra session on 
climate policy 
after UNFCCC 
report 
32) Secret meeting on 
public initiative 
33) NC parliamentary 
debate 
34) Decision on CO2 
levy & gas-fired 
power plants 
35) Debate on 
discrepancies 
SC/ESPEC 
36) Second round on 
C gas-fired power 
plants in SC 
37) Final vote on CO2 
levy SC 
38) ESPEC debates on 
discrepancies 
39) Final vote in NC 
40) Federal decree 
41) Special session on 
climate policy in 
NC 
42) Decision on 
climate cent in NC 
43) Agreement federal 
decree 
44) Final business plan 
45) CO2 Regulation 
enters into force 
46)  Science demands 
more ambitious 
climate policy 
47) Extension contract 
with CCF 
48) CO2-Regulation 
enters into force 
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Phase 2: Revision 2008-13 
Pre-parliamentary 
process 
Parliamentary debates Resolving of 
discrepancies 
Final vote 
1) FC presents 
Climate Initiative 
2) FC postpones the 
decision on new 
climate policy 
3) IC-CI submits 
Climate Initiative  
4) FC presents ideas 
on new climate 
policy 
5) FC rejects Climate 
Initiative 
6) FC publishes 
proposal on revised 
CO2 Act 
7) Public consultation 
starts 
8) FC publishes report 
on Swiss climate 
policy 
9) SVP demands 
suspension of CO2 
Act 
10) IC-CI criticises 
governmental 
proposal 
11) BAFU issues carbon 
statistics for 
Switzerland 
12) Climate alliance 
protests for an 
ambitious climate 
policy  
13) EU climate summit 
14) FC submits 
message to 
parliament 
15) Decision for 
consultation of 
stakeholders  
16) ESPEC-N 
deliberates climate 
initiative 
17) ESPEC-N rejects 
climate initiative 
18) FC introduces legal 
framework for 
building 
programme 
19) Consultation of 
stakeholders in 
ESPEC-N 
20) Parliamentary 
debates national 
council  
21) NC rejects Climate 
Initiative  
22) ESPEC-N 
deliberates policy 
proposal 
23) ESPEC--N adopts 
policy proposal 
24) Parliamentary 
debate NC 
25) NC votes for 
proposal and 
passes it to SC 
26) ESPEC--S 
deliberates on 
policy proposal  
27) FOEN reports 
internationally 
committed targets 
to commissions 
28) ESPEC-S adopts 
proposal with 
changes 
29) SC deliberates on 
proposal 
31) Resolving of 
discrepancies NC 
32) NC decides 
33) Resolving of 
discrepancies in SC 
34) ECON considers 
referendum 
35) Final deliberations 
in NC 
36) Final vote on 
proposal NC 
37) Final vote on 
proposal SC 
38) ECON withdraws 
referendum 
39) Final vote on 
climate initiative  
40) IC-CI withdraws 
climate initiative  
41) Revised act enters 
into fore  
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30) Votes for proposal 
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Appendix C: Centrality statistics for all actors 
 
Phase 1: Centrality Statistics (sorted by the degree statistic) 
 Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector 
DETEC 0,794 0,289 0,829 0,929 
SP 0,765 0,13 0,81 1 
HEV 0,647 0,058 0,739 0,917 
FC 0,618 0,134 0,723 0,84 
AFRCP 0,588 0,035 0,708 0,887 
CVP 0,5 0,011 0,654 0,822 
FDP 0,5 0,011 0,654 0,822 
SVP 0,471 0,008 0,642 0,799 
GP 0,441 0,006 0,63 0,759 
ECON 0,441 0,006 0,642 0,778 
NC 0,412 0,016 0,586 0,635 
SGV 0,412 0,005 0,618 0,734 
EV 0,382 0,002 0,618 0,7 
FRS 0,382 0,002 0,618 0,7 
SC 0,353 0,034 0,567 0,399 
CSP 0,353 0,003 0,576 0,613 
FCC 0,324 0,064 0,596 0,485 
ESPEC.N 0,265 0,007 0,54 0,394 
EDU 0,235 0 0,54 0,411 
EVP 0,235 0 0,54 0,411 
OEBU 0,206 0,001 0,548 0,319 
DSMV 0,206 0,001 0,548 0,319 
SVIT 0,206 0,001 0,548 0,319 
GREEN 0,206 0,002 0,548 0,364 
CEM 0,147 0 0,523 0,239 
SMEM 0,147 0 0,523 0,239 
FOEN 0,118 0,001 0,466 0,115 
SFOE 0,088 0 0,459 0,09 
ESPEC.S 0,088 0 0,479 0,136 
Science 0,059 0 0,5 0,118 
EnAW 0,059 0 0,5 0,118 
CCC 0,029 0 0,378 0,032 
SOLAR 0,029 0 0,459 0,062 
VCS 0,029 0 0,459 0,062 
WWF 0,029 0 0,459 0,062 
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Phase 2: Centrality Statistics (sorted by the degree statistic) 
 Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector 
FOEN 0,538 0,413 0,154 0,613 
ECON 0,436 0,133 0,155 1 
FC 0,41 0,136 0,149 0,868 
SC 0,282 0,053 0,146 0,725 
ASTAG 0,282 0,035 0,151 0,754 
NC 0,256 0,059 0,145 0,631 
FDP 0,231 0,004 0,144 0,683 
SP 0,231 0,004 0,144 0,683 
SGV 0,231 0,034 0,148 0,619 
SVP 0,205 0,009 0,144 0,568 
DETEC 0,154 0,007 0,147 0,449 
ESPEC.N 0,154 0,023 0,143 0,389 
GP 0,154 0,004 0,141 0,435 
ACS 0,154 0,007 0,147 0,449 
EV 0,154 0,007 0,147 0,449 
VCS 0,128 0,007 0,146 0,403 
CVP 0,077 0 0,133 0,203 
IC.CI 0,077 0,045 0,134 0,138 
EnAW 0,077 0,01 0,144 0,202 
BAU 0,077 0,007 0,146 0,27 
COMP 0,077 0,011 0,145 0,217 
CLIA 0,051 0,007 0,145 0,161 
UNFCCC 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
HQ 0,026 0 0,12 0,015 
ESPEC.S 0,026 0 0,13 0,079 
CSP 0,026 0 0,129 0,069 
TRAV 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
USIC 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
SGB 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
FRS 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
OcCC 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
WWF 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
SEV 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
GREEN 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
PUSH 0,026 0 0,136 0,067 
EU 0 0 0,025 0 
BDP 0 0 0,025 0 
EDU 0 0 0,025 0 
EVP 0 0 0,025 0 
GLP 0 0 0,025 0 
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IV. What Triggers Interest Groups Interests? A Case Study of Swiss Climate 
Change Politics, by M. Kammerer 
Abstract 
This paper adds to an emerging literature on the question of how and why political interest 
groups position themselves in ongoing policy processes. It argues that (1) main contestations 
are linked to traditional values, which are complicated to overcome or even not negotiable, 
and (2) how interest groups position themselves with respect to their secondary aspects is 
rather connected to sector-specific interests and prevailing advocacy coalitions. Empirically, 
the paper builds on evidence from the Swiss climate policy debate. Previous research has 
shown that interest groups were influential actors in the formulation, implementation, and 
revision of the CO2-Act, which is the centrepiece of Switzerland’s climate policy. By analysing 
responses from the 2009 public consultation about the revision of the CO2-Act in the context 
of a discourse network analysis, the paper demonstrates that on a more general level, interest 
groups define their positions along their policy core. But when it comes to the secondary 
aspects of a policy issue, they are more inclined with their policy niches and coordinate their 
preferences with other interest groups. A bipartite exponential random graph model (ERGM) 
is used to systematically test for potential structural and actor-related mechanisms that shape 
the patterns of interest groups’ policy positions. 
Keywords. Switzerland, Climate policy, Policy networks, Market-based instruments, Actor-
Process-Event Scheme 
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1. Introduction 
How and why do interest groups adopt their policy positions in relation to a specific policy 
issue? This question is important, as interest groups are vital, formative factors in many policy-
making processes (Beyers, Bruycker, and Baller 2015). The essential mission of interest groups, 
which are themselves non-governmental organisations, is to advocate their perception of the 
public interest to various governmental bodies’ (Heaney and Strickland 2016). The main aim 
of their lobbying activities is to change existing public policies in favour of their specific 
interests, to yield issues on the political agenda, or to influence on-going legislative processes. 
Hence, an increased understanding of how they position themselves in the context of policy-
making and under what conditions they form their policy positions, helps to assess the 
feasibility of policies and to anticipate policy outcomes. 
A dynamically growing scholarship on political interest groups (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 
2009; Hojnacki et al. 2012) issues a vast range of eminent research areas, such as interest 
groups and their role in various stages of the decision-making process and their influence on 
policy outcomes (Baumgartner 2009; Ritchey and Nicholson-Crotty 2015), their lobbying 
strategies (Buffardi, Pekkanen, and Smith 2015; Hanegraaff, Beyers, and Bruycker 2016; 
Hanegraaff, Poletti, and Beyers 2016), mobilisation of interest groups and group dynamics 
(Klüver, Braun, and Beyers 2015), and so forth. Moreover, several authors study interest group 
politics through the lens of policy networks (for an overview compare Heaney and Strickland 
2016). These studies address questions of interest group formation (Hadden 2015; Heaney 
2006; Padgett and Powell 2012), development and identity development (e.g. Browne 1990; 
Engel 2007; Halpin and Daugbjerg 2014; Heaney 2004), patterns and prerequisites of 
collaboration (Carpenter 2010; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Leifeld and Schneider 2012), and 
their general influence in the democratic process (Baumgartner 2009; Varone et al. 2017).  
However, only a limited amount of research has been done on the principles, according to 
which interest groups adopt their policy positions. Roughly, contemporary literature can be 
divided into two contrasting arguments. The first perspective argues that interest groups act 
in the context of policy niches (e.g. consumer interests, nature conservation, industry sectors, 
etc.) and mainly concentrate on the protection and promotion of their respective niche 
interests (Gray and Lowery 1996; Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin 1994). The second 
argument builds on one-dimensional conflict spaces of interest group representation. For 
example, Beyers, Bruycker, and Baller (2015) argue that in European Union (EU) legislative 
politics interest groups are organised along the traditional left-right party cleavages. Other 
studies that focus on biased interest group representation in policy making in the EU and the 
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United States draw the conflict line between business and public interests (Bruycker and 
Beyers 2015; Klüver 2012; Lowery et al. 2015). Regardless of the nature of the conflict line, 
the main argument is that interest group communities align with party politics: While business 
interests line up with conservative, Christian Democratic, and liberal parties, non-
governmental organisations (NGO) align with left, social-democratic, and green parties.  
This paper unifies these contrasting perspectives. In line with a more ‘middle ground’ 
(Beyers, Bruycker, and Baller 2015, 537) perspective on interest group mobilisation, it argues 
that, on a general level of alignment in a policy area, interest groups adopt positions according 
to their core beliefs, reflected by their fundamental value orientations towards important 
political cleavages. At the level of secondary aspects (i.e. technicalities and implementation 
details), they choose positions that best represent the interests of their policy niches. In this 
context, interest groups that are less inclined with a specific topic and less capable to develop 
positions formulate their preferences akin to important opinion leaders. Hence, this research 
uses Sabatier´s beliefs system concept (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Instead of using 
actors’ beliefs to explain coalition building (e.g. Fidelman et al. 2014; Ingold 2010) or 
collaboration patterns (e.g. Ingold and Fischer 2013; Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila, and Broadbent 
2017), the beliefs themselves are of interest. This analysis highlights in how far belief systems 
are formative factors for policy debates and how the individual levels of the belief system 
belong together.  
I test my theoretical claims by analysing for interest group alignment in the Swiss climate 
policy debate. Akin to Leifeld (2016), I define a policy debate or political discourse as ‘verbal 
interactions between actors about a given policy’, where they publicly state their opinion on 
policy objectives and instruments. The actors in this debate are dependent on each other, 
learn from each other, and try to influence each other. Hence, policy debates are necessarily 
relational and their study requires a networked perspective (Fisher, Leifeld, and Iwaki 2013; 
Leifeld 2009; 2016). Discourse networks display, which political actor makes what policy 
statement in a debate. By analysing the structures of the political discourse with tools from 
social network analysis, it is possible to investigate factors that affect the alignment of interest 
group policy positions in a policy domain and conclude how these positions are linked.  
But, why bother with policy debates among interest groups? In the policy analysis 
literature, dynamic elements, i.e. policy learning and policy change, are usually associated with 
open ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon 2011) or ‘focusing events’ (Birkland 1998) that change the 
political agenda. Moreover, ‘external and internal shocks (Sabatier and Weible 2007) or 
‘punctuations’ to the political equilibrium (Baumgartner 2006) jeopardise previous policies by 
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strengthening the position of new actors and coalitions. In this regard, policy debates are often 
‘highly consequential for political outcomes’ (Leifeld 2016), as they determine what gets onto 
the political agenda, influence the public opinion, or alter policy perceptions (Endfield and 
Morris 2012; Tellmann 2012).  
Due to this important role of policy debates, the discursive dimension gained attention in 
the policy network literature (Anttila and Kukkonen 2014; Leifeld 2013; 2016). For example, 
on-going research on discourse networks is conducted in the context of the Comparing 
Climate Change Policy Networks (COMPON) project (Broadbent and et al. 2016). The 
international project compares the climate policy discourse of 19 countries to find general 
principles that explain cross-national variation in climate policy performance. Moreover, a 
recent paper by Fisher et al (2013) investigates how climate policy is framed in the United 
States climate politics by mapping ideological relationships among speakers in congressional 
hearings.  
Empirically, the paper builds on evidence from Swiss climate policy. Previous research has 
shown that interest groups were influential actors in the formulation, implementation, and 
revision of the CO2-Act, which is the centrepiece of Switzerland’s climate policy (Ingold 2010; 
2011). By analysing responses from the 2009 public consultation about the revision of the 
CO2-Act in the context of a discourse network analysis, the paper disentangles different 
explanations for interest group alignment in an important policy field. For this purpose, it 
combines a descriptive analysis of the policy discourse and the prevailing actor constellations 
therein with an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM, Wang, Pattison, and Robins 2013) 
to test the theoretical claims systematically and under consideration of their 
interdependence. 
Swiss climate policy makes for a good case study for two main reasons. In Swiss politics, 
interest groups are generally powerful actors (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2005), but 
especially in climate policy. (Ingold 2010; 2011; Ingold and Christopoulos 2015). In contrast to 
Switzerland’s weaker political parties, interest groups are more coherently structured and well 
appointed with financial resources and personnel. They play a key role in the legislative 
process, particularly in the pre-parliamentary phase, and during policy implementation (David 
et al. 2010; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 100f). They are leading actors in formulating and 
implementing economic policy, but their influence also stretches to other policy fields. In 
addition, an increasing approachability of political institutions (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008) and 
the rise of post-materialist values since the 1980s (Inglehart 1990) established influential 
interest groups in further policy fields. For example, environmental non-governmental 
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organisations (ENGOs), such as the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) Switzerland have 
advanced to important actors in transport, energy, research, or land use planning previously 
domains of business interests. 
Secondly, climate policy is a cross-sectional matter that affects almost all societal sectors. 
Swiss environmental policy has traditionally been shaped by political divisions between the 
political left as proponent for stronger environmental protection and the political right taking 
an adverse stance over environmental regulations (Carter 2007; Geser 2003). Accordingly, 
recent research on Swiss climate politics has shown that policy-making is dominated by two 
opposing advocacy coalitions (Ingold 2008): the ‘pro-economy coalition’ that comprises of 
influential business and trade organisations, as well as right-wing parties and the ‘pro-ecology’ 
coalition that unites important ENGOs and left-wing parties. However, climate policy in 
particular has entered the national political arena, mainly as an international environmental 
policy issue and has remained firmly akin to international policy processes (Klöti et al. 2005; 
Sprinz and Weiss 2001). I assume that the cleavage between internationally open and 
nationally oriented, conservative political actors is also relevant in Swiss climate politics.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical section starts by outlining the main 
theoretical arguments about why interest groups adopt certain policy positions. I rely on 
Sabatier’s belief system concept to disentangle several levels of policy preferences and 
operationalise them by combining cleavage theory (Kriesi et al. 2006; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) 
and policy niche approaches (Browne 1990) with a networked perspective. In the data section, 
I construe my case and data collection. Methodologically, I start with a descriptive analysis. 
Later, I employ a bipartite exponential random graph model (ERGM) to test for potential 
structural and actor-related mechanisms shaping the patterns of interest groups’ policy 
positions on climate policy in Switzerland. 
2. Cleavages, Policy Niches, and the Interests of Others 
As already noted by Schattschneider (1975), political cleavages are important organising 
principles in interest group politics. Cleavages are important lines of conflict along 
fundamental value orientations prevalent in societies. While studying cleavages in the context 
of party systems is widespread, their application to the landscape of interest groups is rare 
and usually connected to how they are situated to political parties (e.g. Beyers, Bruycker, and 
Baller 2015; Klüver 2012). However, studying the political landscape of interest groups 
provides a finer model of competing interests and societal values prevalent in a society, 
because they accurately represent the configuration and prioritisation of important policy 
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domains, i.e. business, transport, energy, agriculture, industry, environment, and so forth. 
Often, political parties are also dependent on the expertise of interest groups. They deal with 
a wide range of topics provide great manpower to satisfyingly deal with issues. Interest groups 
situate themselves close to parties that best represent their fundamental value orientations 
and use them as vehicle to lobby for their sector-specific interests in the policy process.  
In the belief system of an interest group, the positioning towards political cleavages 
constitutes the highest level of beliefs, which are often referred to as core beliefs (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Core beliefs are free from specifics of individual policy domains, but 
do mirror the general convictions of how a society should be organised, like for example the 
level of state intervention, the handling of the challenges as imposed by globalisation, or 
matters of social equity.  
The cleavage literature discusses two main cleavages visible in modern societies: (1) the 
traditional socio-economic division between the political left- and right-wing (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967), and (2) the cultural division between internationally open and culturally liberal 
segments of society, and the part of society that emphasises political independence, 
traditional cultural values, and national identity (Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006).  
The first cleavage reflects the traditional division between capital and labour. The capital 
side of the continuum is usually associated with traditional rightist values and business 
interests. It advocates free enterprises, privatisation, liberal markets, decreased state 
intervention, and a limitation of social services. Associated interest groups are typically 
business or employer associations and trade unions. The labour side is associated with leftist 
values and public interests. It advocates an increasing public ownership of the industry, 
increased state, and a strong focus on reducing income inequality. Associated interest groups 
are usually labour organisations and NGOs.  
The second cleavage reflects the more recent developments in a globalising world. Instead 
of merely dividing societal conflicts into national business interest and public welfare, the 
conflict is now progressing between the losers and winners of globalisation (Kriesi 1998; Kriesi 
et al. 2006). The winners are ‘entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to 
international competition, as well as all kinds of cosmopolitan citizens (…)’ (Kriesi et al. 2006, 
922). The ‘expected losers, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in 
traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees and citizens who strongly identify 
themselves with their national community’(ibid.). Cultural and material threats are not treated 
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as distinct phenomena, but mutually reinforcing factors of social integration. The open and 
culturally liberal segment of winners among society favours open markets and is generally 
internationally oriented. The traditional side of the cleavage, uniting the losers, favours 
protected national economies, political independence and national identity, and promotes 
conservative cultural values. Here, the allocation of interest groups on one or the other side 
of the cleavage works across the typical divide of interest groups into a private or public sphere 
and is therefore less obvious. A humanitarian organisation, for example, might advocate leftist 
but traditional values if it focuses on the welfare of citizens and natives and deplores migrants. 
A business organisation usually supports rightist values, but if it represents a sector that is 
vulnerable to globalisation, it will advocate rather traditional values.  
Considering these core beliefs, as reflected by important societal cleavages is important, 
as they determine, on a most general level, the political space in which a policy domain can 
evolve, i.e. its main directions and boundaries. The assumption is that convictions about 
general policy objectives and approaches, i.e. policy core beliefs, in a policy domain are nested 
in these general value orientations. For example, with respect to the climate policy domain, 
rightist values are usually associated with a policy approach that prioritises economic interests 
to ensure international competitiveness. Also, a low level of state intervention is favoured in 
this perspective. A climate policy approach that is in line with this value orientation supports 
voluntary measures with a high degree of flexibility and opposes taxes or emission standards. 
Being very hard, if not impossible to change, compromise solutions over contested issues 
in a policy domain will typically arise along and not across these lines of conflict. I assume that 
cleavages are reflected on how interest groups position themselves in relation to specific 
policy domains on a general level. Hence, interest groups that share common fundamental 
value orientations, because they are similarly situated in the two-dimensional space of 
political cleavage, are expected to express the same policy preferences more often than 
interest groups from opposing sides do. This leads to a first hypothesis: 
Cleavage hypothesis: If the policy core beliefs of interest groups in a policy domain depends 
on fundamental value orientations (core beliefs), interest groups that are situated on the same 
side of a cleavage should more often than not support the same policy positions.  
I argue that these main cleavage structures are also important for Swiss climate policy in 
general and for the 2008-2013 revision of the Swiss CO2-Act in particular. In Switzerland, 
environmental policy has been shaped by political divisions between left-wing parties as 
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proponents for stronger environmental protection and right-wing parties taking an adverse 
stance over environmental regulations (Carter 2007; Geser 2003). Climate policy has entered 
the national political arena mainly as an international environmental policy issue and has 
remained strongly connected to international policy processes (Klöti et al. 2005; Sprinz and 
Weiss 2001). It is therefore assumed that the cleavage between internationally open and 
nationally oriented, conservative political actors is also relevant.  
However, explaining the policy positions of interest groups based on political cleavages 
alone has limitations, as this approach disregards the configuration of sector-specific interests 
prevalent in a policy domain. This is important, as many policy domains affect a variety of 
different sectors. Climate policy, for example, is usually a conflictive policy domain (Ingold and 
Varone 2011), as it touches a wide range of sectors that often compete in interest, such as 
business, environment, energy, agriculture, forest, spatial planning, industry, consumption, 
among others. In addition, these sectors can be split further, like the energy sector that is 
divided in conventional energy and renewable. The interest group literature discusses these 
sector-specific beliefs in what they call a policy niche (Gray and Lowery 1996; Maloney, Jordan, 
and McLaughlin 1994). 
These sector-specific interests are both reflected in the policy core of an interest group 
and in their secondary aspects. Both are policy domain specific and focus on important 
principles of a domain, i.e. the position towards an instrument type, the relevant target 
groups, appropriate policy objectives (policy core), and more detailed implementation details 
(secondary aspects). In contrast to the core beliefs, both the policy core and secondary aspects 
have a higher propensity for change. In particular, the issues related to the secondary aspects 
of a policy offer room for compromise between actors from different societal sectors. The key 
assumption is that interest group politics mainly follow the imperative of needs among the 
own policy niche. Hence, when formulating their policy position in relation to a specific policy 
proposal in a policy domain, interest groups consider what is best for their own policy niche. 
This leads to a second hypothesis: 
Policy Niche Hypothesis: If the policy position of interest groups in a policy domain depends 
on policy niches (policy core beliefs and secondary aspects), interest groups of the same policy 
niche should more often than not support the same policy positions. 
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3. Research Design: Evidence from Switzerland 
To test my theoretical claims, I draw on two different levels of analysis: To begin with, an 
actor-based explanation focuses on the relationship between interest group characteristics, 
i.e. cleavage affiliation and sectoral-specifics and an interest group’s alignment towards a 
policy domain. Furthermore, a structure-based explanation that highlights the choice to 
support a policy position in relation to the position of others. The simultaneous use of actor-
based and structure-based explanations renders tools from social network analysis as 
particularly useful, as they allow analysing both factors in one approach.  
A Network of Policy Positions 
I created a discourse network that displays interest groups and their policy positions 
towards climate policy. For this purpose, I used the data gathered in the context of a public 
consultation. In Switzerland, an institutionalized consultation procedure (Vernehmlassung) 
includes various non-governmental actors in the decision-making process at an early stage 
and on a regular basis (Linder 2010). The public consultation was executed in the context of 
the revision of the Swiss CO2-Act, which is the centrepiece of Switzerland’s climate policy and 
its main legal framework (FOEN 2010). The first version of the act, entering into force in 1999, 
aimed at implementing Kyoto Protocol21 requirements and serves as key statutory basis of 
Swiss climate policy until 2012. Subsequently, a revision of the act was necessary to set up a 
new legal basis for Swiss climate policy between 2012 and 2020 that is the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The revision was also triggered by a public initiative 
launched by an alliance of environmentalist organisations. The public initiative pursued the 
goal of introducing a constitution article, setting emission reduction targets to 30% against 
the 1990 baseline. Eventually, the government reacted to the initiative with a governmental 
counterproposal.  
The final version of the counterproposal was based on the results of the public 
consultation, which was held in 2009. In the consultation, stakeholders reviewed two 
disparate alternatives for a new draft of the federal CO2-Act: Option 1 (Binding Climate 
Targets) provided for a 20% reduction target (1990 baseline) with a focus on domestic CO2 
emission reductions and a carbon levy on both combustibles and fuels. Option 2 (Binding Steps 
towards Climate Neutrality) comprised for a 50% reduction target (1990 baseline), yet flexible 
                                                            
21The Kyoto Protocol is a legally binding international agreement under the United Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. The agreement defined CO2 emission reduction targets for the 
commitment period of 2008 to 2012 for so-call Annex I countries (mostly OECD countries). 
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approach towards emission reductions that allowed the compensation of emissions by climate 
projects abroad. In addition, several technicalities of policy instruments were discussed, 
among them the continuation of the Swiss emissions trading system (ETS) and its link to the 
EU ETS, emission standards in the housing and traffic sector, as well as matters of climate 
change adaptation, climate innovations, and financing issues.  
The consultation is an excellent data source, as it captures all major points discussed in the 
context of the revision of the CO2-Act and it covers all relevant interest groups. The DETEC 
received around 198 responses by a variety of addressees, such as all cantons, the political 
parties, interest groups, and companies, which all evaluated on the governmental draft. The 
consultation procedure was designed as a structured survey, but also allowed for open 
comments. All responses were collected and summarised in a report issued by the Federal 
Office for the Environment (FOEN 2009).  
Both the consultation survey and the summary report are not scientific but political 
documents that contain a pre-selection of topics to be discussed in detail. This raises the 
potential for a biased data set in favour of what or whom the responsible authorities consider 
to be important. For example, in the summary report some core economic interest groups or 
political parties were mostly named individually, whereas smaller NGOs, or companies were 
often summarised (e.g. environmental organisations). The structured survey, in contrast, only 
contains information on the support or opposition with respect to predefined questions. In 
addition, some but not all participants of the consultation submitted additional statements 
extending the topics discussed in the survey. The summary report certainly considers these 
statements, as well. To overcome the limitation of either data source, I coded both the 
structured survey data and the summary report. When necessary, I also consulted the open 
statements, for example, when an actor was not mentioned in the summary report, but 
submitted a survey statement. Also, I skimmed the open comments to find out, whether there 
were topics not covered by the summary report. If so, I also coded the open comments. The 
resulting data set covers all issues asked by the authorities and includes additional topics that 
arose among the consultation participants.  
The data was used to create an affiliation network that links policy statements to interest 
groups. I used the ‘Discourse Network Analyzer’ (DNA)22 – ‘a quantitative content analysis tool 
with network export facilities’ (Leifeld, 2013) to code the data. Specifically, I assigned 102 
                                                            
22Software accessible via: http://www.philipleifeld.de/software/discourse-network-
analyzer/discourse-network-analyzer-dna.html. 
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interest groups to 85 different statements, expressed in the consultation responses. Next, I 
merged similar statements to 30 broader policy positions (see Appendix 1). I used a routine 
implemented in the DNA tool to export the coded data into an Excel file that summarises 
interest groups (rows) and the supported policy positions (columns)23. If an interest group 
supports a policy position, the respective cell in the spreadsheet contains the digit 1 (or else 
0). This binary two-mode matrix was then transformed into a bipartite network graph, using 
the UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Bipartite networks consist of two 
sets of nodes, where ties can only be among the nodes of different sets. Here, one node set 
reflects the interest groups that participated in the consultation procedures (compare 
Appendix 2 for a list of interest groups). The other node set mirrors the policy positions 
(compare Appendix 1 for a list of policy positions). The network relation (tie) shows the 
support of a policy position by an interest group. This network can be understood as a network 
of policy positions or discourse network. Hence, the main dependent variable is the tie 
between an interest group and a policy position in the discourse network. 
I also identified the three main contestations in the public consultation. The positioning of 
interest groups towards these issues basically reflect their climate policy core beliefs: (1) the 
height of emissions reduction targets, (2) the position towards the carbon levy on fuels, and 
(3) the issue whether CO2-emission reductions should be reached by focusing on domestic 
measures, as opposed to a flexible approach that allows to account for emission reductions 
abroad. Based on the consultation documents, I coded three respective categorical variables: 
the targets variable was coded as ‘high’ (> 20% emission reduction), ‘medium’ (~20% emission 
reduction), or ‘low’ (< 20% emission reduction). The carbon levy variable was coded as ‘yes’ 
(carbon levy on fuels supported) or ‘no’ (carbon levy on fuels not supported). Finally, the scope 
variable was coded as ‘flexible’ (flexible approach supported) or ‘domestic’ (focus on domestic 
emission reductions). 
Explanatory variables 
Cleavage affiliation. I coded the affiliation of each interest group for two cleavages, i.e. the 
capital versus labour cleavage (CapLab) and the liberal versus traditional cleavage (LibTrad), 
to account for policy core beliefs. I assume that most interest groups can be assigned to either 
one side of the cleavage. For example, the WWF Switzerland was coded as ‘labour’ and 
‘liberal’. It is coded as ‘labour’, because it promotes values, such as social equity, sustainability, 
or favours state interventions. In addition, it is situated on the liberal side of the cleavage being 
                                                            
23I also exported a version of the data set linking interest groups and all political statements.  
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an internationally oriented organisation that advocates open cultural values. In contrast, the 
strasseschweiz (the main car driver’s organisations) was coded as ‘capital’, because it supports 
liberal markets and opposes state interventions, and is ‘traditional’, due to its focus on 
securing the need of Swiss car drivers and political independence. 
To assign interest groups to the two cleavages, I developed a simple coding scheme based 
on seminal work in the cleavage literature (Kriesi et al. 2006; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For an 
overview compare Table 12. The coding was based on these outlined core values. For an 
interest group to be assigned to one side of a cleavage, these core values should be 
consistently reflected in the policy goals, positions, or mission statements. To derive this kind 
of documents, I consulted the official websites for all interest groups and assessed 
respectively. Moreover, relevant literature on the Swiss political system in general and 
historical cleavages in Swiss politics in particular served as an alternative data source to cross-
validate the coding (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2005). If an unambiguous assignment 
was not possible, the respective interest group was coded as ‘ambiguous’ situated in the 
middle of the continuum. 
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Table 12: Cleavage coding scheme 
Capital 
vs. 
Labour cleavage 
CAPITAL LABOR 
- Limitation of social 
services 
- Liberal markets  
- Free enterprises and 
privatization 
- More redistribution of 
income 
- More state intervention 
- More public ownership of 
industry 
Liberal 
vs. 
Traditional cleavage 
LIBERAL TRADITIONAL 
- winners of globalization 
- Open markets 
- International political 
orientation 
- Open cultural values 
- losers of globalization 
- Protected national 
economy 
- Political independence 
- Traditional cultural values 
 
Policy niche. I coded a categorical variable that reflects the seven most important sectors 
i.e. agriculture & forest, building, economy, energy, environment and renewable energies, 
human aid, traffic, and cross-sectional. The cross-sectional category was used sparingly and 
reserved for interest groups, situated in more than one policy niche. For example, the Catholic 
Women’s Association focuses on a wide range of themes from environmental issues to 
matters of education or the economy. Compare Appendix 2 for the coding of the policy niche 
variable. 
All these variables are entering the analysis as homophily effect. Homophily (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) is a very prominent concept in social network analysis that 
reflects a tendency of making ties with similar others. Thus, social actors that share common 
attributes are inclined to show a similar behaviour. Here, this implies that interest groups that 
are advocates of the same side of a political cleavage or political niche tend to share a greater 
number of common positions on climate policy. 
To check the reliability of the coding frame and the validity of the data set, a colleague of 
mine re-coded the complete data set on the cleavages, the policy niches, and some of the 
controls based on the same coding rules. Moreover, another colleague reviewed the coded 
data without coding rules. A small number of differences arose, which we discussed until a 
consensus was found. 
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All these actor-focused variables are entering the analysis as homophily effect. Homophily 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) is a very prominent concept in social network that 
reflects a tendency of making ties with similar others. Thus, social actors sharing common 
attributes are inclined to show a similar behaviour too. Here, this implies that interest groups 
being advocates of the same side of political cleavage or the same political niche tend to share 
common positions on climate policy. 
Controls 
In addition to the explanatory variables, I included two further actor covariates and four 
structural network terms. The first actor covariate reflects the affiliation of an interest group 
towards the two important advocacy coalitions in the climate policy subsystem, the pro-
economy, and the pro-ecology coalition. I expected to see that interest groups formulate their 
positions in line with other members of their coalition. For the coding, I used the existing 
literature on advocacy coalitions in Swiss climate policy (Ingold 2008).  The second actor 
covariate mirrors the breadth of an interest group and basically operationalises the dual 
structure of the Swiss interest group system in sector-specific peak organisations. This variable 
is included to control for the impact of influential interest groups on the policy discourse.  
Finally, this analysis also controls for network dependency statistic that model the 
structure of the policy discourse. These, model terms capture the patterns of a network that 
are reflected more or less often than one would expect in a random graph with the same 
metrics (number of nodes and ties). Here, a set of two statistics refers to the popularity of 
policy positions in the discourse network. The first term is a 2-star Markov term that captures 
the overall popularity of policy positions. The second term is an alternating star parameter 
term that is linked to the spread of popularity across policy positions. A positive Markov term 
in combination with a negative alternating star parameter indicates a relatively equal 
distribution of popularity of policy positions across the networks with a small number of high 
degree policy positions. This reflects a tendency to support policy positions that are supported 
by many others. In the network literature, this effect is usually referred to as preferential 
attachment or degree assortativity (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
Furthermore, two network degree terms reflect the number of positions that interest 
groups tend to support. Positive degree terms indicate an increased propensity of an interest 
group to support a higher number of policy positions. This can be interpreted as the 
complexity or readiness to compromise. Interest groups that support a limited spectrum of 
positions are either hard-liners or not really interested in the process. Conversely, interest 
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groups that are more on the middle ground of the debate are expected to have a broader 
spectrum of positions. To control for these processes and to assess the overall level of conflict, 
I included a 2-star model term based on Markov dependence (two ties are conditionally 
independent unless they share a tie) and an alternating star parameter. While the Markov 
terms capture the overall propensity of an interest group to support a policy preference 
better, the alternating star parameter is superior in modelling the spread of the spread of this 
propensity. A positive Markov term combined with a negative alternating star parameter 
implies a relatively equal distribution of activity among interest groups across the networks 
with a small number of highly active interest groups.  
Finally, the research design includes two terms to control for the existence of clusters in 
the network. The interest group alternating 2-path term is the bipartite version of network 
closure (Wang 2013), based on the degree of interest groups. Network closure reflects, 
whether interest groups tend to share the same policy positions. A significant and positive 
parameter estimate points to a tendency of two interest groups to have more than one policy 
position in common. The policy position alternating 2-path: This dependence term is the 
bipartite version of network closure based on the popularity of policy positions. Network 
closure reflects, whether policy positions tend to be supported by the same actors. A 
significant and positive parameter estimate points to a tendency of two policy positions having 
more than one interest group in common. 
4. Methodology 
My analysis proceeded in two steps. I analysed the structure of policy positions and interest 
group alignment based on a descriptive analysis of actor and preference constellations and 
ran several simple Chi-square tests to assess the relationship between cleavage affiliation and 
the positioning of interest groups towards the more general policy positions on climate policy. 
I then applied a bipartite exponential random graph model (ERGM) to test systematically the 
above outlined hypotheses on the more nuanced level of policy discourse. 
ERGMs represent a class of models for specifying the probability distribution for a set of 
random networks (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013). The general form of an ERGM can be 
written as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦) = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �𝜃𝜃′𝑔𝑔(𝑦𝑦)�
𝑘𝑘(𝜃𝜃)  
where Y is the random variable for the state of the network (with realisation y), g(y) is a 
vector of model statistics for the network y, 𝜃𝜃 is the vector of coefficients for these statistics, 
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and𝑘𝑘(𝜃𝜃) represents the quantity of the numerator summed over all possible networks with 
the same node set y. The model terms g(y) are functions of network statistics, assumed to 
appear more common than in a simple random network, in which all ties are equally probable. 
Network ties can be either dyad-dependent or dyad-independent. Dyad-dependent terms, 
such as degree or triad terms, reflect the dependency between nodes in a network. This 
means that a link between an interest group and the policy position it supports depends on 
other existing ties or tie configurations. Dyad-independent terms like nodal covariates or 
homophily terms (i.e. interest groups with the same attributes have the same policy 
preference) (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) imply no dependence between the 
dyads. The presence or absence of a tie is caused by the attribute of an interest group, but 
not by the state of other ties. The main purpose of an ERGM is to model the process of network 
tie formation, whereas the presence of a tie between two nodes is explained by a combination 
of actor attribute variables and by patterns of ties. In contrast to classical regression models, 
ERGMs relax the assumption of independence between observations. Therefore, they 
incorporate possible dependencies among tie variables. For the network at hand, I use a 
version of an ERGM for bipartite networks (Wang 2013). Compare Appendix 3 for an 
illustration of all network dependencies assessed in this analysis and an overview of all 
variables, their description, role in the research design, and data sources. 
5. Results 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of popularity among all 30 policy preferences discussed in 
the 2009 public consultation. The distribution is calculated based on a normalised version of 
the degree centrality statistic that captures how often a preference was supported in relation 
to all other supported preferences present in the network. The most commonly supported 
preferences are the link of the Swiss emission trading system the one of the European Union, 
a federal funding of climate mitigation policies, the introduction for sector-specific emission 
reduction targets, and emission standards for passenger cars. The majority of preferences are 
less frequently supported. With respect to the height of the emission reduction standards and 
their scope (domestic or abroad), the graph shows a dispersion of different supported 
alternatives, such as high targets with great flexibility, low targets with great flexibility, high 
targets with low flexibility, and so on. Also, an extension of the carbon levy on fuels receives 
little support. These findings underpin the identified main contestations in the policy discourse 
(targets, scope, and carbon levy on fuels). 
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Out of the 102 interest groups seized in this analysis 66 are affiliated to the capitalist side 
of the CapLab cleavage, 26 belong to the labour side, and 12 are ambivalent. The LibTrad 
cleavage encompasses 64 interest groups that represent liberal values, 41 with traditional 
values, and eight again ambivalent ones. Figure 9 shows the distribution of actors according 
to the cleavages and their ecological orientation. We see that most of the rightist and 
traditional actors are members of the pro-economy coalition and most of the leftist members 
are part of the pro-ecology collation, but the liberal interest groups seem to be rather split-up 
between the two coalitions 
Figure 9: Distribution of actors across cleavages and coalitions 
 
Figure 10 displays the interest groups according to their cleavages and towards the main 
critical points discussed in the consultation. Not surprisingly, the capital side of the CapLab 
cleavage predominantly demands a greater flexibility, offsets emission reduction targets (at 
home or abroad) and opposes the introduction of a carbon tax on fuels.  
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Figure 10: Distribution of Cleavages and Core Contestations 
Conversely, the labour side opposes the greater flexibility but supporting a levy on fuels. Both 
the liberal and the traditional side of the LibTrad cleavage seem to be rather heterogeneous 
in their preferences. These findings are highlighted and confirmed by the results of a Chi-
square test (compare Table 13). 
Table 13: Results Chi-square tests 
 CAPITAL VS. LABOR LIBERAL VS. TRADITIONAL 
Targets 
Significant. 
X-squared = 48.1508 
df = 2 
p-value = 3.501e-11 
Not significant.  
X-squared = 0.9665 
df = 2 
p-value = 0.6168 
Scope 
Significant. 
X-squared = 11.0944 
df = 1 
p-value = 0.0008659 
Not significant.  
X-squared = 2.3892 
df = 1 
p-value = 0.1222 
Tax 
Significant. 
X-squared = 10.1172 
df = 1 
p-value = 0.001469 
Not significant.  
X-squared = 3.1274 
df = 1 
p-value = 0.07698 
Note 
All chi-square tests were conducted in r based on the data 
displayed in appendix 2. 
Note: All Chi-square tests were conducted in R based on the data displayed in Appendix 2. 
 
The Chi-square tests assess the relationship between the cleavage affiliation of interest 
groups and the most important issues discussed in the consultation. The results indicate a 
significant relationship between how interest groups aligns with the capital versus labour 
cleavage and its major positions towards climate policy, but not for the liberal versus 
traditional cleavage. In sum, all these results point to the importance of the core beliefs, as 
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shaped by the divide into left and right values for the general outline of climate policy in 
Switzerland. In contrast, the split into liberal and traditional values seems to be less important.  
Bipartite Exponential Random Graph Model 
I used MPNet (Wang et al. 2014) – a software designed to simulate multilevel and bipartite 
ERGMs – to estimate the model based on an MCMC algorithm and maximum likelihood 
estimation24. I followed the recommendations proposed by Wang, Pattison and Robins (2013) 
and Wang (2013) for the specification of the model. Table 14 presents the results of the 
bipartite ERGM estimations. The numbers represent the estimated parameter values with 
standard errors in the parentheses. An asterisk indicates significant parameter estimates. The 
parameters provide information about the likelihood of dyad-dependent and dyad-
independent terms in the observed networks. Positive, significant parameter estimates 
indicate that more configurations of that type are observed in the network than expected in 
a random network graph given the same node sets. Negative, significant parameter estimates 
imply that less configurations of that type are observed in the network than expected in a 
random network graph given the same node sets. All models presented in Table 14 
converged25 with t-values below 0.1. 
The Bernoulli model only contains one model term that captures the density of the 
network, as a function of a homogeneous edge probability. Cleavage Model 1 includes the two 
homophily terms related to the cleavages. Cleavage Model 2, in addition, controls for the 
advocacy coalitions. These first models reveal several highly interesting findings. While the 
parameter estimates of the first model that are related to the cleavage variables are both 
significant and positive, the effect for the CapLab cleavage in the second model is now 
significant, but negative. The one related to the OpTrad cleavage remains robust. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from this. To begin with, the advocacy coalition variable is 
correlated to the CapLab variable, but the effect of the policy preferences is much better 
covered by the coalitions. The implications are not surprising: Climate policy preferences on 
the level of secondary aspects are formulated considering the policy core beliefs of the 
                                                            
24To date, the MPNet software is the only software tool that allows a reliable estimation of ERGMs for 
bipartite networks. Although the statnet package implement in R offers network terms for bipartite 
networks, they are not yet steady enough to produce consistent results for large networks, in particular. 
25Convergence means that the ‘difference between simulated statistics and observed statistics for the 
‘fitted effects’, as measured by the convergence statistic, is smaller than 0.1 in absolute value’ Robins 
and Lusher (2013, 181). 
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respective advocacy coalition. On a more detailed level, the results contrast with the Chi-
square test, which only evaluated the relationship for the most critical issues and the policy 
core. For these critical issues, core values are decisive. These findings also explain why the 
core conflicts in climate policy are so hard to solve. They are strongly influenced by the core 
beliefs, and therefore, not negotiable. In addition, analysis on a detailed level also 
demonstrates the importance of the new cleavage between winners and loser of globalisation. 
In sum, while these results support the cleavage hypothesis, the affaire is more intricate. The 
traditional divide between the political right and left wing is responsible for ingrained 
controversies in Swiss climate policy and explains why over some issues, such as the 
introduction of a carbon tax on fuels, no satisfying compromise solution can be found.  
Introducing the policy niche variable does not affect the parameters of other variables. The 
parameter estimate shows a positive and significant effect, what points at the importance of 
policy niches on the level of secondary aspects. Figure 11 shows how the sectors are 
positioned in relation to the three most critical issues, and demonstrates that there are now 
clear tendencies with respect to these positions. In contrast, the results of the ERGM highlight 
that interest groups tend to formulate their policy preferences considering sector-specific 
interests on the level of secondary aspects. This finding supports hypothesis 2. Finally, I 
controlled for the effect of umbrella organisations, and whether these organisations support 
a wider-range of preferences, as they also cover a broader spectrum of policy preferences, yet 
the variable shows now effect. 
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The final model includes the dyad-dependent terms, introduced above. The model has a 
sound goodness of fit (GOF), as illustrated in Appendix 4, and shows robust results, as 
compared to the other models. In the structural model, the popularity terms behave as 
expected. The combination of the 2-star Markov and the alternating star parameters for both, 
policy preferences and interest groups, reflect the structure of the discourse well. On the one 
hand, it mirrors the right-skewed distribution of the supported policy preferences. While a 
small number of preferences receive large support, the majority of positions is contested. On 
the other hand, the negative and significant 2-star Markov parameter undermines this, as it 
reflects the tendency of interest groups to support only a small number of policy preferences. 
In all, these results point to a rather high level of conflict, present in the discussion on the 
revision of the CO2-Act, connected to the three contestations, discussed. Finally, the model 
now shows significant effects, related to the clustering statistics. 
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Figure 11: Sectors displayed per key contestations 
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6. Outlook 
This paper tackles the question of how and why political interest groups position 
themselves in ongoing policy processes and has two main contributions: First, it unites 
previous literature by linking cleavage-based and policy-niche based arguments about why 
and how interest groups adopt policy preferences in relation to a specific policy issue and 
operationalises these concepts with Sabatier’s belief system. Specifically, this paper finds that 
core contestations in climate policy are determined by the traditional divide between the 
political left and right, what also explains why it is difficult to solve these conflicts. When it 
comes to the secondary aspects of a policy issue, interest groups are more importantly 
inclined to the needs of their respective policy niches and tend to support popular 
preferences. While the causal effect of the latter cannot exactly be determined, a possible 
explanation is that many less disposed interest groups simply follow the opinion leaders in 
their advocacy coalitions. 
Secondly, it adds to the scholarship of interest groups and policy preferences in two main 
ways. On the one hand, it highlights the split between winners and looser of globalisation, as 
a further important political cleavage, structuring the realm of interest groups. Here, this 
cleavage is only visible in the more detailed discussion about how Switzerland’s climate policy 
should be formulated. Hence, the fundamental questions related to a policy issue are very 
much reflected by the traditional divide between leftist and rightist values. Detailed questions 
that have implications on the de facto implementation are discussed more in the context of 
the challenges of a globalised world.  
In addition, this paper offers a relational perspective by considering that the policy 
positions of interest groups are not per se exogenous and independent of each other. Instead, 
they depend on policy positions of separate interest groups, and how different policy positions 
are linked to each other, until they form a narrative on how a policy domain should ideally be 
regulated. These narratives stretch beyond the complete belief system of an interest group 
and usually encompass the policy core beliefs and secondary aspects (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993). For example, an economic interest group might support an ambitious climate 
policy with high emission reduction targets, but favours non-interventionist policy 
instruments, such as voluntary agreements among the administration and companies to reach 
their targets. An environmental organisation, on the other hand, might also support high 
emission reduction targets, but favours more interventionist policy instruments, such as 
emission standards or taxes. I argue that these narratives develop through collaborative 
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interaction of interest groups that usually do not act individually, but are organised in peak 
organisations or form advocacy coalitions.  
Moreover, not all interest groups are equally interested in the same policy issues and they 
do not have the time and resources to focus on all of them with similar scrutiny. Only few 
interest groups, highly involved in a policy issue take up the role of opinion leaders in an 
advocacy coalition. For example, the Swiss climate policy subsystem is divided into the pro-
ecology coalition, primarily led by the WWF Switzerland, and the pro-economy coalition, led 
by the economiesuisse and the oil association (Ingold 2011). In contrast, a large number of 
interest groups that are less inclined and resourced will follow and adopt policy position from 
opinion leaders. Although not tested directly, the results of this analysis reveal considerations 
of the policy discourse on the revision of the CO2-Act by the tendency of many interest groups 
supporting the positions promoted by their coalitions. The implication of this is 
straightforward: In the rather detailed discussion about the design of a policy, the majority of 
less inclined interest groups align with the minority of opinion leaders.  
Finally, the findings of this study provide a first attempt of understanding how interest 
groups or other actors formulate their preferences in the context of a specific policy issue. The 
results have shown that (1) main contestations are linked to traditional values, which are 
complicated to overcome or even not negotiable, and (2) how interest groups position 
themselves with respect to their secondary aspects, which are considerably connected to 
sector-specific interest and prevailing advocacy coalitions. This research might spark off future 
investigation, if different policy fields are compared or the analysis extended to a dynamic 
investigation of policy discourses.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: List of Aggregated Policy Positions 
20% domestic 20% reduction of CO2 emissions with a focus on Swiss-
wide efforts 
30% abroad 30% reduction of CO2 emissions allowing the flexibility 
to include investment in mitigation efforts abroad  
50% abroad 50% reduction of CO2 emissions allowing the flexibility 
to include investment in mitigation efforts abroad 
EU ETS instead carbon tax Link to the EU ETS instead of carbon tax 
Carbon tax combustibles Carbon tax on combustibles is supported 
Carbon tax fuels Extension of carbon tax on fuels is supported 
Climate friendly innovations Focus on climate friendly innovations 
Climate neutrality Switzerland should focus on climate neutrality 
Climate penny Climate cent must be reintroduced 
Domestic reductions Focus on Swiss-wide CO2 emissions reduction efforts 
Emission standards housing Introduction of emissions standards in the housing 
sector 
Federal funding adaptation Federal funding of adaptation 
Federal funding mitigation Federal funding of mitigation 
< 20% target Less than 20% CO2 emissions reduction target 
No CO2 act No CO2 Act at all 
No revision No revision of the CO2 act 
Partial reduction targets Partial reduction targets for different GHG 
Sectoral reduction targets Sectoral reduction targets  
Subsidiary carbon tax Carbon tax shall be a subsidiary instrument only 
Voluntary instruments Focus on voluntary instruments  
Voluntary targets Voluntary targets for the industry  
Ambitious climate policy More ambitious climate policy 
Internationally coordinated target Swiss target must be internationally coordinated 
Compensation Compensation of CO2 emissions instead of tax 
Emission standards transport Emissions standards in the transport sector  
Carbon tax contested Carbon tax is contested 
Reduction flexibility More flexibility with respect to CO2 emission reduction 
measures 
Exemption carbon tax More exemptions from carbon tax 
High standard CDM CDMs should have a higher standard 
Tax incentives Tax incentives to reduce CO2 emissions 
 
  
 195 
Appendix 2: List of Interest Groups and Coding 
ACTOR FULL NAME FOCUS CAPLAB LIBTRAD AMBI 
ACS Automobil Club der Schweiz traffic mat cap trad 
ADER Association pour le 
Développement des Energies 
Renouvelables 
env-renew postmat ambi open 
AEE Agentur für erneuerbare 
Energien und Energieeffizienz 
env-renew postmat cap open 
AEFU Ärztinnen und Ärzte für 
Umweltschutz 
env-renew postmat lab open 
AGVS Auto Gewerbe Verband Schweiz traffic mat cap open 
AIHK Aargauische Industrie- und 
Handelskammer 
economy mat cap ambi 
ALLS Alliance Sud civil postmat lab open 
ALP Alpen-Initiative env-renew postmat ambi trad 
ALU Aluminium-Verband Schweiz economy mat cap open 
AQUA AQUA NOSTRA Schweiz env-renew postmat ambi trad 
ASTAG Schweizerischer 
Nutzfahrzeugeverband 
traffic mat cap open 
ATE Arbeitskreis Tourismus & 
Entwicklung 
civil postmat lab open 
AUTO auto-schweiz, Vereinigung 
Schweizer Automobil-
Importeure 
traffic mat cap open 
AVES Aktion für vernünftige 
Energiepolitik Schweiz 
energy mat cap trad 
BAU bauenschweiz Dachorganisation 
der Schweizer Bauwirtschaft 
building mat cap trad 
BFA Brot für alle env-renew postmat cap open 
BMEI Schweizerischer 
Baumeisterverband 
building mat lab trad 
CARGO Cargo Forum Schweiz traffic mat cap open 
CEM cemsuisse - Verband der 
schweizerischen 
Cementindustrie 
building mat cap trad 
ECON economiesuisse economy mat cap open 
ECOS Eco Swiss Umweltorganisation 
der Wirtschaft 
energy mat cap trad 
EMOD Energiemodell Zürich env-renew postmat cap open 
EV Erdöl-Vereinigung energy mat cap open 
Energieforum Energieforum Schweiz energy mat cap open 
FER Fédération des Entreprises 
Romandes 
economy mat cap open 
FFU Fach Frauen Umwelt env-renew postmat lab open 
FH Verband der Schweizerischen 
Uhrenindustrie 
economy mat cap open 
FME Forum Medizin und Energie energy mat cap trad 
FRC Fédération romande des 
consommateurs 
civil ambi ambi ambi 
FROM FROMARTE Die Schweizer 
Käsespezialisten 
agri-forst mat cap trad 
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FRS strasseschweiz traffic mat cap trad 
FVPL La Fédération Vaudoise des 
Producteurs de Légumes 
agri-forst mat lab trad 
FWS Fördergemeinschaft 
Wärmepumpen 
building mat cap open 
GLAS Vereinigung Schweizer 
Glasfabriken 
economy mat cap ambi 
GREEN Greenpeace Schweiz env-renew postmat lab open 
GVB Schweizerischer 
Gemeindeverband 
civil ambi ambi trad 
HENG Verein Holzenergie Schweiz env-renew mat cap trad 
HEV Hauseigentümerverband 
Schweiz (HEV) 
building mat cap trad 
HKB Handelskammer beider Basel economy mat cap open 
HOLZ Holzindustrie Schweiz economy mat cap trad 
HOTEL Schweizer Hotelier-Verein 
hotelleriesuisse 
economy mat cap open 
IGEB Interessensgemeinschaft 
energieintensiver Branchen 
energy mat cap open 
IGWV IG Wirtschaft und Verkehr traffic mat cap trad 
ISOL Verband Schweizerischer 
Isolierfirmen 
building mat cap open 
KLIA Allianz für eine 
verantwortungsvolle 
Klimapolitik 
env-renew postmat ambi open 
KLIS KlimaBündnis-Städte Schweiz env-renew postmat ambi open 
KMU KMU Forum economy mat cap ambi 
KSE Konferenz Steine und Erden economy mat cap ambi 
LIGN Lignum Holzwirtschaft Schweiz agri-forst mat cap open 
LITRA Informationsdienst für den 
öffentlichen Verkehr 
traffic mat cap open 
NFS Naturfreunde Schweiz agri-forst ambi lab trad 
NOE noé 21 économie, énergie et 
sociéte 
env-renew postmat ambi open 
OEBU Netz für nachhaltiges 
Wirtschaften 
env-renew postmat lab open 
OEKU Oekumenische 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kirche und 
Umwelt 
env-renew postmat lab open 
PAT Centre Patronal economy mat cap trad 
PRON Pro Natura env-renew postmat lab open 
PUSH Stiftung Praktischer 
Umweltschutz 
env-renew postmat lab ambi 
SAB Schweizerische 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die 
Berggebiete 
economy mat cap trad 
SBV Schweizerischer Bauernverband agri-forst mat cap trad 
SEK Schweizerischer Evangelischer 
Kirchenbund 
civil postmat ambi ambi 
SELEC swisselectric energy mat cap open 
SES Schweizerische Energiestiftung env-renew postmat lab open 
SEV Schweizerischer Eisenbahn- und 
Verkehrspersonal-Verband 
traffic mat lab open 
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SFV Schweizerischer Forstverein agri-forst postmat ambi open 
SGB Schweizerischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund 
civil postmat lab trad 
SGCI Chemie Pharma Schweiz economy mat cap open 
SGV Schweizerischer 
Gewerbeverband, 
Dachorganisation der Schweizer 
KMU 
economy mat cap ambi 
SIA Schweizerischer Ingenieur- und 
Architektenverein 
building mat cap trad 
SKF Schweizerischer Katholischer 
Frauenbund 
civil postmat lab open 
SKS Stiftung Konsumentenschutz civil ambi ambi ambi 
SMEM Swissmem economy mat cap open 
SMU Arbeitgeberverband 
Schweizerische Metall-Union 
economy mat cap open 
SMV Schweizerischer Mieterinnen- 
und Mieterverband 
civil ambi lab trad 
SOIL swissoil energy mat cap open 
SOLAR Schweizerischer Fachverband 
für Sonnenenergie 
env-renew mat cap open 
SSES Schweizerische Vereinigung für 
Sonnenenergie 
env-renew postmat lab open 
STEC Schweizerisch-Liechtensteiner 
Gebäudetechnikverband 
building mat cap open 
STV Schweizerischer 
Tourismusverband 
economy mat cap open 
SVB Schweizerischer Städteverband civil ambi ambi open 
SVU Schweizerischer Verband der 
Umweltfachleute 
env-renew postmat lab open 
SVV Schweizerischer 
Versicherungsverband 
economy mat cap open 
SWV Schweizerischer 
Wasserwirtschaftsverband 
economy mat cap open 
TCS Touring Club Schweiz economy mat cap trad 
TRAV Travaille.Suisse civil mat cap open 
TVS Textil Verband Schweiz economy mat cap open 
USIC Schweizerischer Vereinigung 
Beratender 
Ingenieurunternehmungen 
economy mat lab trad 
VCS Verkehrsclub Schweiz economy mat cap open 
VELO Pro Velo Schweiz traffic postmat lab open 
VOEV Verband öffentlicher Verkehr traffic postmat lab open 
VPE Verband der 
Personalvertretungen der 
Schweizerischen 
Elektrizitätswirtschaft 
traffic mat cap trad 
VSE Verband der Schweizerischen 
Elektrizitätsunternehmen 
energy mat lab open 
VSFU Verband der Schweizerischen 
Forstunternehmungen 
agri-forst mat cap trad 
VSG Verband der Schweizerischen 
Gasindustrie 
energy mat cap open 
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VSIG VSIG Handel Schweiz economy mat cap open 
VSMR Verband Stahl-, Metall- und 
Papier-Recycling Schweiz 
economy postmat cap open 
VSZ Verband Schweizerischer 
Ziegelindustrie 
economy mat cap trad 
VTS Verband Textilpflege Schweiz economy mat cap trad 
WWF WWF Schweiz env-renew postmat lab open 
WWS Waldwirtschaft Schweiz agri-forst mat cap trad 
ZPK Verband der Schw. Zellstoff-, 
Papier- und Kartonindustrie 
economy mat cap open 
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Appendix 3: Overview on Variables and Data Sources 
VARIABLE 
TYPE 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
EXPLANATION DATA SOURCE RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Policy 
preferences  
Tie in the discourse network that 
reflects whether an interest 
group supports a policy 
preference 
Discourse 
network 
based on 
2009 Public 
Consultation 
Bipartite 
ERGM 
 Core 
contestations 
Positions towards contestation 
identified in the consultation 
(position towards the flexibility of 
reduction measure and a carbon 
levy on fuels)  
2009 Public 
Consultation 
summary 
report 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Chi-square 
test 
DYAD-
DEPENDENT 
COVARIATES 
Left vs. Right 
Cleavage 
Number of adopted climate 
change mitigation policies in 
period t 
Official 
documents 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Chi-square 
test 
Bipartite 
ERGM 
 Liberal vs. 
Traditional 
Cleavage  
Average vulnerability of country 
towards climate change risk in 
period t 
Official 
documents 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Chi-square 
test 
Bipartite 
ERGM 
 Pro Economy 
vs. Pro Ecology 
Average absolute emissions 
(ktCO2 e, logged) in period t 
Official 
documents 
Ingold 
Control 
variable 
 Policy Niche  Average rents from coal, oil, and 
natural gas production (% GDP) 
in period t 
Official 
documents 
 
Control 
variable 
NETWORK 
RELATIONS 
Edges This baseline parameter models 
the density of the network and 
expresses the balance between 
creating and deleting ties. 
Network 
Statistic 
Control 
 2-Star Interest 
Group & 
Alternating Star 
Interest Group  
This model term captures the 
‘activity’ of interest groups in 
terms of supporting different 
policy positions. I included a 2-
star model term based on Markov 
dependence (two ties are 
conditionally independent unless 
they share a tie and an alternating 
star parameter. While the Markov 
terms capture the overall activity 
of actors better, the alternating 
star parameter is superior in 
modelling the spread of the 
activity. A positive Markov term 
combined with a negative 
alternating star parameter 
implies a relatively equal 
distribution of activity among 
interest groups across the 
Network 
Statistic 
Control 
200 
networks with a small number of 
highly active interest groups.  
 
 2-Star 
Preference & 
Alternating Star 
Preferences 
This model term captures the 
popularity of policy positions. 
Analogous to the interest group 
activity terms, I included both a 
2-star Markov term and an 
alternating star parameter term. 
While the Markov terms captures 
the overall popularity of policy 
positions, the alternating star 
parameter models the spread of 
popularity across policy 
positions. A positive Markov term 
in combination with a negative 
alternating star parameter 
indicates a relatively equal 
distribution of popularity of 
policy positions across the 
networks with a small number of 
high degree policy positions. This 
reflects a tendency to support 
policy positions that are 
supported by many others. In the 
network literature, this effect is 
usually referred to as preferential 
attachment or degree 
assortativity (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). 
Network 
Statistic 
Control 
 Clustering 
Interest Group 
This dependence term is the 
bipartite version of network 
closure (Wang 2013) based on 
actor activity. Network closure 
here reflects whether interest 
groups tend to share the same 
policy positions. Hence, a 
significant and positive 
parameter estimate points to a 
tendency of two interest groups 
to have more than one policy 
position in common. 
Network 
Statistic 
Control 
 Clustering  
Preferences 
2-path: This dependence term is 
the bipartite version of network 
closure based on the popularity 
of policy positions. Network 
closure here reflects whether 
policy positions tend to be 
supported by the same actors. 
Hence, a significant and positive 
parameter estimate points to a 
tendency of two policy positions 
to have more than one interest 
group in common. 
Network 
Statistic 
Control 
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Appendix 4: Goodness of Fit 
PARAMETER COUNT MEAN SD T-RATIO 
XEDGE 783 785,454 97,868 -0,025 
XSTAR2A 2973 2940,862 711,564 0,045 
XSTAR2B 16037 15536,558 4995,242 0,1 
XSTAR3A 7306 7029,088 2469,936 0,112 
XSTAR3B 270797 244185,905 127631,949 0,208 
X3PATH 241217 241208,421 101967,671 0 
X4CYCLE 29927 26866,199 15910,563 0,192 
XECA 421138 404325,77 271338,927 0,062 
XECB 2971255 2674721,45 2050225,7 0,145 
ISOLATESXA 0 0,126 0,363 -0,347 
ISOLATESXB 0 0 0 NaN 
XASA 1168,1488 1171,4956 191,715 -0,017 
XASB 1448,1259 1452,9841 196,354 -0,025 
XACA 570,0527 581,1365 32,014 -0,346 
XACB 7440,4863 7527,9877 1117,246 -0,078 
XAECA 117147,58 105938,999 63441,951 0,177 
XAECB 119633,42 107433,865 63629,974 0,192 
UMBRELLA_XEDGEA 105 108,65 14,871 -0,245 
UMBRELLA_XEDGEB 0 0 0 NaN 
UMBRELLA_X2STARA010 383 409,328 107,675 -0,245 
UMBRELLA_X2STARB010 0 0 0 NaN 
UMBRELLA_X2STARA100 0 0 0 NaN 
UMBRELLA_X2STARB100 4238 4019,169 1330,568 0,164 
UMBRELLA_X2STARA101 0 0 0 NaN 
UMBRELLA_X2STARB101 286 275,925 98,76 0,102 
UMBRELLA_X4CYCLEA1 7907 6749,641 4230,538 0,274 
UMBRELLA_X4CYCLEB1 0 0 0 NaN 
UMBRELLA_X4CYCLEA2 549 475,48 309,481 0,238 
UMBRELLA_X4CYCLEB2 0 0 0 NaN 
UMBRELLA_XEDGEAB 0 0 0 NaN 
NICHE_X2STARAMATCH 3536 3471,45 1052,578 0,061 
NICHE_X2STARBMATCH 2973 2940,862 711,564 0,045 
NICHE_X2STARAMISMATCH 12501 12065,108 3954,893 0,11 
NICHE_X2STARBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
NICHE_X4CYCLEAMATCH 7993 7232,303 3996,92 0,19 
NICHE_X4CYCLEBMATCH 29927 26866,199 15910,563 0,192 
NICHE_X4CYCLEAMISMATCH 21934 19633,896 11967,114 0,192 
NICHE_X4CYCLEBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
NICHE_XEDGEMATCHAB 0 0 0 NaN 
NICHE_XEDGEMISMATCHAB 3060 3062,454 97,868 -0,025 
ECONECOL_X2STARAMATCH 8669 8376,207 2666,653 0,11 
ECONECOL_X2STARBMATCH 2973 2940,862 711,564 0,045 
ECONECOL_X2STARAMISMATCH 7368 7160,351 2348,588 0,088 
ECONECOL_X2STARBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
ECONECOL_X4CYCLEAMATCH 17127 15116,126 8782,629 0,229 
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ECONECOL_X4CYCLEBMATCH 29927 26866,199 15910,563 0,192 
ECONECOL_X4CYCLEAMISMATCH 12800 11750,073 7192,978 0,146 
ECONECOL_X4CYCLEBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
ECONECOL_XEDGEMATCHAB 0 0 0 NaN 
ECONECOL_XEDGEMISMATCHAB 3060 3062,454 97,868 -0,025 
CAPLAB_X2STARAMATCH 7847 7578,219 2428,149 0,111 
CAPLAB_X2STARAMISMATCH 8190 7958,339 2583,68 0,09 
CAPLAB_X2STARBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
CAPLAB_X4CYCLEAMATCH 14961 13282,318 7786,156 0,216 
CAPLAB_X4CYCLEBMATCH 29927 26866,199 15910,563 0,192 
CAPLAB_X4CYCLEAMISMATCH 14966 13583,881 8181,882 0,169 
CAPLAB_X4CYCLEBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
CAPLAB_XEDGEMATCHAB 0 0 0 NaN 
CAPLAB_XEDGEMISMATCHAB 3060 3062,454 97,868 -0,025 
OPTRAD_X2STARAMATCH 8382 8133,713 2635,548 0,094 
OPTRAD_X2STARBMATCH 2973 2940,862 711,564 0,045 
OPTRAD_X2STARAMISMATCH 7655 7402,845 2381,96 0,106 
OPTRAD_X2STARBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
OPTRAD_X4CYCLEAMATCH 16394 14975,221 8894,231 0,16 
OPTRAD_X4CYCLEBMATCH 29927 26866,199 15910,563 0,192 
OPTRAD_X4CYCLEAMISMATCH 13533 11890,978 7093,789 0,231 
OPTRAD_X4CYCLEBMISMATCH 0 0 0 NaN 
OPTRAD_XEDGEMATCHAB 0 0 0 NaN 
OPTRAD_XEDGEMISMATCHAB 3060 3062,454 97,868 -0,025 
STDDEV_DEGREEX_A 2,6669 2,2717 0,189 2,085 
SKEW_DEGREEX_A -0,117 -0,2677 0,274 0,551 
STDDEV_DEGREEX_B 20,6954 18,8754 4,707 0,387 
SKEW_DEGREEX_B 0,8118 0,2816 0,238 2,223 
CLUSTERINGX 0,4963 0,4108 0,085 1,01 
MAHALANOBIS DISTANCE = -2036003 
  
MAXIMUM QASI-AUTOCORRELATION IN ABSOLUTE VALUE = ∞ 
 
 
